Agreement and Disagreement: A Study of Speech Acts in Discourse and ESL/EFL Materials by Pearson, Eloise
OCCASIONAL PAPER # 5  
1985 
AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT: A STUDY 
OF SPEECH ACTS IN DISCOURSE AND 
ESL/EFL MATERIALS 
Eloise Pearson 
iii 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose was t o  formulate a description of the speech ac t  
agreementldisagreement and the rules  of use under which i t  occurs i n  
nat ive speaker conversation. This was done by surrept i t iously recording 
na tura l  conversation, transcribing it and examining it for  agreement1 
disagreement. It w a s  found tha t  i t  occurred only as a response re la ted 
t o  a pr ior  i n i t i a t i o n  move and i t  occurred on a sca le  of poli teness 
from the most po l i t e  forms of agreement to  the l e a s t  po l i t e  forms of 
disagreement. The description was compared t o  two ESL/EFL textbooks 
t o  determine the degree to which the presentation matched tha t  of native 
speaker use. The r e su l t  was tha t  the textbooks presented formulaic 
expressions which occurred infrequently in conversations among native 
speakers. 
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PREFACE 
I have taught i n  countries where teaching students how t o  agree 
and disagree with foreigners for  the purpose of business negotiations 
is of prime importance. I was aware of the importance of t h i s  speech 
<-/- ^ /1 ! . I !  
act,,?Wy chairman suggested describing a speech ac t  a s  par t  of my 
thes i s ,  and agreementldisagreement seemed the natural  choice. 
Anything of value to  the ESL f i e l d  which might be found i n  t h i s  
t hes i s  is the  r e s u l t  of the t ra in ing  I have received from a l l  of the 
professors i n  the Department of English a s  a Second Language a t  the 
University of Hawaii. I especially owe a debt of grati tude t o  my 
chairman, D r .  J. Richards, f o r  h i s  endless paitence, encouragement and 
guidance, and for  the many f r u i t f u l  ideas he suggested throughout the 
study. He is responsible for  suggesting that  'Opines' ra ther  than 
'Reportatives' may be the pr ior  i n i t i a t i o n  move to  which agreement1 
disagreement can occur a s  responses. To D r .  M. Long I owe my love for  
research, and my f a i t h  i n  r ig id  empirical research as  the only sound 
method of supplying answers to  the many questions about how language 
is used. To D r .  R. Schmidt I owe my love of natural ly  occurring 
language which always e x i s t s  within sociolinguistic contexts. 
In  addit ion I owe a debt of grati tude t o  my family, Mrs. R. H. 
Pearson and t o  the  many friends a l l  over the  world who gave me such 
tremendous support and encouragement. To a l l  of them I dedicate t h i s  
thesis .  
CHAPTER I 
IHTRODUCTION: HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
For the last several years the field of English as a Second1"Freign 
Language has seen a considerable expansion in the number of functionally 
based pedagogical materials. The communicative properties of language 
in use have assumed prime importance with 'communicative competence' 
as the teaching slogan of the day. 
The research described in this thesis is an empirically based 
investigation of the speech act agreement/disagreement. The goal of 
the study was to formulate a description of what constitutes agreement/ 
disagreement and to discover the rules of speaking within which it 
operates in native speaker conversation.' The findings are then applied 
to two conversation oriented notional functional ESL/EFL textbooks to 
determine the degree to which the presentation of this speech act 
correlates with its appearance in native speaker conversation. Chapter I 
provides some of the historical context from which notional functional 
materials arose. Chapter I1 outlines the literature and research 
relevant to this study. Chapter I11 describes the methods and procedures 
followed in carrying out the research. Chapter IV presents the results, 
discusses the findings and the relevance of those findings to the 
ESLIEFL classroom/learner. Chapter V makes a comparison of the findings 
of this study with two conversational notional functional ESLIEFL 
textbooks. 
Recent changes in the focus of linguistics have resulted in causing 
a virtual revolution in the approach to language taken by linguists 
and language educators alike. Structural linguists in the 1930's-50's 
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defined language as  "systematized combinations of sounds meaningful 
i n  a given cu l tura l  community and grammar a s  the s e t  of formal patterns 
in which words of a language a re  arzanged in order to  convey larger 
meanings" (Zarsh 1982:3). Analysis of these patterns proceeded from 
form (phonemes to  sentences) t o  meaning allowing the unique patterns of 
individual languages to  be described and contrasted. A t  the same time 
behaviorist psychology was in vogue with i ts  theory that language 
learning, l i k e  any other form of learning, was a s e t  of habi ts  which 
could be established through a mechanical habit  forming process. 
Language teachers turned t o  the s t ruc tura l  l inguis t s  for  a theory 
of language and t o  the behaviorist psychologists for  a theory of 
learning. Out of t h i s  union came the audio-lingual method with i ts  
s t r e s s  on teaching language as  it i s  spoken by native speakers (and 
hence the emphasis on the ora l /aura l  aspects of language i n  teaching), 
and its view tha t  language could be ident i f ied a s  a system of basic 
s t ructures  which could be broken down in to  a sequence, presented t o  the 
student and d r i l l ed  mechanically. 
Reibel comented that  what t h i s  meant was that w e  were taking the 
language behavior and the language knowledge t h a t  we aimed to  produce 
in our learners,  analyzing the l inguis t ic  components of the desired 
performance and isolat ing its units.  Then we were teaching the uni ts  
piece by piece so as  to  get back to the exact posit ion from which we 
s ta r ted  ( h i b e 1  1969). Wilklns adds t h a t  "the assumption seems to  be 
tha t  form and meaning are  in a one-to-me re la t ion ,  so tha t  the meaning 
to  be learned in association with a particular grammatical form would 
be self-evident'' (Wilkhs 1976:g). In  another a r t i c l e  he notes tha t  
there is no assurance that the student can work out how the grammatical 
t 
3 
system he has mechanically learned works i n  actual  communication. 
Additionally, the language taught the student and the language he needs 
a r e  often different .  Another problem, he points out,  is that  sentences 
of similar s t ructure  a r e  brought together in one unit  ra ther  than 
sentences t ha t  co-occur i n  r e a l  l i f e  so that s t ruc tura l ly  based.comses 
a r e  a r t i f i c i a l  i n t r i n s i ca l ly  even though they purport to  teach the 
language a s  it is spoken by native speakers (Wilkins 1975:17&-75). 
With the 1960's came Chomsky's Transformational Grammar and 
cr i t ic ism of structuralism and its psychological basis  a s  not merely 
inadequate but a s  misconceived. Concerning audio-lingualisn he said ,  
"Linguists have had t h e i r  share i n  perpetuating the myth that l inguis t ic  
behavior i s  'habitual '  and that a fixed stock of 'patterns '  is acquired 
through pract ice  and used a s  the basis  for  'analogy.' These views 
could be maintained only as  long a s  g r m t i c a l  description was 
suf f ic ien t ly  vague and imprecise. As soon a s  an attempt is made to  
give a careful  and precise account of the  ru les  of sentence formation, 
the ru l e s  of phonetic organization, or  the rules of sound-meaning 
correspondence in a language, the inadequacy of such an approach 
becomes apparent. 'What is more, the fundamental concepts of l inguis t ic  
description have been subjected t o  serious cri t ique" (Chomsky 1966:43-49). 
Although Chomsky viewed the learner as  a creative individual who 
learns in an abstract  way, and h i s  transformational grammar opened new 
avenues fo r  inquiry, his view of language was very narrow. "Linguistic 
theory is concerned primarily with an idea l  speaker- listener, in a 
completely homogeneous speech-community, who knows i ts  language 
perfectly and is unaffected by such grammatically i r re levant  conditions 
of memry l h i t a t i o n s ,  dis t ract ions ,  s h i f t s  of a t tent ion and in t e r e s t ,  
and e r rors  (random o r  charac te r i s t ic )  in applying h i s  knowledge of the 
language in actual  performance. This seems to  me to  have been the 
posit ion of the  founders of modern general l i ngu i s t i c s ,  and no cogent 
reason for  wdi fy ing  it has been offered'' (Chomsky 1965~3) .  
This view of language as  a well-defined system arrested in time 
dates back to  de Saussure and has been attacked by Jakobson and Halle, 
H o c h t t ,  F i r th  and others. Both F i r th  and Hockett contend that  such a 
narrow def ini t ion of language does not allow language to  be used a s  
~LI instrument f o r  human interact ion,  and Labov says: 
It is d i f f i c u l t  to  avoid the cownuon-sense conclusion 
tha t  the object  of l i ngu i s t i c s  must u l t h a t e l y  be the 
instrument of conununication used by the speech community; 
and i f  we are  not talking about tha t  language, there  is 
something t r i v i a l  in our proceedings (Labov 1970:33). 
I n  addition to  his narrow def ini t ion of language, Chomsky's 
f a i l u r e  t o  provide an expl ic i t  place f o r  socio-cultural features  in 
his def ini t ion of l h ~ g u i s t i c  competence has been attacked most notably 
by E p s  in 1971. Chomsky postulated that  l inguis t ic  theory is comprised 
of two parts: l i ngu i s t i c  competence, and l i ngu i s t i c  performance. 
'Linguistic competence' i s  the unconscious knowledge of the language 
s t ructure  which allows the ideal  speaker- listener to  produce and 
understand an i n f i n i t e  s e t  of sentences creatively.  'Linguistic 
performance' is concerned with the processes of encoding and decoding. 
Hymes contends that a view of competence must cover the overal l  
underlying knowledge and a b i l i t y  for  language use which the speaker- 
l i s t ene r  possesses, and he proposes four sectors  of comunicative 
competence. 
1) Whether something is foma l ly  possible (gramaaticality). 
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2) Whether something is feas ib le  i n  v i r tue  of the means of 
impleumitation available. 
3) Whether something is appropriate in re la t ion  to a context 
in which it is used and evaluated. 
4) Whether something is in f a c t  done, actual ly  performed, and 
what its doing en ta i l s .  (Hymes 1971) 
The concept of language had been expanded to  include not only 'usage' 
but 'use," and the concept of communicative competence became the 
ra l lying point and goal of k g u a g e  teaching. 
'The 1970's brought a new in t e re s t  in how language functions in 
interpersonal comunication. W i l k i n s '  book, Xotional Syllabuses, 
appeared in 1976. In  i t  "he attempted t o  out l ine  a theory of the  
communicative content of language which could be used a s  a basis  for  
elaborating a language teaching syllabus (Richards 1982). Ee conceived 
of a 'notional'  syllabus a s  consisting of three elements of meaning 
conveyed by an utterance: (1) the sen~antical/gramnatical i n  which the 
propositional meaning is expressed through "gramatical  systems in 
d i f fe ren t  languages'' (Wilkins 1976:21), (2) modality in which a t t i t udes  
and degrees of cer ta inty a r e  expressed through the use of modalverbs, 
intonation, etc.,  (3 )  categories of communicative function in which the 
. 
function of the utterance a s  a whole in the larger context in which it 
appears is expressed, i .e. ,  the social  purpose of the utterance. For 
W i l b s  a l l  three  elements were interwoven and there could be M 
separation of gramnar, meaning, and function. He s t a t e s  tha t  a 
'notional' syllabus begins with w h a t  it is tha t  the speaker c o ~ i c a t e s  
througn language ( l i i l b s  1976:18). 
Van Ek and the Council of Europe defined the organization of a 
syllabus in te rns  of s i tua t ions  in which a learner w i l l  use the 
language, i.e., the ro l e s  he w i l l  play, the  se t t ings  i n  which he w i l l  
play them, and the  topics  he w i l l  have t o  deal  with. Designation of 
the  learner and the  spec i f ic  aims he has f o r  learning the language a r e  
therefore deemed prerequis i te  fo r  the  design of a syllabus. After 
designating the  s i tua t ions  and the  language a c t i v i t i e s  which the  learner  
w i l l  be involved in, the 'functions' and 'notions' he w i l l  have t o  be 
sk i l l ed  in using can be i den t i f i ede3  After the  notions and functions 
a learner w i l l  probably use a r e  iden t i f i ed ,  the  ac tua l  language f o r m  
can be specified. Finally,  the  degree of s k i l l  the learner w i l l  need 
in order t o  perform must be s t ipulated in order t o  complete the  learner ' s  
objectives. Within each category, the  Council of Europe document 
provides a list of possible components from which the  objectives of the 
learner can be designated. 
There have been many cr i t ic isms of the notional functional 
approach, (cf. Brumfit 1981 and 1980, Paulston 1981, Widdowson 1973, 
1979 and 1981, Stra t ton 1977), most notably fo r  i ts  lack of an empirical 
data base and i ts  re l iance on native-speaker in tu i t ion  in the implementa- 
t ion  of a l l  phases of the  theory, Wilkins himself admitted in 1973 that 
"the framework adopted is largely ad hoc . . . and in the places where I 
have attempted t o  susgest some possible l i ngu i s t i c  rea l iza t ions  of the 
communicative functions, the  suggestions a r e  made on the basis  of 
introspection a d  not a s  the r e s u l t  of objective,  observational 
research" (Wil!Uns 1973:&2). 
There a r e  other problems a s  well.  For example, no universally 
accepted f i n i t e  list of functions o r  speech a c t s  e x i s t s ,  nei ther  speech 
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ac t s  nor functions are  adequately defined and, a s  ye t ,  there ex i s t s  no 
complete description of the rules  of speaking which a 'notional'  
syllabus claims t o  teach. 
Therefore, i f  a syllabus based on speech ac t s  o r  functions is 
being used, the teacher o r  materials wri ter  must re ly  on h i s  o r  her 
own in tu i t ion  in making decisions about what const i tutes  a par t icu la r  
function and what other functions it can and does co-occur with in 
actual  language use. 
W i l k i n s  advocates the use of "authentic language materials" in 
courses based on a 'notional'  syllabus t o  aid the learner in bridging 
"the gap between classroom knowledge and an effect ive capacity to  
par t ic ipate  in r e a l  language events" (Wilklns 1973:79). H e  goes on to  
say that  "the function of an individual utterance is of ten not deducible 
from its form but can only be discovered when the context in which it 
occurs is fu l ly  taken Into account and . . . tha t  there  a r e  recurrent,  
though not f ixed,  patterns of interact ion through language so tha t  
di f ferent  language functions may chain together i n  not unpredictable 
ways. These f a c t s  suggest tha t  in contrast  t o  sentence-level learning 
of a synthetic approach, learning based on a notional syllabus demands 
a l inguis t ic  context for  utterances t ha t  is larger  than the utterance 
and might well be founded on the typical  sequences of language functions 
tha t  recur in natural  language use. 
"It would seem to  follow tha t  the use of dialogues in teaching is 
f a r  more c ruc ia l  than is the case in synthetic approaches, tha t  such 
dialogues should be based much more closely on the kinds of l inguis t ic  
interaction tha t  take place in r e a l  language use and should not be 
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treated simply a s  ways of contextualizing particular grammatical 
structures" (Wilkins 1976:BO-81). 
Chapter I1 out l ines  the l i t erature  and past research on "the kinds 
of l i n g u i s t i c  interaction that take place in r e a l  language use'' 
(Wilkins 1976: 80-81). 
NOTES 
Conversation is defined a s  "any s t r e t ch  of t a l k  which involves 
two or  more speakers and in which what is said  is more or  l e s s  unprepared, 
and not overtly predetermined in terms of topic or  procedure" 
(Edmondson 1981:6). 
Pules of usage provide for  t he  way language is manifested, r u l e s  
of use provide fo r  the  way language is realized a s  a means of 
communication (Widdowson 1979:llb). 
The t e rn  'notion' has t o  do with the  relat ionship between the  
utterance and the world independent of the  people who use it, e.g., 
time, existence, e tc .  'Function' r e f e r s  t o  what people use language 
f o r  in reference t o  other people, e.g., an o f f e r ,  re fusa l ,  e tc .  
(Schachter 1981). 
W T E R  I1 
THE ANALYSIS OF SPOKEN DISCOURSE 
Spoken discourse has been examined and analyzed from many d i f fe ren t  
perspectives depending on the purpose of the analysis and the background 
of the analyst .  Sociologists, anthropologists, ethnomethodologists, 
pragmaticians, philosophers, sociol inguis ts ,  psycholinguists and 
discourse analysts a l l  "share a common in t e re s t  in how language actual ly  
functions, and a c o m n  belief that jus t  a s  there a r e  ru les  within the 
areas of language t rad i t iona l ly  studied by l inguis t s ,  so too there  a r e  
rules  in operation and grammars to  be writ ten t o  describe how language 
is used in face-to-face communication among human beings'' (Richards 
1980:414). 
This chapter w i l l  concentrate on reviewing the various methods of 
analysis  tha t  have been applied t o  language, especially spoken language, 
in order t o  form a background for  the research carr ied out in t h i s  
thesis .  It begins with an examination of Austin and Searle 's  account 
of Speech Act theory and then considers other theories and taxonomies 
of i l locutionary acts .  Following t h i s ,  some issues i n  pragmatics 
relevant to the  analysis of discourse w i l l  be discussed and, f i na l ly ,  
some of the methods which have been used in the analysis of larger un i t s  
of discourse w i l l  be examined. 
A. Speech A c t  Theory 
1. Austin 
It would appear t h a t  v i r t ua l ly  a l l  methods of analysis of 
verbal language must acknowledge a t  l ea s t  some debt to  speech ac t  theory 
since " l inguis t ics  res t r ic ted  i t s e l f  for  a generation to  a concentration 
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on form," leaving "the study of meaning to  l inguis t ic  philosophers'' 
(Coulthard 1977:11), In 1955, in a s e r i e s  of lectures delivered a t  
Harvard University, J. L. Austin observed tha t  "It was for  too long the 
assumption of philosophers that the business of a 'statement' can only 
be t o  'describe' some s t a t e  of a f f a i r s ,  o r  to  ' s t a t e  some f a c t , '  which 
it must do e i ther  t m l y  or  fa isely"  (Austin 1962:l). He then went on 
to describe a kind of utterance he named a 'performative' as  when 
ut ter ing "the sentence ( in ,  of course, the appropriate circumstances) 
is not t o  describe my doing of what I should be said b so ut ter ing 
to be doing or  to  s t a t e  tha t  I am doing it: it is t o  do it" (Austin 
1962:6). The utterance 'I name t h i s  ship the Queen Elizabetht- as 
uttered when smashing the bo t t l e  against the s te rn  const i tutes  the 
perfo-ce of an action,  and although i t  has the grammatical make-up 
of a statement, it is not an utterance which could be ' t rue '  or  ' f a l se '  
(Austin 1962:s). Austin thus makes a d i s t inc t ion  between a 'performative' 
which can be e i ther  'happy' o r  'unhappy' and a 'constative' (statement) 
which can 'be t rue  o r  fa lse .  
In succeeding lectures  he advanced the posit ion tha t  in saying 
anything one is performing some kind of act .  He  accomplished this by 
demonstrating that in fac t  a l l  utterances are  performative simply by 
analyzing them into a form 'I s t a t e  tha t  I + present simple act ive 
verb' (Austin 1962:62). J3e was then in a posit ion to  conclude that  i n  
ut ter ing something a speaker can be performing three simultaneous ac t s  
a t  once, a 'locutionary ac t '  which i s  the "performance of an a c t g  
saying something'' (Austin 1962:100), an ' i i l o c u t i o n a q  ac t '  which is the 
"performance of an a c t &  saying something" (Austin 1962:99), and a 
'perlocutionary ac t '  which is the perfo-ce of an ac t  such a s  when 
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"saying something w i l l  often,  o r  even normally, produce cer ta in  
consequential e f fec t s  upon the feel ings ,  thoughts, o r  actions of the 
audience, or  of the speaker, or  of other persons; and it may be done 
with the design, intention,  o r  purpose of producing them" (Austin 1962: 
101). 1 
According to  Austin, there  a r e  three ways in which i l locutionary 
a c t s  a r e  bound up with e f f ec t s ,  a l l  of which a re  d i f fe ren t  from the 
production of e f f ec t s  charac te r i s t ic  of the  perlocutionary act .  
1) "Unless a cer ta in  e f fec t  is achiwed, the i l locut ionary a c t  
w i l l  not have been happily, successfully performed." He c a l l s  
t h i s  "the securing of uptake" (Austin 1962:116-17). 
2) "The i l locutionary ac t  ' takes e f f ec t '  in cer ta in  ways, a s  
distinguished from producing consequences in the sense of 
bringing about s t a t e s  of a f f a i r s  in the normal way, i .e . ,  
changes in the natural  course of events." 
,* 3) . . . many il locutionary a c t s  i nv i t e  by convention a response 
o r  sequel" (Austin 1962: 117). 
A perlocutionary a c t  may be e i ther  an achievement of a 'perlocutionary 
object '  (e.g., a le r t ing)  or  may bring about a 'perlocutionary sequel' 
(e. g., alarming, in the case of the i l locutionary a c t  of warning). 
Edmondson has noted tha t  within Austin's theory "the notion of the 
perlocutionary ac t  is an b p l i c i t  recognition that  a speech ac t  has an 
interact ional  cmponent" (Edmondson 1981:ZO). But he c r i t i c i z e s  Austin 
for  confusing perlocutionary e f fec t  and perlocutionary intent  so t h a t  
the perlocutionary ac t  cannot be said  t o  be par t  kÂ a speech ac t  in the 
way that the locutionary and i l locutionary ac t s  are. Perlocutionary 
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intent  is indistinguishable from il locutionary in ten t  while the 
perlocutionary e f fec t  of an utterance cannot be considered par t  of the 
utterance (Edmondson 1981:20). 
Not working with r e a l  conversation, but with isolated invented 
sentences, Austin t i e s  the speaker's intentions t o  i l locutionary 
force. According to  Coulthard (1977:19), some discourse analysts,  e.g., 
Sacks, e t  a l . ,  would probably say tha t  the i l locutionary force of an 
utterance should be from the viewpoint of the hearer ra ther  than from 
tha t  of the speaker since the speaker's intention i s  not available for  
examination, while the  hearer's in terpreta t ion is evident from h i s  
response, and it is t h i s  response which d i rec t s  the progress of the 
interaction.  
Strawson observes tha t  a speaker has much more control  over the 
i l locutionary force than the perlocutionary. He agrees with Austin 
that  i l locutionary force is that  intended by the speaker, but he 
s t resses  tha t  "the speaker must f ind a means of making the intention 
clear"  (Strawson 1964:451).~ The use of an expl ic i t  perfonnative is 
the c learest  way to  convey a speaker's intention,  but it is also d i rec t  
and may not always be appropriate. 
Although Austin's work has aroused a great  deal of cr i t ic ism and 
. 
controversy, h i s  d i s t inc t ion  between locutionary, i l locutionary and 
perlocutionary ac t s  remains useful i n  any discussion of speech acts .  
a) Austin's Taxonomy of I l locutionary Acts 
Austin distinguishes f i ve  "very general classes" as  a basis 
for  discussion of speech ac t s  (Austin 1962:151) (cf. Appendix I ,  Table 1 ) .  
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1) Verdictives "consist of the delivering of a finding, o f f i c i a l  
or  unoff ic ia l ,  upon evidence or  reasons a s  to  value or  fac t ,  
so f a r  a s  these a r e  distinguishable" (Austin 1962:153). Some 
of h i s  examples include: grade, assess,  value, describe, 
analyze and estimate. 
2) Exercitives a r e  "the giving of a decision in favor of or  
asainst  a cer ta in  course of action,  or  advocacy of it. It is 
a decision that something is t o  be so, a s  d i s t i nc t  from a 
judgement tha t  i t  is so: it is advocacy tha t  it should be so, 
a s  opposed to  an estimate that it is so" (Austin 1962:155). 
Examples include: name, choose, advise, beg, d i r ec t ,  and enact. 
3 )  Commissiveshave a s  t he i r  whole point committing the speaker 
to  a cer ta in  course of action. Ee lists promise, contract ,  
undertake, intend and s h a l 1 . a ~  some examples. 
4 )  Behablatives "include the notion of reaction t o  other people's 
behavior and fortunes and of a t t i t udes  and expressions of 
a t t i t udes  to  someone e l se ' s  past conduct or  imminent conduct'' 
(Austin 1962:160). This c lass  includes apologize, thank, 
deplore, commiserate, welcome and curse among others. 
5)  Expositives "are used in ac t s  of exposition involving the 
expounding of views, the  conducting of argments ,  and the 
c lar i fying of usages and of references.'' Austin himself 
expresses some uneasiness about t h i s  c l a s s  saying tha t  "we may 
dispute a s  t o  whether these a r e  not verdict ive,  exerci t ive ,  
behabitive, or  commissive ac t s  as  well . . .; or  whether they 
a re  not s t ra igh t  descriptions of our feel ings ,  pract ice ,  etc." 
(Austin 1962:161). He lists analyze, argue, agree, and 
demur as  examples. 
2. Searle 
Building on the concepts A u s t i n  formulated, Searle has 
attempted to  d e t a i l  some of the m l e s  governing the e f fec t ive  use of 
cer ta in  speech acts .  In Speech Acts (1969), he hypothesized that 
"speaking a language i s  performing speech ac t s  such a s  making statements, 
giving commands, . . .; and more abstract ly ,  ac t s  such a s  re fe r r ing  and 
predicating; and, secondly, that  these ac t s  in general a r e  made possible 
by and a re  performed i n  accordance with cer ta in  rules  for  the use of 
l inguis t ic  elements'' (Searle 1969:16). He went on to  define a 'speech 
ac t '  a s  "the production or  issuance of a sentence taken under cer ta in  
conditions, and speech ac t s  a r e  the basic or  minimal un i t s  of l inguis t ic  
coufmmication" (Searle 1969: 17). He  believes tha t  ' any purely formal 
theory of language is necessarily incomplete without studying speech 
ac t sS3  and that  an analyt ic  t ru th  about language is that "whatever can 
be meant can be said" (Searle 1969:17). He claims then that  there  a r e  
a s e r i e s  of "analytic connections between the notion of speech ac t s ,  
w h a t  the speaker means, w h a t  the sentence uttered means, w h a t  the 
speaker intends, w h a t  the hearer understands, and w h a t  the rules  
governing the l i ngu i s t i c  elements are" (Searle 1969:Zl). 
Following Austin he maintains that  a speaker 7erforms three kinds 
of ac t s  in ut ter ing a sentence. 'Utterance ac t s '  a r e  simply ut ter ing 
s t r ings  of words. Instead of Austin's locutionary ac t ,  he proposes 
the 'propositional ac t '  which contains the  content of an utterance and 
hc ludes  the two subsidiary ac t s  of 1) ' referr ing '  to  someone or  
something, i .e . ,  identifying it f o r  the hearer,  and 2) 'predicating' 
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something about that  which has been referred.  Propositions a r e  always 
"expressed in the performance of an i l locutionary act"  (Searle 1969:29), 
and from t h i s  he can dist inguish two syntact ic  elements in a sentence, 
a 'propositional indicator '  and an ' i l locutionary force indicator '  
which indicates  " wha t  i l locutionary a c t ,  o r  function, the speaker is 
performing i n  the utterance'' (Searle 1969:30). He also accepts Austin's 
'perlocutionary a c t '  a s  "the consequences o r  e f f ec t s  such ac t s  have on 
the actions,  thoughts or  be l i e f s ,  e tc .  of hearers" (Searle 1969:25). 
For S a r l e ,  "saying somthing and meaning it a re  closely connected 
with intending to  produce cer ta in  e f f ec t s  on the hearertv4 (Searle 1969: 
48). When a speaker u t t e r s  a sentence and means i t ,  he w i l l  be intending 
(1) to  make the hearer aware of ce r t a in  s t a t e s  of a f f a i r s ,  (2) to make 
the hearer aware of these s t a t e s  of a f f a i r s  by get t ing h h  to  recognize 
t h i s  intention,  and (3) t o  make the hearer recognize t h i s  intent ion 
through h i s  knowledge of the rules  for  the sentence uttered.  I f  the  
hearer understands the sentence, these three intent ions  w i l l  have been 
realized. 
Before outl ining necessary and suf f ic ien t  conditions for  performing 
a happy ac t  of 'promising' he makes a d i s t inc t ion  between two types of 
facts .  Knowledge is the knowledge of 'brute fac t s , '  and "the concepts 
which make up the knowledge are  essen t ia l ly  physical, o r ,  in i ts  
dua l i s t ic  version, e i ther  physical o r  mental. . . . and the basis  for  
a l l  knowledge of t h i s  kind is generally supposed t o  be s b p l e  empirical 
observations recording sense experiences'' (Searle 1969:jO). The other 
type of f ac t  he enumerates a r e  ' i n s t i t u t i ona l  fac t s , '  about which he 
says "there is no s iaple  s e t  of statements about physical or  psychological 
properties of s t a t e s  of a f f a i r s  to  which the statements of f a c t s  such as  
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these are  reducible. . . . They a re  indeed facts ;  but the i r  existence, 
unlike the existence of brute f a c t s ,  presupposes the existence of cer ta in  
human insti tutions ' '  (Searle 1969:51). 
The necessary and suf f ic ien t  conditions he iden t i f ies  f o r  promising 
have been outlined by S c h i d t  and Richards a s  follows: 
-"Normal input and output conditions obtain,  i .e . ,  the speaker 
aad hearer a r e  not insane o r  play-acting, e tc .  
-A speaker expresses a sentence, the propositional content of 
which predicates a future  ac t  of the speaker. 
-The hearer would prefer the speaker's doing the ac t  t o  his not 
doing the a c t ,  and the speaker believes chis. Searle c a l l s  t h i s  
a preparatory condition. 
-It is not obvious to  both speaker and hearer that  the  speaker 
w i l l  do the a c t  in the n o w 1  course of events. (The second 
preparation condition.) 
-The speaker intends t o  do the ac t .  This is the i l locutionary 
point of promising, which Searle c a l l s  the s incer i ty  condition. 
-The speaker intends that the utterance of the sentence w i l l  place 
him under an obligation to  do the act .  This is cal led the 
essen t ia l  condition'' (Schmidt and Richards 1980:134). 
By extension, the psychological s t a t e  expressed in the performance 
of the i l locutionary ac t  is the ' s incer i ty  condition.' For ' a sser t , '  
' s t a t e '  o r  'affirm' this means that the speaker believes h i s  proposition 
to  be an expression of an actual  s t a t e  of a f f a i r s .  
The preparatory condition t e l l s  us w h a t  the speaker implies by 
the act .  There are  two parts  to  the preparatory condition: a )  the 
differences in the s t a tu s  o r  posit ion of the speaker and hearer in 
of the  proposition. 
The 'point '  o r  purpose of the  type of a c t  is  the  'essential' 
condition of performing an act .  For ' a sse r t ,  ' ' state' o r  'aff irm'  t h i s  
means tha t  the  proposition r ea l l y  does represent an ac tua l  state of 
a f f a i r s  backed by what is perceived t o  be evidence t o  t h a t  e f f e c t .  He 
is care fu l  t o  point out  that by ' i l locut ionary point '  o r  'purpose' he 
is not  t a lk ing  about 'perlocutionary in tent .  ' "For many, perhaps most, 
of t h e  important i l locut ionary a c t s ,  the re  is no e s s e n t i a l  per locut iouary 
i n t en t  associated by def in i t ion  with the corresponding verb* e.g., 
statements a r e  not  by def in i t ion  attempts t o  produce perlocutionary 
e f f e c t s  in hearers" (Searle 1976: 3). 
I n  developing a taxonomy of i l locut ionary a c t s  he s t a t e s  that 
t ' e s e n t i d  conditions form the  best  bas i s  f o r  a taxonmy" (Sear le  lg76:3), 
but he claims tha t  in addit ion t o  i l locut ionary point  o r  e s s e n t i a l  
conditions and the  s incer i ty  condition, t he  'd i rect ion of f i t  is a l s o  
m e  of the three  most important c r i t e r i a  around which he bu i lds  h i s  
taonomy. By d i rec t ion  of f i t  be indicates  t ha t  t h e  i l l o c u t i o n a q  
force  determines how the  Content of a P ~ O P O S ~ ~ ~ O ~  r e l a t e s  t o  t h e  world. 
m e n  the  words f i t  the  world a s  in S t a t m e n t s ~  descr ipt ions ,  a s s e r t i o n s p  
etc. ,  he c a l l s  it "word-to-world d i rec t ion  of f i t  ," but when t h e  words 
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determine the world, a s  in promises, requests, e t c . ,  he c a l l s  it 
"world-to-word direct ion of f i t "  (Searle 1976:4). 
In  addition to  these three c r i t e r i a  outlined above he lists 
several  other dimensions a s  c r i t e r i a  for  c lass i f icat ion.  i )  Differences 
in the force,  strength,  or  comdtment with which the i l locutionary 
point is presented. i i )  Differences according to  how the utterance 
r e l a t e s  to  the r e s t  of the discourse. i i i )  Differences in how the 
i l locutionary force- indicating devices determine propositional content. 
i v )  Dffferences between a c t s  which must be speech ac t s  (verbally 
performed) and those which can be, but do not need t o  be. v) Differences 
between ac t s  which require the speaker and hearer to  be members of an 
extra- linguistic i n s t i t u t i on  for  t he i r  performance and those which 
don't. v i )  Differences in ac t s  which a r e  due to  the  i l locutionary 
verb having a perfonnative use and those where it does not. 
v i i )  Differences i n  the s t y l e  of performance of the i l locutionary ac t  
(Searle 1976:s-7). 
He out l ines  s i x  problems with Austin's taxonomy of i l locutionary 
acts.  1) A confusion between verbs and ac t s ,  2 )  not a l l  the  verbs 
a r e  i l locutionary verbs, 3)  too much overlap of the categories,  4 )  too 
much heterogeneity within the categories, 5) nany of the verbs within 
the categories don't s a t i s fy  the def ini t ion for  tha t  category, and 
6) most importantly, no consistent principle of c lass i f ica t ion  exis ts .  
Searle, along d t h  Austin, is responsible for  providing a framework 
for  a theory of speech acts.  Sear le ' s  taxonomy of i l locutionary ac t s  
is the most important of any of the taxonomies. It is outlined a s  
follows. 
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a )  Sear le ' s  Taxonomy of I l locutionary Acts 
Searle lists f ive  basic categories and one subcategory (cf.  
Appendix I ,  Table 1) .  
Representatives "commit the speaker ( i n  varying degrees) to  
something's being the case, t o  the  t r u t h  of the expressed proposition'' 
(Searle 1976:lO). The direct ion of f i t  is 'words t o  the world,' and 
the s incer i ty  condition is 'bel ief . '  The degree of bel ief  and 
commitment var ies  along a continumu, in Searle 's  words "they a re  
determinable ra ther  than determinates'' (Searle 1976:lO). True and f a l s e  
a r e  on opposite ends of the same dimension of assessment. A 
representative can be tes ted by whether or  not it can be characterized 
as  t rue  or  fa l se .  Syntactically,  the deep s t ructure  of a paradigm 
representative sentence is: 
I verb ( tha t )  + S 
I predict  he w i l l  come 
Examples include: s t a t e ,  a s se r t ,  claim, say, deny. 
Directives "are attempts (of varying degrees, and hence, more 
precisely,  they are  determinates of the determinable which includes 
attempting) by the speaker t o  get the hearer to do something" (Searle 
1976:ll). The direct ion of f i t  is world-to-words, and the s incer i ty  
condition is 'desire. '  The proposit ional content is always that  the  
hearer does some future action. Syntactically,  the  deep structure of a 
paradigm direct ive sentence is: 
I verb you + you Fut Vol Verb (ID) (Mv) 
I order you to leave 
kamples include: ask, order,  request, i nv i t e ,  advise. 
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C o d s s i v e s  ''CODTXL~ the speaker ( in  varying degrees) to  some 
future course of action'*5 (Searle 1976:ll). The direction of f i t  is 
world-to-words, and the s incer i ty  condition is 'intention. '  The 
propositional content is always that the speaker does some future  action. 
Syntactically the deep s t ructure  of a paradim commissive sentence is: 
I verb (you) + I Fut Vol Verb (W) (Adv) 
I promise t o  pay you the money. 
hamples include: pledge, promise. 
Expressives "express .the psychological s t a t e  specified in the 
s incer i ty  condition about a s t a t e  of a f f a i r s  specified in the propositional 
content" (Searle 1976:lZ). There i s  no direct ion of f i t  but the t ru th  
of the expressed proposition is presupposed. Syntactically,  the deep 
s t ructure  of a paradigm expressive sentence is: 
I verb you + I/you VT - Gerundive Nom. 
I apologize for  stepping on your toe. 
m l e s  include: thank, congratulate, apologize. 
Declarations, successfully perfomed, "bring about the correspondence 
between the propositional content and r ea l i t y"  (Searle 1976:13). 
Declarations cause an al ternat ion in the s t a tu s  or  condition of the 
referred- to object only because the declarative has been performed. 
. 
This c lass  is closest  t o  h s t h ' s  'performatives' and Searle acknowledges 
t h i s  saying tha t  Austin realized tha t  making a statement was "as much 
performing an i l locutionary ac t  a s  making a promise. Any utterance w i l l  
consist i n  perforning one or  more i l locutionary acts"  (Searle 1976:13). 
Syntactically the deep s t ructures  of the three most hpor t an t  c lasses  of 
paradigm declarative sentences are: 
1) I verb ?PI + XPl be pred. 
I appoint you chairman. 
2)  I declare + S. 
I declare the meeting is adjourned. 
3)  I verb (NF). 
I f i r e  you. 
Examples include: pronounce, appoint, declare,  resign, excmun ica t e ,  
define, name, dub. k a subclass of Declarations he formulates 
Representative Declarations which d i f f e r  from the other declarations 
in that they share with representatives a s incer i ty  condition. In  some 
in s t i t u t i ona l  s i tua t ions  f a c t s  a r e  not only ascertained, but an 
authority is  needed to  decide (and declare that decision) as  to  what 
those f a c t s  a r e  a f t e r  they have been ascertained. A person who nominates 
another cannot l i e  in perfonning the i l locutionary act .  The direct ion 
of f i t  is both ways (one f o r  declarations and the other f o r  representa- 
t ives)  and the s incer i ty  condition is 'bel ief . '  Syntactically,  the 
deep s t ructure  for  t h i s  subclass is: 
I verb NFl + XPl be pred. 
I c a l l  him a liar. 
Examples include: describe, diagnose, ca l l .  Usually verbs i n  t h i s  
subclass a r e  in the indicat ive forms character is t ic  of representatives. 
H e  is a l i a r .  
So Searle concludes that  there a r e  two syntact ical  Â£0 fo r  
representatives; one which focuses on the propositional content, the 
other on the object referred .to. 
There have been m y  cr i t ic isms of Searle 's  theories and 
subsequent taxonomy of i l locutionary acts.  Gnly a few which are  relevant 
t o  the  present study w i l l  be mentioned here. 
Levinson (1980) maintains t h a t  "Searle's systemization is 
responsible fo r  the  loss  of some of the  soc ia l  and in te rac t iona l  
ins ights  t o  be found in Austin's work'' (Levinson 1980:7). The f a c t  
t ha t  Searle considered only the paradigm cases while "in the empirical 
investigation of conversational behavior we seldom come across the  
paradigm cases ( i f  indeed we ever do)'' is a c r i t i c i sm raised by 
Edmndson (198l:Zl). He goes on by saying that Sear1e1s evidence fo r  
h i s  characterization of 'promising' is native-speaker in tu i t ion .  
bncerning the  propositional content ru l e ,  he asks "how and i n  what 
sense a proposition P is expressed in an utterance T" (Edmondson 1981:Zl). 
The preparatory r u l e  cannot be anything but weak because the  hearer 's  
preference and the  speaker's be l i e f s  cannot be inspected except fo r  
w h a t  we  can deduce from the discourse i t s e l f .  He notes t ha t  following 
Gricean co-operative pr inciples  (cf. p. 33) we assume s incer i ty  so the  
s incer i ty  condition has no ident i ty .  The essen t ia l  condition, he 
insists, is simply a dictionary def in i t ion  of the  notion, such a s  
'promising' (Edmondson 1981 : 21). 
Ee a t tacks  Sear le t s  assumption that h i s  c l a s s i f i ca t i on  of 
i l locut ionary a c t s  is a c l a s s i f i ca t i on  of the  basic things we do with 
language by using Gofhan's  (1971:177) example of the  "minimization" 
which usually follows an expression of thanks and includes such 
utterances a s  'not a t  a l l , '  'don't mention it ,' 'you're welcome. ' 
Where could Searle 's  c l a s s i f i ca t i on  place t h i s  type of a c t ?  Edmondson 
continues by saying that Sear le t s  f i ve  categories a re  "so broad tha t  
t h e i r  re lwance for  the analysis of spoken discourse is limited" 
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(Edmondson 1981:Zl). The reason for  this, he s t a t e s ,  i s  tha t  "what 
Searle characterizes and c l a s s i f i e s  a r e  not un i t s  of conversational 
behavior, but concepts evoked by a s e t  of l ex ica l  items in English- 
i l locutionary verbs" (Edmondson 1981:22). 
3. O t h e r  Taxonomies 
I n  addition t o  Austin's and Searle 's  major taxonomies, several 
others have been proposed. (Appendix I contains a tab le  of the seven 
d i f fe ren t  taxonomies discussed in t h i s  study. Searle 's  i s  l i s t e d  
f i r s t  a s  a basis  for  comparison.) 
0 ~ ' s  (1972) system provides many subcategories which 'mediate' 
between the few basic categories. He also provides for  conditionals 
claiming that they are  "amalgamated speech ac t s ,  joining an influencer 
and a conmissive" (Ohmam 1972:125). A description of t h i s  type 
allows a different  i l locutionary a c t  t o  be assigned t o  each component 
sentence of the compomd sentence (cf.  Appendix I, Table 1).  
Hancher (1979) drew on both Ohmam and Searle in formulating h i s  
c lass i f ica t ion  of i l locutionary acts .  He suggests that. in addition t o  
Searle 's  c lasses ,  there should be a 'couanissive direct ives '  c l a s s  which 
he says "have both comissive and d i rec t ive  force,  e.g., invi t ing,  
offer ing,  challenging. These a l l  look forward to some act  by the 
hearer which w i l l  respond t o  the or ig ina l  speech act." These he c a l l s  
precooperative i l locutionary ac t s  and they give " r i se  to  a cooperative 
i l locutionary ac t  involving more than one agent, such a s  a g i f t  
(whether goods o r  hosp i ta l i ty ) ,  a s a l e ,  a contract' ' (FIancher 1979:8). 
3e claims that  contracts,  marriages, and be ts  a r e  cooperative 
c ~ s s i v e s ,  while cooperative declarations a r e  such things as  g i f t s .  
25 
In 1974, Fraser proposed a taxonomy of 'vernacular perfonnative 
verbse6 The c r i t e r i a  he lists for  d i f fe ren t ia t ing  the classes a r e  the 
same a s  Searle 's  (cf .  pp. 20-22). Also, similarly to  Searle he claims 
t h a t  "the purpose of the speaker i n  performing the act" i s  the most 
important cri terium (Fraser 1974:142). He specif ies  t h i s  by saying 
t h a t  "the speaker i n  performing an i l locutionary ac t  has the intention 
of creating in the hearer an understanding of the speaker's posit ion 
towards the proposition expressed in the sentence" (Fraser 1974:143). 
Ee distinguishes e ight  c lasses  and breaks the c lass i f ica t ion  into  
twu par t s ,  the f i r s t  three c lasses  consist  of verbs which describe the 
world: asser t ing,  evaluating and verbs that r e f l e c t  the speaker's 
a t t i tude .  The second f ive  c lasses  a r e  of verbs which change the world 
in some way: s t ipulat ing,  requesting, suggesting, legit imatizing,  and 
committing (cf. Appendix I, Table 1). 
Recently Fraser (forthcoming) has proposed a revised system f o r  
the c lass i f ica t ion  of speech ac t s  which he s t a t e s  were "named by Austin 
(1962) as  i l locutionary acts"  (Fraser, forthcoming, 51). In  t h i s  
system, he divides the verbs into  classes according to  which of the 
four major a t t i tudes  the speaker is expressing toward the proposition. 
H e  claims that "what distinguishes each of these four a t t i t udes  is that  
once one is recognized a s  being the a t t i t ude  intended by the speaker, 
the speaker has successfully communicated to  the hearer" (Fraser. 
forthcoming, 53-54). To each a t t i t ude  he assigns a corresponding term 
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of c lass i f icat ion.  Each c lass  is fur ther  subclassified according to  
dif ferent  conditions placed on that a t t i tude  by the speaker. The four 
a t t i tudes  and class i f icat ions  a r e  a s  follows: 
RepresentativesIBelief. The speaker expresses h i s  belief tha t  the 
propositional content is true. Examples include a s s e r t ,  predict ,  agree, 
describe. Sub-species involve conditions about the reasons and basis 
for  the belief by the speaker. 
DirectivesIAttitude. The speaker expresses h i s  a t t i t ude  towards 
a future  action of the  hearer. F,xamples include plead, forbid,  suggest, 
order. There a r e  sub-species in this genus also.  
Comissives/Comitment. The speaker expresses his intentions 
about a future  action. Examples include guarantee, promise, o f f e r ,  
volunteer. 
EvaluativeslEvaluation. The speaker expresses regre t ,  sympathy, 
gladness, pleasure and gratitude. Examples include greet ,  thank, 
apologize, complbent. 
This revised taxonomy i s  more f ine ly  grained in t h a t  it demonstrates 
the broader more generalized categories of i l locutionary force and how 
these broader categories of w h a t  people do with h g u a g e  are  subdivided 
in to  increasingly f iner  shadings. Also, by characterizing an 
i l locutionary ac t  by defining it in terns  of the  a t t i t ude  which the 
speaker intends t o  express toward the propositional content, he can 
show t h a t  "each a t t i t ude  places some r e s t r i c t i ons  on the proposition 
about which the a t t i t ude  is held" (Fraser, forthcoming, 59) .  
Bach and Earnish (1979) presented more detailed def ini t ions  of the 
speaker's a t t i t udes  which place the most f inely grained r e s t r i c t i ons  
on a c lass i f ica t ion  of i l locutionary acts .  In  1957, Grice defined a 
' reflexive intention'  a s  "an intention tha t  is intended to  be recognized 
as  intended t o  be recognized'' (Grice 1957:382). Following Fraser (197k). 
Bach and Harnish r e s t r i c t  i l locutionary interitions to  those which are 
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f u l f i l l e d  when the hearer does nothing more than recognize those 
intentions,  and "the sor t  of ref lexive intention tha t  has t h i s  feature  
i s  that  of expressing an a t t i t ude ,  e.g., a bel ief  o r  desire" (Bach and 
Harnish 1 9 7 9 : ~ ) .  They present a 'Schema for  Speech Acts' which gives 
an account of how the hearer can ident i fy  what i s  said ,  and.fromthat 
"with mutual contextual be l ie fs ,  he can proceed to  the iden t i f ica t ion  
of the speaker's i l locutionary a c t ,  that  is, of what a t t i t ude  the 
speaker is intending" (Bach and Harnish 1979:m).' Their taxonomy is 
based on "the distinguishing keatures" of those a t t i tudes ,  i .e.,  the 
exact thing that the hearer m u s t  ident i fy  (Bach and Harnish 1979:40). 
A t  the highest l eve l  they ident i fy  f i ve  c lasses ,  Constatives, 
Directives, Comuissives, and Acknowledgements. These a r e  defined a s  
follows : 
Constatives. The speaker expresses the speaker's belief  and h i s  
intent ion or  desire  that the hearer have a similar be l ie f .  Examples 
include a s se r t ,  predict ,  report ,  c l a s s i fy ,  predicate, advise, conclude, 
agree, deny, accept, disagree, object ,  reply,  guess, assume. 
Directives. The speaker expresses h i s  a t t i t ude  toward some future  
action by the hearer and h i s  intention that his utterance be accepted 
by the hearer, a s  a reason for  the hearer's doing it. Examples 
include request, inquire,  demand, forbid,  allow, advise. 
C d s s i v e s .  The speaker expresses h i s  intention and belief tha t  
his utterance obligates him t o  some action. Examples include promise, 
offer.  
Acknowledgements. The speaker expresses h i s  feelings about the 
hearer o r  intends h i s  utterance to  s a t i s fy  a social  expectation and he 
believes t ha t  it does. Examples include apologize, condole, 
congratulate, greet ,  thank, bid,  accept, re jec t .  
Each of these f i v e  categories is fur ther  subdivided according to  
more refined conditions within the larger  category. For instance,  
under the larger  c l a s s  of constantives, the concessives, assentives,  
and dissentives " a l l  involve a presumption about the  contextual 
relevance of the expressed be l ie f .  A 'concessive' (e.g., 'agree')  
expresses a belief contrary t o  w h a t  (the speaker) would l i k e  t o  believe 
or  contrary t o  w h a t  he previously believed. . . . k s e n t i v e s  (e.g., 
'agree') and dissentives (e.g., 'disagree') presume tha t  a cer ta in  
claim has been made by (the hearer) o r  t h a t  someone's claim, not 
necessarily (the speaker's o r  the hearer 's)  i s  under discussion'' 
(Bach and Harnish 1979:45). 9 
Ballmer and Brennenstuhl (1981) claim that their work presents an 
"alternative t o  a l l  previously published class iÂ£icat ion of speech acts"  
(Ballmer and Brennenstuhl 1981:~) .  The aim "is t o  c lass i fy  speech ac t s  
by means of a c lass i f ica t ion  of speech ac t  verbs," which are  defined a s  
verbs "used t o  describe the content or  means of expression of l inguis t ic  
a c t i v i t i e s  l i k e  ' to  l i e , '  and ' to  discuss"' ( B a l h r  and Brennenstuhl 
1981:15).'~ They separate 'speech ac t  verbst from general verbs by 
using the folloving frame: 'Someone VP-past . . .' e.g., Alphonse 
declared 'I am huugry.' 'Declare' is a speech ac t  verb according to  
t he i r  def ini t ion because the sentence makes sense. Using a heur i s t ic  
method employing native-speaker in tu i t ion ,  they divided a l l  the speech 
act  verbs in to  semantic 'categories'  with some categories fur ther  
divided into  'phases.' These categories are combined into  models which 
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"from a heuris t ic  point of view the order of the categories displays 
the order of the main phases of a model ' x '  with verbal means" (Ballmer 
and Brennenstuhl 1981:23). For example, the 'Struggle Hodel' begins 
with a ' s t a r t i ng  s i tua t ion , '  which is followed by an i n i t i a t i o n  of the  
struggle by 'making claims' and then 'dissent. '  The r e a l  beginning of 
the struggle is the 'at tack'  which is followed by various ' t a c t i c a l  
phases.' Towards the end of the  struggle 'making coali t ions1 o r  
' re t reat ing '  occurs and the struggle r e su l t s  i n  a 'victory' fo r  one 
opponent and in 'defeat '  for  the  other ,  o r  in mutual 'willingness t o  
cooperate.' A model i s  therefore defined a s  "a s e w t i c a l  area 
structured by a s e t  of categories connected by appropriate orderings" 
(Ballmer and aremenstuhl 1981:26). 
Ballmer and Bremenstuhl 1981:32 c l a b  that the i r  c lass i f ica t ion  
"because it i s  based on the c lass i f ica t ion  of an exhaustive list of 
speech ac t  designating verbs, . . . accounts f u l l y  f o r  a l l  the 
poss ib i l i t i e s  of l i ngu i s t i c  behavior and does not neglect for  instance 
interactions and a large par t  of discourse behavior" (Ballmer and 
Bremenstuhl 1981:32). 
4 .  Some Criticisms of Speech Act Theory 
Levinson (1980) has made sane serious c r i t i c i sms  of Speech 
A c t  Theory. I n  f a c t  he goes so f a r  a s  t o  say that "there a r e  in f a c t  
some compelling reasons t o  think that speech ac t  t b o r y  may disappear 
in favor of much more complex multi-faceted pragmatic approaches to  the 
functions tha t  utterances perform" (Levinson 1980:lg). He claims t h i s  
for  several  reasons, one being tha t  it i s n ' t  possible to  assign a speech 
act function t o  an utterance because neither the  utterance un i t s  nor 
the speech ac t  uni ts  a r e  c lear ly  defined, "and the one is characterized 
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par t ly  in terms of the other" (Levinson 1980:20). He continues by 
saying tha t  even i f  we could assign speech ac t s  to  utterances i n  any 
way other than a r b i t r a r i l y ,  it s t i l l  would not t e l l  us anything about 
how conversations proceed since we now know t h a t  'conversational 
sequencing' cannot be s ta ted according t o  speech a c t  categories. H i s  
coaclusioa is tha t  the concept of the 'speech ac t '  w i l l  turn out t o  be 
a t rans i t iona l  concept which w i l l  give way to  "more sophisticated and 
a p i r i c a l l y  based theories of the ways in which w e  actual ly  communicate'' 
(Levinson 1980:21). 
Aa Edmondmn has pointed out (cf. p. ) Speech A c t  theory 
completely overlooks the interact ional  relationships b u i l t  in to  some 
of the  i l l ocu t imary  ac t s  described1' in the theory, e.g., Austin lists 
'agree' a s  an Expositive but doesn't achowledge the f ac t  tha t  it can 
only occur i n  re la t ion  with some other previous utterance. I n  addit ion,  
might not agreeldisagree equally qualify a s  a Behablative a s  a "notion 
of reaction to  other people's behavior . . . and of a t t i t udes  and 
e q r e s s i o n s  of a t t i tudes  t o  someone e l s e ' s  past conduct . . . 8 ,  
(Austin 1962:160), e-g. ,  
C31:23, 25 
D: Oh now t h a t ' s  stingy. 
A: Yeah tha t ' s  def in i te ly  stingy. 
Doesa't 'A' react  t o  another person's behavior and express an 
a t t i t ude  towards i t ?  Moreover, how would Austin c l a s s i fy  D ' s  
utterance: a s  a Verdictive, a 'describe, '  or  as  an Exercitive, a 
'name'? 
Searle also overlooks relationships between utterances when he 
discusses the three necessary conditions for  a speech a c t ,  although he 
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does r ea l i ze  the hportance of t ru th  for  the speaker of a proposition. 
As with Austin, where does A ' s  ut terance f i t  in Searle 's  system? Searle 
would probably place i t  a s  a Representative (cf.  p. 20) because the 
speaker appears t o  believe the content of h i s  u t t e r a c e ,  but can an 
evzluatfon l i k e  'stingy' be tes ted a s  being t rue  o r  fa l se?  According 
t o  whatlwho's sca le  of assessment, and according to  what c r i t e r i a  is 
the judgement made? Doesn't A ' s  utterance also express a psychological 
s t a t e  a s  i n  an Fxpressive? Searle makes a separate c lass  of Representa- 
t i v e  Declarations, a c lass  which i s  a subclass of Declarations i n  that 
it shares some conditions with Representatives (cf. p. 22). But no 
mention i s  made of a subclass of Representatives, which include some 
character is t ics  of Expressives. 
O b a a ~  recognizes 'amalgamated speech acts. '  !dancher recognizes 
that some types of speech ac t s  a r e  re la ted to  what occurs subsequent 
t o  the  i n i t i a l  utterance in h i s  "precooperative i l locutionary acts'' 
(cf .  p. 24), although such ac t s  re fe r  to  a c t s  as  sa les  and contracts. 
Fraser 's  1974 taxonomy f a i l s  t o  account for  verbs which occur 
only a s  responses t o  other speech ac t s  so 'agree' and ' s t a t e '  are  both 
l i s t e d  a s  'Verbs of Asserting.' And again, where would Fraser place 
the utterances i n  the previous example? Would they both be asser t ing,  
or  evaluating? Couldn't they also be a t t i t ude  i n  that both speakers 
a r e  showing the i r  atxitudes toward a s t a t e  of a f f a i r s ?  Es  forthcoming 
taxonomy does indicate f iner  shadings of speaker a t t i t ude  toward h i s  
proposition, but the same cr i t ic isms above still hold true. 
Bach and Harnish recognize the two par t  relationship required by 
some speech ac t s ,  e-g. ,  'assentives' and 'dissentives '  (cf .  p .  2 8 ) .  
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Again where would they c l a s s i fy  the  utterances i n  the previous example, 
a s  constatives (cf. p. 27)? I f  so,  do e i t he r  utterance express the  
s p e a k r ' s  " intention or  desi re  that the  hearer have a similar belief"? 
(cf.  p. 27). 
The models of in te rac t iona l  sequences presented by Ballmer and 
Brennenstuhl c lea r ly  display the in te rac t iona l  qua l i t i e s  awng speech 
ac t s ,  and the  overlapping and combining aspects of speech functions 
(cf .  pp. 28-29). But again w h a t  of the  two utterances in the example, 
w h a t  category contains them and accounts fo r  t h e i r  relat ionship.  None 
of the  theor ies  of speech a c t s  outl ined above can adequately describe 
o r  define those utterances given in the  example. 
B. Issues in Pragmatics Relevant t o  Discourse 
Most conversation is not made up of a s ingle  speech a c t ,  but is 
made up of utterances performing several  speech a c t s  simultaneously. 
Labov and Fanshall (1977~29) note "the pa r t i e s  t o  a conversation appear 
t o  be understanding and react ing t o  these speech a c t s  a t  many levels  of 
abstraction . . . conversation is not a chain of utterances,  but ra ther  
a matrix of utterances and actions bound together by a web of 
understandings and reactions.' '  Goffman (1971) sees conversation a s  a 
form of in teract ion.  It's a means that people use t o  deal  with each 
other ,  and "a major function of conversation then is the perfomance 
of speech a c t s  . . . and a c ruc i a l  goal fo r  conversationists  is to  
in te rpre t  the  intended speech ac t  appropriately" (Mchards 1980:418). 
Hymes (1972, 1974) has defined 'speech events' a s  a c t i v i t i e s  
which a r e  governed d i rec t ly  by 'norms' f o r  the  use of speech. An 
example he gives is a conversation a t  a party where the party is the 
non-verbal context o r  'speech s i tua t ion '  in which the  'speech event,' 
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conversation, occurs. Several speech events, conversations, can occur 
successively or  simultaneously a t  the party and within each event there 
are  one or  more 'speech acts. '  Speech events then are  the largest  
un i t s  for  which there a r e  l inguis t ic  s t ructures  and are  made up of speech 
acts .  The se t t i ng  (time and place),  the par t ic ipants ,  the purpose 
(even i f  only phatic),  the hey (tone, manner of s p i r i t  i n  which an 
event is performed), the channel ( w i t t e n ,  o ra l ,  e t c . ) ,  and the message 
content ( topic) are  a l l  important components of speech w e n t s  which 
determine the performance and outcome of the events. 
Ervin-Tripp (1976) has presented a proposal for  the way a speaker 
chooses which type of d i rec t ive  helshe w i l l  u t t e r .  She c l a b s  that  
soc ia l  factors  determine the actual  choice of direct ive type. Social 
variables such a s  age, rank, fami l ia r i ty ,  presence of outsiders,  
t e r r i t o r i a l  location,  and many other a l l  a f fec t  di rect ive choice. 
Moreover, she claims tha t  hearers do not necessari ly need to  in fe r  the 
i l locutionary force of a direct ive from a l i t e r a l  in terpreta t ion.  When 
speakers and hearers share a knowledge of obligations and prohibit ions,  
an utterance can be promptly understood through s b p l e  interpreta t ion 
rules.  
People come to  the interact ional  exchange that  is conversation 
with shared assumptions and expectations about how it w i l l  develop and 
what they a re  expected t o  contribute to  it. They also share common 
principles tha t  allow them to  interpret  each others utterances a s  
contributions t o  tha t  conversation. Grice (1967) formulated a general 
principle he cal led the "cooperative principle" which par t ic ipants  in 
conversation are  expected to  observe. '%ke your conversational 
contribution such as  i s  required, a t  the stage a t  which it occurs, by 
the accepted purpose or  direct ion of the t a l k  exchange in which you 
a re  engaged'' (Grice 1967:45). Under this general pr inciple  he 
distinguished four categories,  Ouantity, Qual i ty ,  Relation and Manner, 
under which a re  l i s t e d  more spec i f ic  maxims and sub-maxims. 
CJuantity r e l a t e s  to  the quanti ty of information to  be provided. 
1) Make your contribution as  inÂ£ormativ a s  is required (for the 
current purposes of the exchange). 
2) Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. 
Quali ty.  T r y  t o  make your contribution one that is true.  
1 )  Do not say w h a t  you believe t o  be fa lse .  
2) Do not say t h a t  f o r  which you lack adequate evidence. 
Relation. Be relevant. 
Manner r e l a t e s  not ( l i ke  the previous categories) t o  what is sa id ,  
but,  ra ther ,  t o  HOW what is said  is t o  be said. Be perspicuous. 
1) -Avoid obscurity of expression. 
2)  Avoid ambiguity. 
3) B e  brief (avoid unnecessary prol ixi ty) .  
4) Be orderly. (Grice 1967~45-46) 
These categories and maxbs have received much cr i t i c i sm for  the i r  
lack of definiteness but perhaps it is just  tha t  breadth of interpreta t ion 
that gives them such strength and allows fo r  t h e i r  generalizabil i ty.  
Certainly, they have provided much in the way of explaining how 
conversation is interpreted. 
h h f f  (1973:296) puts fo r th  the argument that "conditions for  the 
appl icabi l i ty  of a syntactic ru l e  include pragmatic fac tors  l ike  the 
e f fec t  the  speaker wishes h i s  utterance to  have on the addressee.'' She 
suggests that  there a r e  three areas of pragmatic behavior which act  a s  
conditions. 1) "The speaker's asswnptions about his lher  re la t inus  
with h i s  addressee, 2) h i s  real-world s i tua t ion  a s  he speaks, and 3) the 
extent t o  which he wishes t o  change e i t he r  or  both or  t o  reinforce them" 
(Lakoff 1973:296). These conditions a f f ec t  the way a speaker makes use 
of two sets of ru les  in speaking. The f i r s t  s e t  a r e  Rules of Pragmatic 
Competence: 1) B e  c l ea r ,  2) Be po l i t e .  The second s e t  of ru l e s  a re  
Grice's Rules of Conversation (cf.  pp. 33-3&). She notes tha t  most 
of ten when the ru l e  fo r  c l a r i t y  conf l ic t s  wlth that of poli teness,  
poli teness supersedes. This she claims i s  only na tura l  since in 
"infoma1 conversation, ac tua l  c m u n i c a t i o n  of inportant ideas is 
secondary . . . ( to  a speaker's desi re  to)  impart a favorable feel ing 
about the  fac tua l  infomat ion,  best  achieved by making one's addressee 
think w e l l  of one, notably through the  use of the  Rules of Politeness' ' 
(Lakoff 1973:298; parentheses a r e  mine). She introduces three Rules 
of Poli teness ( h k o f f  1973:298). 
1) "Don't hpose." This can be interpreted a s  ' r a i n  aloof , '  
don't intrude in to  other people's business. Stay away from ' f ree  goods' 
o r  a t  l e a s t  ask permission before indulging in them. 
2) "Give options." This says 'Let the  other person make h i s  own 
decisions, leave h i s  options open f o r  him.' Devices fo r  the rea l iza t ion  
of t h i s  ru l e  include hedges which may suggest the  speaker's weak 
emotional commitment t o  his proposition. Another such device is the 
use of uncektalnty markers such a s  'I &ess . . . , ' 'Naybe' and tag 
questions. She suggests t h a t  the  speaker may be genuinely uncertain 
or  he may be acting po l i t e ly  because "such sentences leave the f i n a l  
decision a s  t o  the t ru th  of the  sentence up t o  the  addressee'' (Lakoff 
1973: 300). 
3) Fake A f e e l  good-be friendly.  This r u l e  produces a sense of 
comradarie between speaker and hearer. The use of nicknames, in-group 
language and pa r t i c l e s  l i k e  ' l i ke , '  'you know,' ' I  mean' which a r e  
not meaningless according to  Lakoff, "they mean RZ i s  in ef fec t"  
(Lakoff 1973:302). She also observes t ha t  such pr inciples ,  since t h e i r  
use indicates  t o  the  hearer that what the  speaker is saying i s  only 
h i s  o m  feel ings ,  then "the use of such expressions may also be 
construed as giving options'' (Lakoff 1973:302). 
Leech (1977), i n  a discussion of how logical  sense and pragmatic 
force a r e  re la ted ,  proposes the  Tact F d .  In  so doing he introduces 
several  other useful  ins igh ts  in to  the  motivating fac tors  behind what 
people do with words in in te r re la t ing .  He  maintains (1977~4-5) tha t  
there a r e  three  sca les  which a r e  important in defining pragmatic force. 
1) Costbenef i t  scale.  This scale  spec i f ies  how much the ac t  
referred t o  in the speech ac t  is judged to  cost  or  benef i t  the  speaker 
o r  the  hearer. 
2 )  Cptionality scale. This scale  spec i f ies  how f a r  the 
performance of the  a c t  referred t o  i n  the  speech ac t  is a t  the  choice 
of the  speaker o r  hearer. 
3) Poli teness scale.  This sca le  is p a r t i a l l y  a fuuction of 
sca les  1 )  and 2). I f  the  cost lbenef i t  fac tor  is heid constant and the  
opt ional i ty  scale  is increased, the  degree of poli teness is increased. 
Conversely, i f  the  opt ional i ty  fac tor  is held constant,  and the  cos t /  
benef i t  scale  is increased, the  degree of poli teness is increased. 
Concerning Grice's Maxim of Quantity (cf .  p .  34), he mentions tha t  
a negative sentence, being l e s s  informative v io l a t e s  the  mxim "unless 
there  is some reason to  believe tha t  the  equivalent posi t ive  statement X 
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is true" (Leech 1977:12), i .e. a negative question implies disbelief  
in the poss ib i l i ty  of a negative answer. "The force of a negative 
question ( i s )  a t a c t f u l  way of expressing disagreement, d i sbe l ie f ,  
impatience'' (Leech 1977:lZ; parentheses a r e  mine). 
A s  an introduction t o  the  Tact Maxim he r e f e r s  t o  'negative 
poli teness '  a s  "the avoidance of con f l i c t ,  o r  of s i tua t ions  which might 
lead t o  conflict ' '  (Leech 1977:lS). According t o  him three fac tors  
enter  i n to  the  need fo r  politeness. The 'power fac tor '  is "the 
mutual recognition by & and that & is in a-position of superiori ty 
over L" (Leech 1977:18), so - k is the 'authoritor, '  and L is the  
'authoritee. '  The ' so l idar i ty  fac tor 1 is "the strength of the mutual 
bond of intimacy between - k and A" (Leech 1977:lS). The 'degree of 
c o d l i c t  factor '  exists a s  a scale  of sever i ty  from 'physical conf l ic t '  
,to 'will- incompatibility.' "Unless the  power fac tor  o r  the  so l i da r i t y  
fac tor  i s  suf f ic ien t ly  s t rong,  i t  is necessary t o  employ t ac t  in order 
t o  reduce o r  e l b i n a t e  the  conf l ic t  factor' ' (Leech 1977:lg). Ee s t a t e s  
t ha t  ' t a c t '  is " stra tegic  c o d l i c t  avoidance, and can be measured in 
terms of the degree of e f f o r t  put in to  the  avoidance of a conf l ic t  
si tuation" (Leech 1977:lg). Therefore, usually the more t a c t f u l  an 
utterance is, the more indirect  it is. "Tact is closely correlated 
. 
with indirectness,  where indirectness is to  be defined . . . i n  t e r m  
of the  complexity of the inductive s t ra tegy required in order t o  work 
out the  force,  given the  sense" (Leech 1977:ZO). Indirectness here is 
scalar.  There i s n ' t  any opposition between d i r ec t  and indirect  speech 
ac t s ,  there a re  only d i f fe ren t  degrees of indirectness. 
Finally,  he s t a t e s  the  Tact Xaxb a s  ''Assume tha t  you a r e  the  
authoritee and that your in ter locutor  is the authoritor"  (Leech 1977:20), 
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and gives the  following a s  a meta-maxim, "Don't put your in ter locutor  
in a posit ion where e i t he r  you or  he havelhas t o  break the  Tact Maxim" 
(Leech 1977:21). 
Another aspect t o  the  in te rac t iona l  qua l i ty  of conversation has 
been put fo r th  by Brom and Lwinson (1978). Speech a c t s  can present 
varying degrees of th rea t  t o  e i t he r  the  speaker o r  the hearer by imposing 
on one of the par t ic ipan t ' s  freedom of act ion,  e.g., requests threaten 
the  freedom of act ion of the  hearer,  and/or by damaging che self-image 
of one of the  par t i c ipan ts ,  e.g., c r i t i c i sms  threaten the  hearer ' s  face  
whereas apologies threaten the  speaker's face. A s  a r e s u l t ,  a speaker 
assesses the  mount of th rea t  according t o  par t ic ipants '  power and rank 
re la t ionships ,  soc ia l  distance,  and the  weight of par t i cu la r  impositions 
in t h a t  cu l tu re  i n  se lect ing an appropriate form or  s t ra tegy fo r  
performing the ac t .  Acts wtth the  l e a s t  amount of th rea t  can be 
performed more d i r ec t l y  and exp l i c i t l y  than those which involve greater 
threat .  The most threatening a c t s  may not be done a t  a l l ,  while 
somewhat l e s s  threatening ones may be carr ied out 'off the  record' with 
h in t s  or  association c lues  providing both the  speaker and the  hearer 
with an out by providing d i f fe ren t  possible in te rpre ta t ions  of the 
speech act .  
There a r e  two types of s t r a t eg i e s  open to  a speaker, 'negative 
poli teness '  "performs the  function of minimizing the  par t icu la r  
imposition that the  speech ac t  unavoidably effects"  (Brown and 
Levinson 1978:134), by apologizing o r  being ind i rec t  and formal. 
'Posit ive poli teness '  s t r a t eg i e s  a r e  those which emphasize speaker- 
hearer so l idar i ty ,  rapport and equal i ty  by the  use of in-~roup iden t i ty  
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markers, exaggerated in t e r e s t  or  sympathy with the hearer, or  by 
attending to  the hearer 's  wants. 
Brown and Levinson suggest that ' face'  is "something that  i s  
emt iona l ly  invested, and tha t  can be l o s t ,  maintained, or  enhanced, 
and must be constantly attended t o  i n  interaction.  I n  general, people 
cooperate (and assume each other ' s  cooperation) in maintaining face in 
interact ion,  such cooperation being based on the mutual vulnerabi l i ty  
of face. That is normally everyone's face depends on everyone e l s e ' s  
being maintained, and since people can be expected t o  defend the i r  
faces i f  threatened, and in defending their o m  to  threaten other ' s  
faces,  it i s  generally in every par t ic ipant ' s  best  in te res t  to  maintain 
each others '  face" (Brown and Levinson 1978:66). 
This br ief  description cannot do jus t ice  to  the  power or  the 
depth of B r m  and Levinson's ins ights ,  nor can i t  do jus t ice  t o  a 
model which has had pervasive e f f ec t s  on a l l  aspects of the analysis of 
interact ional  discourse. 
C. Conversational Analysis 
EIatch and Long (1980) describe 'conversational analysis '  as  
ansuering the question, "What is the interact ional  s t ructure  of natural  
talk?" (Eatch and Long 1980:28). Instead of looking a t  an utterance 
in terms of l inguis t ic  functions (speech acts)  such as  direct ives  and 
representatives,  conversational analysts l i ke  Schegloff, Sacks and 
Jefferson look a t  utterances in terms of conversational functions, 
e.g., openings and closings. Edmndson (1981:38) notes t h a t  "elements 
of interact ional  s t ructure  (conversational functions) may be realized 
by verbal o r  mn-verbal ac t s  which may be re la ted in complex ways" 
(parentheses a r e  mine). 
Turn-taking is an aspect of in teract ion occurring i n  na tura l  
conversation which has been described by Sacks in the fom.o f  ru les  
derived from the investigation of na tura l  conversation: I )  only one 
party t a l k s  a t  a t i m e ,  2) speaker change occurs by a current speaker 
controll ing the  next turn through a )  naming o r  al luding t o  the  next 
speaker, or b) constraining the  next utterance,  but not se lect ing the  
next speaker, o r  c )  se lect ing nei ther  and leaving i t  open to  one of 
the other par t ic ipants  t o  continue the  conversation by self- selection.  
'Potent ia l  next speakers' a r e  then concerned with points of possible 
completion which Sacks c l a h s  core a t  the  ends of sentences12 so a s  
next speaker could begin speaking a s  soon a s  a current speaker has 
reached a possible completion (Sacks, m s .  in b u l t h a r d  1977:53-55). 
Even though such 'conuaunicative rules' have been l a id  out fo r  
turn-taking, and tha t  the  possible next speaker can 'how' t ha t  a turn 
is avai lable ,  "whether o r  not he takes the  available turn however is a 
matter of subjective choice" (Edmondson 1981:41). 
Regarding interrupt ions  and speaker overlap, Sacks, Schegloff and 
Jefferson (1974:706-07) suggest t h a t  normally adul t  speakers do not 
in te r rup t  one another. When overlap occurs it i s n ' t  random a s  it tends 
t o  occur j u s t  before a construction is about t o  be completed. Ochs 
(1979:71) indicates  t h a t  the  hearer projects  a possible ending point of 
an utterance and a t t e q t s  t o  'get the  f l oo r 1  a s  that point approaches. 
Gilson (1982:lO) concluded from a study of an expl ic i t  adversary s i tua t ion  
t ha t  there  were two types of in terrupt ions  " 'disruptive interrupt ions '  
increase con f l i c t ,  and 'bonding interruptions '  bring par t ic ipan ts  
together. Such interrupt ions  with t h e i r  d i s t inc t ive  r e s u l t s  can be 
predicted from the re la t ionships  between par t ic ipants .  "13 3ennett 
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(1981:186-87) suggests tha t  in terpreta t ion of whether an in terrupt ion 
is bel l igerent  or  is t r i v i a l  or even cooperative in any given s i tua t ion  
may depend on how much "one or  more of the par t ic ipants  f e e l s  helshe 
has or  has not been able  (or allowed) t o  share in the creation of t h a t  
conversation a s  much a s  or  i n  the  ways they would have li'ked." 
Sequencing in conversation is another area of concern f o r  
conversational analysis. Labov (1970, 1972) e q l a i n s  how an utterance 
can be heard a s  an answer t o  a preceding utterance by formulating 
' in terpret ive  rules. '  Speaker-hearer shared knowledge is c ruc ia l ly  
important f o r  correct  in terpreta t ion because, a s  Labov says, speaker A 
must t r y  t o  f ind a l ink  between what he i n i t i a l l y  said and speaker B's 
-
response. Failure to f ind any r e l a t i on  may be due t o  incompetence. He 
also suggests t ha t  i t  is through an in te rpre ta t ive  r u l e  t ha t  a hearer 
is able t o  recognize a 'request f o r  confirmation' when tha t  request is 
formed a s  an asser t ion (Labov 1972:252-57). 
Cne problem tha t  has concerned a l l  discourse analysts i s  the s i ze  
of the basic unit .  Labov (1972), Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1972) 
use the  'ut terance'  o r  ' turn. '  S inc la i r  and Coulthard (1975) f e l t  they 
needed a smaller unit  which they've cal led the 'move.' A move can be 
the  same a s  one utterance, but some utterances contain more than one 
move, e.g., 'To keep you strong, yes, / /but why do you want t o  be strong?'  
A conversation consis ts  of a t  l e a s t  two turns according to  Coulthard 
(1977:70). Within conversation, there may be paired sequences which a r e  
'conditionally relevant. ' The 'adjacency-pair' such a s  'greet-greet ,' 
'invite-acceptldecline,' 'offer-accept/refuse, '  'question-answer' has 
been defined by Schegloff (1977) a s  having the following features:  
1) Two utterances length 
2 )  Adjacent positioning of component utterances 
3) Different speaker producing each utterance 
4) Relative ordering of par t s  ( i . e . ,  f i r s t  pa i r  pa r t s  precede 
second pa i r  pa r t s ) ,  and 
5 )  Discrimination re la t ions  (i .e . ,  the  pa i r  type of which a f i r s t  
pair  par t  is a member is relevant t o  the select ion among second 
pa i r  par t s ) .  (In Edmondson 1981:46) 
Coulthard (1977:70) claims tha t  "adjacency pa i r s  a r e  the  basic 
s t ruc tu ra l  un i t s  in conversation (and they) a r e  very important during 
conversations both fo r  operating the  turn-taking system by enabling 
a speaker t o  s e l ec t  next act ion and next speaker, and a lso fo r  enabling 
the next speaker t o  avoid both gap and overlap." (Parentheses a r e  mine.) 
Sacks notes t ha t  in the case of an adjacency pa i r ,  the  f i r s t  pa i r  
par t  provides specif ical ly  for  the  second and i f  the  second pa i r  par t  
doesn't follow, the  absence is both noticeable and noticed. 
Ee fur ther  suggests a person who asks a question has the  r igh t  t o  
t a l k  again a f t e r  the  answer is given and tha t  he can ask another 
question so that a 'chaining ru le '  allows f o r  an indef in i te ly  long 
sequence of Q. A. Q. A. Q. A. (Sacks 1972a:54). 
Edmondwn (1981:49-50) points out that it is sometimes hard t o  h o w  
how to in te rpre t  w h a t  a par t i cu la r  utterance does in a conversation. 
He gives two possible ru l e s  fo r  in te rpre ta t ion ,  the "effect  m l e "  
(whereby utterance Tvo determines the  nature of utterance One), and the  
"sequence rule"  (whereby utterance h e  determines the  nature of 
utterance Two). Since both together a r e  not possible, he proposes a 
"hearer-haws-best" principle,  such thac H ' s  in te rpre ta t ion  of S ' s  
behavior may be said to determine w h a t  S ' s  behavior counts a s  a t  that 
point of time in the ongoing conversation: t h i s  allows for  the 
poss ib i l i ty  of course tha t  S may self-correct-i.e-, the hearer-bows- 
best pr inciple  may be applied sequentially (cf. p. 13 where it is noted 
tha t  Austin t i e s  the  speaker's intentions t o  ' i l locutionary force ' ) .  
O t h e r  types of pa i r s  functioning a s  sequences a r e  a lso common in 
conversation. Sacks has named another pa i r  a 'pre-sequence' which 
occurs when a speaker wishes to  avoid potent ia l ly  embarrassing o r  
annoying s i tua t ions ,  e.g., a speaker is opening himself t o  a possible 
refusal  by making an inv i ta t ion  so he precedes h i s  inv i ta t ion  by 
producing a pre-sequence to  determine i f  h i s  inv i ta t ion  is l ike ly  to  
be accepted. 
We-sequence-A: What a r e  you doing tonight? 
B: Nothing. Why? 
Invi ta t ion -A: X was wondering i f  you'd l i k e  to  go to  a movie. 
(Coulthard 1977 :71) 
Schegloff (1972:76-79) has ident i f ied embedded pa i r s  ca l l ing  them 
' inser t ion sequences.' Sometimes a next speaker doesn't want to  or  
can' t  respond h e d i a t e l y  to  the f i r s t  speaker's pair  par t  so he responds 
by i n i t i a t i n g  another f i r s t  pa i r  par t .  During the inserted sequence, 
the o r i g h a l  f i r s t  pa i r  par t  remains relevant and therefore must be 
responded to  when the inserted sequence is finished. 
b o t h &  type of embedded sequent=, the 'side sequence7 has been 
proposed by Jefferson (1972: 294-330). This d i f f e r s  from the ' insert ion 
sequence' in two ways. 1) The f i r s t  item is not a f i r s t  pair. par t ,  the 
other items are  not ' inserted'  and there is no e-qectation of who should 
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speak a t  the  end of a sequence or  of what type of utterance should 
follow. 2 )  The sequence which is a 'misapprehension' followed by a 
' c l a r i f i ca t i on '  looks l i k e  a p a i r ,  ac tual ly ,  there  is a t h i rd  element, 
an indication by the 'misapprehendere that he now understands and t h a t  
the  sequence is terminated. 
Concerning re la t ionships  between the pa i r s ,  Sacks in a s e r i e s  of 
l ec tures  in 1967, put fo r th  "a much more pemasive form of s t ructur ing 
which he c a l l s  'tying"' ( in  Coulthard 1977:74). Cohesive devices 
discussed by Ualliday and Hasan (1976) a r e  one type of tying,  but a s  
Sacks argues "a speaker can't t i e  and that t h i s  is very b p o r t a n t  
because in tying a speaker i s  forced to  show whether he did or  did not 
understand what went before. Thus tying simultaneously f u l f i l l s  two 
fmc t ions ,  i t  is cohesive and it displays the  speaker's understanding 
of previous utterances" (Coulthard L977:75). 
Schegloff, Jefferson,  and Sacks (1977:378) noted that most 'other- 
corrections '  a re  modulated by being domgraded on a 'confidence1 
uncertainty' sca le ,  e.g., 'I think, '  'maybe,' o r  by the  use of ce r ta in  
question forms, e.g., 'You mean 'XI?' rOther-corrections' and 
'understanding checks' are not asser ted,  but offered for  acceptance or  
re jec t ion  a s  a guess o r  suggestion. They a l so  suggest that  i f  a hearer 
understands a speaker w e l l  enough to  produce a correction,  h is lher  
understanding is "adequate t o  allow production of a sequential ly 
appropriate next turn" (Schegloff, Jefferson,  and Sacks 1977:380), 
and t h i s  is usually what happens. So hearers who could do an other- 
correction,  usually don't; they do a sequential ly appropriate next turn 
instead. "Therein l i e s  the bas i s  fo r  the modulation, i n  par t i cu la r ,  
the  uncertainty marking of other-correction: i f  it were confidently 
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held, it ought not to  be done; only i f  unsurely held ought it to  displace 
the sequentially implicated next turn. Therein is a basis fo r  much 
of the other-correction which does occur being treated by i ts  recipient  
on i ts  occurrence, as  involving more than correction,  i .e. ,  disagreement'' 
(Schegloff , Jefferson, and Sacks l977:38O). They also suggest that  
"other forms of 'other- init iated repair '  a r e  systematically re la ted t o  
disagreement regularly being used and understood a s  pre-disagreements" 
(Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks 1977:f.n. 28, 3801, but there  w a s  no 
fur ther  discussion on t h i s  point. In  a subsequent a r t i c l e ,  Schegloff 
(1981:88) suggests in passing tha t  the  reason 'uh huh's' and the l i k e  
can be taken a s  indications of agreemert with a speaker is because "if 
disagreement were brewing, then opportunities t o  i n i t i a t e  repair  would 
supply a ready vehicle for  the display and poten t ia l  deflection of tha t  
disagreement.". When such opportunities for  ra i s ing  problems of 
understanding a re  passed over, the indication is tha t  such problems 
do not ex is t .  Schegloff (1981:88) claims tha t  it might also be taken 
a s  indicating "the absence of that  which such problems might have 
portended-disagreement-and thus be taken a s  indications of agreement.'' 
Coulthard (1977:91-92) lists some major d i f f i c u l t i e s  connected 
with the work on 'conversational mechanisms' presented by Sacks, 
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Schegloff and Jefferson. 1) Their descriptive categories a r e  not w e l l  
defined so it is d i f f i c u l t  fo r  another researcher t o  assign such 
categories a s  'challenge' or  ' t e ~ t o r '  to  his o m  data. Coulthard 
suggests this i s  due to  the lack of re la t ion  of l inguis t ic  form to  
conversational meaning. 2) Their analysis is based on some ' s t re tches  
of t ex t '  extracted from various examples of conversations, and an appeal 
to  intui t ion.  They don't o f fe r  any analysis which can deal with the 
whole of any discourse. 3)  Their analysis does not o f f e r  any 
exceptions or  var iants  of the s t ructures  they describe, and 4 )  furthermore 
the question of what const i tutes  a s t ructure  is not s a t i s f ac to r i a l l y  
answered. 5) The terms 'utterance'  and ' turn '  a r e  used interchangeably 
whereas many utterances consist  of a single sentence but some do not. 
Coulthard gives thexu c red i t  fo r  presenting "a great many insights  
in to  the workings of conversation and some useful analyt ic  tools,"  but 
he contends that the i r  w r k  generally "suffers from a lack of 
expl ic i tness  and formalism, which hinders others anxious to  make use 
of it" (Coulthard 1977: 92). 
Empirical research into  compliment responses in weryday conversation 
by Pomerantz has revealed that  "most complhent responses l i e  between 
(not a t  the polar extremes of )  acceptances and agreement on the one hand, 
and re ject ions  and disagreements on the other" (Pomerantz 1978:81). She 
found tha t  there  a r e  two systems of constraints.  "Responses to  
compliments of ten find expression a s  1) second assessments which are  
formed a s  agreements o r  disagreements with the pr ior  compliments . . . 
agreements are  generally performed a s  preferred seconds and disagreements 
a s  dispreferred seconds'' (Fomerantz 1978:81), and as  2) accepting o r  
re ject ing pr ior  compliments with acceptance being the preferred second. 
The findings also revealed that the two systems a re  in te r re la ted ,  
agreements a r e  associated with acceptances and disagreements with 
rejections.  However, the f ac t  is tha t  disagreements and reject ions  
occur more often in response to  compliments than agreementsfacceptances. 
She accounts for  t h i s  phenomena as  being due to  a system involving 
"speakers' minimization of self- praise" (Pomerantz l978:Sl). hsponses  
to  compliments, then, can be seen as  a solution o r  resolution of the 
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problem of conf l ic t ing systems: 1) preferences t o  agree with andlor 
accept compliments, and 2 )  the desi re  t o  avoid self- praise.  
She out l ines  two types of 'action chain.114 The f i r s t  one has 
accept/reject  a s  the second par t  and the  complement par t  is seen a s  a 
'supportive' action. In the second type, the  complement is seen a s  an 
assessment with which the receiver can agreeldisagree. 
In  discussing 'tokens' of appreciation, she mentions t h a t  the  token 
"recognizes the  s t a t u s  of the  pr io r  compliment without being semantically 
f i t t e d  t o  the spec i f ics  of that complement. That is, i t  does no t ,  
i t s e l f ,  contain a focus upon the  referent of the complement'' (Pomerantz 
1978:83), and it should be performed in a next turn a f t e r  a complement. 
Agreements were found most couanonly t o  be such tha t  "the referent  
assessed in a pr io r  assessment is again assessed in a current turn such 
tha t  current speakers assessment ( the second) stands in agreement with 
pr ior  speaker's. Referent presemation across the  pa i r  of assessments 
is a feature  of such agreements'' (Pomerantz 1978:84). She a l so  suggests 
tha t  often acceptances, especially tokens, a r e  followed by agreements 
a s  responses t o  c o ~ l i m e n t s .  
Disagreements appear a s  two types, as a second evaluation, i . e . ,  
that of the  second speaker, "which stands i n  some disagreement with the  
prior"  (Pomerantz 1978:87). This of ten occurs a s  a "contrastively 
classed (negative) walua t ion  term, . . . from the posicive one contained 
in the prior"  (Pomerantz 1978:87). The second type is when the second 
speaker presents an argument a s  a response, i .e . ,  a s  an 'exception' t o  
w h a t  was assessed previously. 
'"Jhen a recipient  agrees with a pr ior  compliment, he a f f i l i a t e s  
h i s  posit ion with the  pr ior  asserted position; when he disagrees, he 
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d i s a f f i l i a t e s  h i s  posit ion from that of the prior"  (Pomerantz 1978:88). 
Followjr~g complements, agreements and disagreements which. r e t a in  pr ior  
referents  a r e  agreements o r  disagreements with praise  of s e l f .  Therefore, 
self-praise avoidance s t r a t eg i e s  a r e  put in to  play by e i t h e r  the  speaker 
himself when he uses a disclaimer, or  by another speaker when bi/she 
makes a c r i t i c a l  assessment of the self-praising person. Another aspect 
of self- praise avoidance is that i t  can be in te rac t iona l  through 
s t r a t eg i e s  tha t  give c r ed i t  t o  other persons, e.g.,  one s p e a h r  may 
'announce' the  accomplishments of another. 
Solutions t o  these problems of multiple preferences can take various 
forms. 'Praise downgrades' can be employed and with this type of 
solution agreements show some features  of disagreement and v i s a  versa. 
'Upgrading' is a type of agreement which uses stronger second evaluation 
terms than in the  or ig ina l  complement. 'Contrastive opposites'  a r e  a 
type of disagreement where negative, c r i t i c a l  evaluations a r e  followed 
by posi t ive  complimentary ones. 
Another type of agreement is a 'scaled-down agreement' where the  
pra i se  t e rn s  in the response a re  more moderate than the o r i g b a l .  This 
type of ten has " i n i t i a l l y  positioned agreement tokens o r  appreciations'' 
(Pomerantz 1978:95). In  addition a sequence may be set up whereby the  
par t ic ipants  make a l te rna t ing  reasser t ions  of t h e i r  evaluation terms. 
These scaled-down agreements seem t o  be subject to some r e s t r i c t i ons .  
They don't follow "complements which d i r ec t l y  p ra i se  coparticipant" 
(Pomerantz 1978:97). ?3ey contain re fe ren ts  tba t  a re  "objects, persons, 
a c t i v i t i e s ,  and so on, other than coparticipant d i r ec t l y  ("you"), 
namely, referents  through which coparticipants a re  accorded c red i t"  
(Ponerantz 1978:97). 
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Disagreement also can occur i n  various forms. In proposing that 
c red i t  given in the complement was exaggerated, the responder w i l l  
counterpropose lesser  amounts of c red i t ,  but hefshe does not al together 
negate o r  deny the pr ior  assert ions.  Disagreement markers such as  
'though,' 'yet '  and 'but '  a r e  used with qual i f icat ions  of a p r ior  
complement. Following these diminutions and qual i f icat ions  the or ig ina l  
praise  giver may challenge o r  disagree with the responder's evaluation 
and reasser t  praise. 
Praise downgraders in both agreements and disagreements a r e  a 
comaon solution t o  the "incompatible preferences operating on compliment 
responses,'' i . e . ,  compromise following negotiation (Pomerantz 1978:lOl). 
'With downgraders, the referent of the pr ior  i s .p resenfed ,  but the praise  
is neither t o t a l l y  agreed with (i .e. ,  it is responsive to  self- praise 
avoidance) nor t o t a l l y  disagreed with (i.e.,  it is also responsive to  
acceptance/agreement preferences)" (Pomerantz 1978:lOl). 
D. Systems for  the Analysis of Discourse 
Several systems have been developed which approach the analysis 
of spoken discourse from the leve l  of the conversation a s  the overal l  
uni t  of analysis. In  so doing, the discourse analyst can determine the 
function of a speech ac t  in re la t ion  to  the  whole organizational pattern 
of the conversation. Discourse function not only covers "the meaning 
of an utterance i n  conte.xt" but a lso the function of an utterance "in 
re la t ion  to  other utterances in the discourse . . . the interact ional  
location of utterances within discourse" (McTear 1979:39S). Utterances 
are  not connected to  each dther,  but it is the actions they perform 
which bring about those connections. Edmondson suggests that  a 
conversational unit  is seen "as both i l locut ion and interact ion . . . a 
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speaker i s  both communicating h i s  own wishes, feel ings ,  be l i e f s ,  and 
desi res  and interact ing with a fellow member, e l i c i t i n g  and giving 
responses in a dynamic process of negotiation" (Edmondson 1981:54). 
I .  Rehbein and Ehlich 
Rehbein and Ehlich (1976) noted that Sear le ' s  conditions 
(cf .  p. 17) a r e  not enough fo r  the analysis  of a speech ac t .  They 
suggest that a t  l e a s t  the  antecedents o r  pre-history and the  "systematic 
e f f ec t s  and consequences'' o r  post-history of the ac t  must a l so  be taken 
in to  consideration, i .e.,  "the processes leading t o  the const i tu t ion 
of a speech a c t ,  . . . play a cen t r a l  par t  within the  sequel of act ion 
t o  which the  speech ac t  belongs. The same is t rue  of the  immediate 
e f f ec t s  which the  utterance has on the  hearer" (Rehbein and Ehlich 
1976:314-15). They r e l a t e  the  perlocutionary e f f ec t  t o  the  speech a c t  
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they a r e  examining in t h e i r  paper, "effective reasoning" which is only 
successful i f  i t  produces a ce r ta in  change on the  par t  of the  hearer; 
"othemise it only counts a s  'reasoning''' (Rehbein and Ehlich 1976~314- 
15). In  order t o  bring about t h i s  change .in the hearer, they maintain 
that the speaker and hearer must share cer ta in  knowledge and the  
speaker must r ea l i ze  w h a t  t ha t  shared knowledge consis ts  of .  The 
purpose of their analyt ic  system i s  t o  produce a model of the  complex 
s t ructure  of the "psychic process'' of "representing r e a l i t y  in speech'' 
(Rehbein and Ehlich 1976:316). 
Their model introduces three types of e f fec t ive  reasoning. 1) The 
speaker attempts t o  cause the hearer t o  understand a past  act ion on the  
partAof the  speaker. 2 )  The speaker gives reasons fo r  one of his 
future  actions. 3)  The speaker attempts t o  cause the hearer t o  understand 
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some asser t ion he has uttered leading to  "cognitive conformity'' 
between the speaker and hearer which would then be part  of the shared 
knowledge upon which they can base fur ther  interaction (bhbe in  and 
Ehlich 1976:328). 
Simplified reconstruction of t h e i r  model extracts  much of its power . 
a s  a model of a complex psychological process, but even s h p l i f i e d  
it re ta ins  the  interact ional  aspects which a re  the m a i n  points of 
i n t e r e s t  here. 
I )  The speaker has done some action C ,  
11) and consequently realized that the hearer does o r  does not 
understand tha t  action. 
111) A) I f  the hearer has not understood the action: 
i )  the speaker knows that  
a )  the hearer w i l l  have e i t he r  a negative or  
posit ive a t t i t ude  toward the speaker's action,  
and that  
b) a negative a t t i t ude  would bring about a 
deter iorat ion of the re la t ionship,  (perhaps 
to  the point of breaking i t  o f f )  while 
c )  a posit ive a t t i t ude  would include the continuation 
of the relationship.  
d) Therefore, i f  he/she desires to  continue the 
re la t ionship,  he must cause the hearer to  
understand h i s  action. 
i i )  The hearer must choose between: 
a )  indicating that he has not understood (and 
bringing d above in to  play) 
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or ,  b )  not understanding the action and causing the 
consequences of non-comprehension t o  come into 
e f fec t .  
i i i )  I f  the hearer indicates  he has not understood the 
action,  the f i r s t  speaker has two options: I )  some 
form of response from the f i r s t  speaker is needed 
a s  a clue for  understanding w h a t  helshe did, or  
2) not attempting to  give any clues to  help the 
hearer in which case the hearer w i l l  have a negative 
a t t i tude .  
B) I f  the  hearer understood the action i n i t i a l l y ,  he has a 
posi t ive  a t t i t ude  and the relationship/conversation can 
continue using t h a t  action on the par t  of the speaker 
as a new addition t o  t he i r  s to re  of shared knowledge. 
Cne- of the in te res t ing  aspects of t he i r  m d e l  is tha t  it cannot be 
viewed as  a slmple succession of actions. Decisions a r e  made by both 
the speaker and the hearer a t  points where conditions necessi ta te ,  and 
sequences can repeat themselves within the frame of a larger sequence. 
For example, i f  the hearer has indicated non-comprehension a t  point III.A., 
and the speaker has responded with a clue which the hearer s t i l l  could 
not understand, the s i tuat ion returns to  point 111.A. again. So, 
e i t he r  1 )  closure of a sequence can occur, o r  2) repet i t ion of a 
sequence can occur a f t e r  the expression of a ' r ight  pa i r  par t . '  
2. Labov and Fanshall 
I n  very general terms it could be said  that  Labov and Fanshall's 
(1977) analysis of Therapeutic Discourse of fe rs  cer ta in  pa ra l l e l s  t o  that 
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of Rehbein and Ehlich i n  t h a t  they both look a t  analysis in terms of 
speech ac t  sequences. Labov and Fanshall have taken taped sessions 
between a therapis t  and an analyst and applied a 'cross-sectional 
analysis '  to  them. For t h e i r  analysis they ident i fy  two kinds of 
re la t ions  among utterances, propositions, and actions. 'Vertical 
re la t ions '  a r e  "bet-deen surface utterances and deeper actions,  which 
are united by ru les  of interpreta t ion and production, while the  
'horizontal re la t ions '  (are) of sequencing between actions and utterances 
which a re  united by sequencing rules"  (WDOV and Fanshall 1977:37; 
parenthesis a r e  mXae). They have dea l t  with the analysis of the 
discourse by dividing the i r  data in to  f ive  episodes. Each episode is 
broken in to  uni ts  which serve a s  the bas i s  for  the cross-sectional 
analysis. The uni t s  are  fur ther  subdivided into  sub-units (cf.  
Appendix I, Table 3). 
"Their analysis  i s  made a t  dffferent  l eve ls  of abstraction'' 
&Tear 1979:398). They bring together i n  an 'expansion' of each unit  
of t ex t  "all the information that we have tha t  w i l l  help i n  understanding 
the production, in terpreta t ion and sequencing of the utterance in 
question" (Labov and Fanshall 1977:48). They do t h i s  by eqanding the 
paral inguis t ic  cues, giving referents ,  re la t ing  past and future factual  
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information to  the utterance, and identifying shared laowledge, a l l  t o  
ground the utterances in social  interaction.  
Labov and Fanshall (1977~55-56) i so l a t e  several  types of 
propositions which a re  re la ted to  "the normal course of soc ia l  l i f e"  
(Labov and Fanshall 1977:55). 'Challenges to  competence' a s  ' s ta tus  
predicates'  usually do not deny that a person holds a cer ta in  s t a tu s ,  
but the question is whether that person is qual i f ied o r  not to hold that  
s ta tus .  'Performance predicates'  c r i t i c i z e  or  support a person's 
ac t iv i ty  in the roles  that  he plays and usually appear a s  qua l i ta t ive  
judgements that a person is above or  below expected standards i n  h i s  
ro l e  performance. 'Constitutional predicates'  a r e  not concerned with 
a person's s t a tu s  but instead assign cer ta in  par t icular  charac te r i s t ics  
t o  a person, e-g. ,  lazy,  thoughtless, energetic. 
'What i s  done' by an utterance is the interact ional  component of 
a discourse according t o  Labov and Fanshall (1977:67). They define 
interact ion "as action which a f f ec t s  ( a l t e r s  o r  omintains) the re la t ions  
of the  self  and others in face-to-face comunication" (Labov and 
Fanshall 1977:59) which move along the dimensions of power and 
sol idar i ty .  
'Verbal interact ions '  a r e  grouped in to  four s e t s  of 'speech ac t s '  
(Labov and Fanshall 1977:bl). The f i r s t  set, 'Meta-actions,' have to  
do with the regulation of speech i t s e l f  and describe what the speaker 
i s  doing besides taking his turn. These include i n i t i a t e ,  in te r rup t ,  
redirect ;  continue, respond, repeat and reinforce;  end, s i p 1  
completion and withdraw. 
The second set, 'Representations,' a r e  a large c l a s s  of speech 
ac t s  which represent some s t a t e  of a f f a i r s .  A-events a r e  h o r n  t o  the 
speaker but not necessari ly to  the hearer. The speaker may give 
information and/or "express various s t a t e s  of mind about them" (Labov 
and Fanshall 1977:62), because he is in a posit ion to  deal  with them 
a s  an expert without fear  of contradiction. The feel ings  about such 
A-events ident i f ied by Labov and Fanshall in t h e i r  data include ' be l i e f , '  
'uncertainty, '  'exasperation,' and 'deference.' 
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'D-events' a re  disputable events. "In dealing with these events, 
both speaker and l i s t ene r  r ea l i ze  that the  t ru th  of the proposition 
cannot be assumed: the  speaker ac t s  in a way that shows he is aware 
tha t  someone might disagree with him" (Labw and Fanshall 1977:62). 
Usually this is accomplished through an asser t ion which usually leads 
t o  a response. Assertions a r e  of two kinds according t o  Labw and 
Fanshall. An 'evaluation' occurs a f t e r  a speaker's presentation of 
a s e r i e s  of events t h a t  actual ly  happened and expresses the  significance 
of those events. An ' in terpreta t ion '  occurs iÂ the  event re la ted  can 
be talcen as symbolic of some other meaning. Both a r e  i n i t i a l  actions 
by some speaker and can be responded to  by another speaker 'agreeing 
with, '  'denying,' o r  'supporting' that asser t ion.  The responder may 
a l so  re in te rpre t  the  or ig ina l  in terpreta t ion.  The i n i t i a l  speaker may 
support h i s  own statement with fur ther  evidence, o r  contradict  h i s  own 
position. "'Agree,' 'deny,' and 'contradict '  a r e  d i sc re te ,  cognit ively 
oriented actions; t o  'give support' o r  'question' a r e  actions of 
var iable  strength that are  i n t r i n s i ca l l y  affective' '  (Labov and Fanshall 
1977~63).  
The t h i rd  set of speech actions outl ined by Labov and Eanshall 
a r e  'requests'  which include 'mitigated requests, '  e.g., pe t i t ions ,  
pleas,  suggestions, and 'aggravated requests, '  e.g., orders,  c o ~ d s  
and demands. Responses may appear a s  one of three types: 1) the  hearer 
may f u l f i l l  the request by giving the  information o r  c a w i n g  out the  
action requested, 2) the hearer may put off the  request with an 
accounting ( in  which case it may be re insta ted,  redirected o r  withdrawn), 
or  3) the  hearer may refuse it with or  without an accounting. I f  he 
refuses it without an accounting, a break in re la t ions  might resu l t .  
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The four th  s e t  of speech act ions  a r e  types of in terpreta t ions  hearers 
can have of requests. 'Challenges' a re  "any reference to a s i tua t ion ,  
which i f  t rue ,  would lower the  s t a t u s  of the  other person'' (Labov and 
Fanshall 1977:64), and include ' c r i t i c i sms , '  'a t tacks, '  and ' insu l t s . '  
'Supports' a r e  "that form of behavior which would reinforce o r  r a i s e  
the  s t a t u s  of the  other  person'' (Labov and Fanshall 1 9 7 7 ~ 6 4 ) ~  and 
include 'pra ise , '  ' f l a t t e r y , '  and 'reinforcement.' 'Questions' 
represent an intermediate step in making a challenge by throwing "doubt 
upon a proposition which another speaker endorses'' (Labov and Fanshall 
1977~64). Responses can be in the form of a 'defense' which may 
include a challenge or  c r i t i c i sm of the  initial speaker, or  they can be 
an 'admission,' o r  a 'huff '  which breaks re la t ions .  The i n i t i a l  speaker 
may ' r e t r e a t  from,' 'mitigate, '  o r  'aggravate' h i s  i n i t i a l  challenge 
(cf. Appendix I, Table 3 ) .  
These four sets of speech actions can be seen a s  hierarchical  
ordering of l eve l s  of in te rac t iona l  significance.  The highest l eve l  
represents the  most impersonal l eve l  of discourse regulation while the  
fourth leve l  represents the  deepest and most personal l eve l  of speech 
ac t  in terpreta t ions  which can be made by the  hearer. So it can be said 
that "obligatory sequencing is not found between utterances but between 
the actions which a r e  being perfomed" (Labov and Fanshall 1977:70). 
3. S inc la i r  & Coulthard and Sincla i r  & Brazil  
While Labov and Fanshall propose a model based on a hierarchy 
of l eve l s  of in te rac t iona l  significance,  S inc la i r  and Coulthard (1975) 
and S inc la i r  and Brazil  (1982)15 approach analysis through a Hallidayan 
model where un i t s  of the  lowest rank, Acts, a r e  defined functionally,  
and higher rank un i t s  a re  defined in terms of possible combinations of 
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lower uni ts  producing a s t ruc tu ra l  ana1ygis.l6 The smallest uni t  is 
the ' ac t '  which describes the functional properties the speaker i s  using 
the item for .  Three major ac t s  a r e  described: 1) ' e l i c i ta t ions '  which 
function as  requests for  l i ngu i s t i c  responses, 2) 'directives1 which 
function as  requests for  non- linguistic responses, and 3) informatives 
which serve the function of passing on information, opinions, and fac t s .  
Sinclai r  and Coulthard (1975:28) suggest that the function ' e l i c i t a t i on , '  
is most often realized gramat ica l ly  a s  a question; 'd i rect ives '  a s  
imperatives; and 'informatives' a s  declaratives,  but t h i s  i s  not always 
a c l ea r  one-to-one relationship. Choices about form a r e  determined 
from ' s i tua t ion '  and ' t ac t ics . '  'Situation'  "includes a l l  relevant 
factors  i n  the environment, soc ia l  conventions, and the shared experienc 
of the participants' '  (Sinclair  and Coulthard 1975:28). 'Tactics' a r e  
"the way in which items precede, follow and a r e  re la ted t o  each other. 
It is the place i n  s t ructure  of the discourse which f ina l ly  determines 
which a c t  a par t icular  grammatical i t e m  is real iz ing,  though c lass i f ica t ion  
can only be made of i t e m s  already tagged with features from gr-r and 
si tuation" (Sinclair  and Coulthard 1975:29). 
When there  is a succession of statements, questions, and commands 
the hearer knows that he only has to  respond to  the f i n a l  one, only t h a t  
one has an i n i t i a t i n g  function. In i t i a t i on  moves have one e l i c i t a t i o n ,  
di rect ive,  o r  informative. "A 'move' const i tutes  a coherent contribution 
to  the interaction" according to  Sinclai r  and Coulthard (1975:36) while 
Sinclai r  and Brazil  (1982:53) define a 'move' as  "a minimum contribution 
by one speaker and comprising one or  more acts.'' rWhen a move is 
comprised of more than one ac t ,  the other ac t s  a r e  subsidiary to  the 
head and optional. I n i t i a t i on  is usually followed by a response move 
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and typ ica l  responie types can be ident i f ied as  following each of the 
three major ac t s ,  i . e . ,  d i rect ives  are  followed by ' reac ts , '  the 
performance of the action required by the direct ive;  infomatives  a r e  
followed by ' a c h ~ w l e d g e s , ~  a verbal o r  non-verbal s ignal  confirming 
that the hearer i s  l i s ten ing  and understanding; e l i c i t a t i o n s  a r e  
followed by ' repl ies , '  often a one word moodless noise although they can 
be statements o r  questions. 'Comments' can optionally follow rep l ies  
and serve t o  j u s t i fy ,  expand, provide addi t ional  infomation about the  
head. They a r e  almost always real ized by statements o r  tag-questions 
(Sinclai r  and Coulthard 1975:36). 
'Exchanges' a r e  "the minimum uni t  of interaction" and a r e  comprised 
of one o r  more moves (Sinclair  and Brazil  1982:53). The four m a i n  
functions of exchanges a r e  informing, direct ing,  e l i c i t i n g ,  and checking. 
S i n c h i r  and Brazil  (1982:52) ident i fy  another leve l  in  the 
hierarchy which they c a l l  a 'sequence..' This appears when "a predictable 
routine is begm-perhaps a number of similar questions, o r  repe t i t ive  
coatmands, o r  anything tha t  par t ic ipants  recognize a s  forming a d i s t inc t ive  
s e t  of =changes, with a beginning, middle, and end." 
'Transactions' a r e  marked by boundaries and comprise one or  more 
sequences o r  exchanges but beyond tha t  l i t t l e  i s  known about them 
(according t o  both Sinclai r  and Coulthard (1975:56) and Sinclai r  and 
Brazil (1982:53)) because the leve l  of the sequence i s  the highest 
l eve l  where a formal l inguis t ic  pat tern can be found. 
'Lessons' a r e  "the highest uni t  of classroom discourse, made up 
of a s e r i e s  of transactions" (Sinclai r  and Coulthard 1975~59) (cf.  
Appendix I, Table 2). 
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Sinclair  and Brazil  (1982:60) suggest that  there a r e  three rain 
kinds of e l i c i t a t i o n  ident i f iab le  because they bring about dif ferent  
consequences i n  the discourse. The f i r s t  type is the 'polar 
interrogative'  or  YesIXo Question which has an idea l  response to  e i t he r  
'Yes' or  'No' with nothing e l se  required. If the  hearer i s  hesi tant  
about his response he can use a ten ta t ive  marker, e.g., maybe, sometimes, 
probably, I suppose so, e tc .  However, i t  is noted tha t  t h i s  type of 
e l i c i t i n g  device is f a i r l y  ra re  because a speaker is concerned with 
the maintenance of control  in conversation so he prefers  t o  pre-empt 
decisions. Also, usually the hearer is happier when he has some idea 
as  to  the posit ion of the speaker and why he is asking the question. 
Therefore, the second type of e l i c i t ,  ' e l i c i t i ng  agreement' is more 
common where the responder has t o  d e a l  with the howledge he has of t he  
speaker's a t t i tudes .  
No?a~&lly,  a f i t t i n g  response to  an e l i c i t a t i o n  contains two acts:  
an a c t  anx~ouncing the decision and an ac t  indicating the speaker's 
position. h'hen the response is negative, there  adght be a t h i rd  ac t  
that  indicates the difference between the assumptions of the f i r s t  
speaker and the decision of the responder. 
Syntacttcally,  tag-questions and negative questions a r e  agreement 
e l i c i t a t i n g  devices. A tag question suggests tha t  a "lack of immediate 
agreement by the addressee has cas t  doubt on the t r u t h  of the assertion' '  
and so he is requested to  support the proposition (Sinclair  and Brazil  
1982:65). Segative questions, on the other hand, appear to be the 
th i rd  stage of a process. F i r s t  a posit ive asser t ion is aade, its t r u t h  
is questioned, and then a negative question is a p ~ r o p r i a t e  a s  a check 
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on the t ~ t h  value of the or ig ina l  asser t ion.  Negative questions put 
pressure on the hearer to  c l a r i fy .  Sinclai r  and Brazil  (1982:66) claim 
tha t  " d e c l a r ~ t i v e s  w i l l  =early always be understood a s  i f  there  was a 
tag on the end; and posit ive polar interrogatives w i l l  imply tha t  a 
speaker tends to  believe the declarative form of h i s  questions." The 
use of the forms, 'declaratives' and 'polar interrogat ives , '  allows a 
speaker t o  be l e s s  e w l i c i t  in seeking agreement and allows for  the 
poss ib i l i ty  of negotiation i n  discourse. 
The th i rd  type of e l i c i t a t i o n  is ' e l i c i t i n g  content'  which i s  
usually realized by an information question beginning with a wh-word. 
The response can take any form a s  long as  it supplies the  content 
requested by the speaker. 
4. Edmondson, and Edmondson & House 
The word done by both Sinclai r  and Coulthard, and Sinclai r  
and Brazil  represent very similar models f o r  the  analysis of a specif ic  
type of discourse a s  found in a classroom between a teacher and pupils. 
Edmondson (1981) and Edmondson and House (1982) on the other hand, 
present a model f o r  the analysis of conversation which i s  defined as  
"any s t r e t ch  of t a l k  which involves two or  more speakers and in which 
w h a t  is said  is more o r  l e s s  un-prepared, and not overtly pre-determined 
in terms of. topic o r  procedure" (Edmondson and '&use 1982:35). l7 In 
addition they claim "that in contributing to a conversational event, a 
speaker produces an utterance, i .e. ,  a s ignif icant  instance of language 
use, which has a dual comersational function: in the f i r s t  place it 
reveals the speaker's ~ k l i e f s ,  a t t i t udes ,  desires and so on about some 
s t a t e  of a f f a i r s ,  and secondly it plays a par t  in building up the ongoing 
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conversation, being s ignif icant  both with respect to  what may follow 
it in the conversation'' (Edmondson and House 1982:36). n e s e  two 
aspects are: 1) the t i l locut ionary value' which r e l a t e s  to  the speaker 
and i s  indicated by terms such as  'suggest, '  ' request , '  and 'o f fe r , '  
and 2)  the ' in teract ional  value' which r e l a t e s  the i l locutionary value 
to a possible outcome of the conversation and i s  indicated by such terms 
a s  'agree, '  'contradict, '  and 'refuse. '  Conversation is structured in 
terms of interact ional  s t ructure  a s  an answer r e f l e c t s  the " interactional 
re la t ion  holding between the utterance so named and the preceding 
question" (Edmondson and House 1982:36). 
' In teract ional  s t ructure '  i s  described &s being made up of four 
hierarchical  elements. ' I l locutionary ac t s '  a r e  a t  the lowest l eve l  
and these ident i fy  the 'comunicative in ten t '  of the speaker. 'Acts' 
make up the 'moves' made by one speaker in one turn-at-talk. 
'Exchanges' a r e  'movest made by a f f e r e n t  speakers which a re  combined 
in s tmctured  sequences. Exchanges a r e  then linked together into  
'Phases' and an ordered sequence of Phases makes up the f u l l  conversation. 
A t  a  m i n i m m ,  an exchange is made up of two moves produced by 
different  speakers. It 's a "conversational un i t  i n  which both partners 
together reach a conversational outcome, i .e. ,  they reach a point of 
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agreement, and the conversation may then proceed t o  further business o r  
indeed t o  a closing ritual" (Edmondson and House 1982:38). They describe 
the basic obligatory un i t s  of exchange as  ' i n i t i a t e '  and ' sa t i s fy . '  
Using an of fe r  a s  an example of i n i t i a t e ,  accepting would sa t i s fy  the 
i n i t i a t e .  A re ject ion of an of fe r  must in turn be accepted by the f i r s t  
speaker to  make a sa t i s fy .  This re ject ion of the offer  is cal led a 
'contra' because it does not s a t i s fy  the i n i t i a t e .  In an ' i n i t i a t e , '  
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'contra, '  ' s a t i s fy 1 exchange the or ig ina l  o f f e r  is withdrawn by the 
s a t i s fy  m e .  I f  the re fusa l  i s  not accepted by the offering speaker 
and he repeats his  o f f e r ,  the exchange can include a s e r i e s  of contras 
before a s a t i s fy  is reached. Besides s a t i s fy  and contra, a responder 
has a th i rd  option, he may employ a 'counter1 which is similar to  a 
contra but the potent ia l  consequences a r e  d i f fe ren t .  (1) I f  a counter 
is sa t i s f i ed  the speaker who made the s a t i s fy  may s t i l l  hold h i s  initial 
posit ion which was countered. (2) I f  a counter is withdram, i .e . ,  
it is contraed and the comterer  then s a t i s f i e s  tha t  contra, the  
withdrawal of the counter does not e n t a i l  accepting, i .e. ,  sa t isfying 
the move tha t  was or ig ina l ly  countered. 
A: I think we should inv i t e  the  whole family. 
B: Oh God the kids a r e  such terrors .  
li: Oh come on they're not that bad. 
B: Yeah perhaps you're r i gh t ,  but even so I don't want to  have to  
cook for  the  whole family. I'll be exhausted. 
A: Oh well i f  you f e e l  l i k e  tha t  about i t  l e t ' s  forget the whole 
business. Pab 
This can be diagrammed a s  follows: 
I n i t i a t e  Counter Contra Sat isfy  Contra Sat isfy  
One speaker can make two consecutive moves inside one exchange. When 
t h i s  happens, the  f i r s t  move is always a s a t i s fy  which does not close the 
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exchange but which does terminate a "sub-issue inside the  ongoing 
process of negotiation'' (Edmondson and House 1982:42). 
Exchanges can be linked by 'pre-exchanges, ' 'pre-responding- 
exchanges,' and 'post-exchanges.' m e s e  linked exchanges then form 
three 'Phases,' i . e . ,  the 'opening,' 'core,' and 'closing' phases (cf .  
Appendix I, Table 2). 
Elaving given a forrcal description of conversational s t ructure  
Edmondson and House give a psychological in terpreta t ion.  "The way in 
which speakers make use of in te rac t iona l  s t ruc tures  i n  order t o  gain 
t h e i r  conversational goals" they c a l l  'conversational s t ra tegy '  
(Edmondson and House 1982:45). They note that using a strategy may 
not be del iberate  because conventionalism is so strong i n  conversational 
behavior. The cen t r a l  notion in 'strategy, '  f o r  them, i s  the  notion of 
anticipation.  .'Supportive moves' a re  derived from t h i s  notion of 
ant ic ipat ion wen though they do not form a par t  of the  in te rac t iona l  
s t ructures .  'Grounders' give support t o  a move by providing the grounds 
for  it; 'sweeteners' sweeten a move by removing a possible objection the 
hearer may have; 'expanders' give more d e t a i l s  about a person o r  s t a t e  of 
a f f a i r s ;  'disarmers' a r e  self-defensive in tha t  they an t ic ipa te  a 
possible offense t o  the  hearer. 
Social skills, not l i ngu i s t i c  ones, a r e  a t  i s sue  when referr ing t o  
notions of poli teness o r  t a c t ,  which a r e  "centrally concerned with the  
degree t o  which a speaker takes h i s  hearer in to  account, and s u i t s  
what he says and how he says i t  to  what he believes h i s  hearers reaction 
might be" (~dmondson and House 1982:47). 
Edmondson and House list seven " social  ru les  of conduct" which 
they claim "may be empirically derived from o b s e m b g  people talk"  
(Edmondson and House 1982:47). They c a l l  them 'conversational 
 maxim^,"^ and of fe r  the  following a s  examples. 
1) Support your hearer ' s  cos t s  and benef i ts  and suppresss your own. 
2) Anticipate any case in which you might give offense. 
3)  When wanting somthing from your hearer,  be prepared t o  ground 
your request and t o  make compensatory offers .  
4 )  Be generous in giving information about yourself i f  your 
hearer requests such-i.e., when a f r e e  soc ia l  good is 
requested, give more than is asked for .  
5) When you can, support your hearer during h i s  turn,  i - e . ,  engage 
in ' ac t ive  l is tening.  ' 
6 )  Plug any conversational gaps. 
7 )  When in doubt, reciprocate,  especial ly  in 'hearer- friendly' 
soc i a l  rituals which f a c i l i t a t e  contacts-i.e., when you 
receive a soc ia l  benef i t ,  give one back. 
(Edmondson and House 1982:47) 
A l l  seven maxims can be swnned up in the f i r s t  maxim which is 
termed the  '8-support naxim.'  It is meant t o  apply to both par t ic ipants  
by implying tha t  "one should avoid put t ing the  hearer i n  a posit ion 
such that  he cannot in h i s  behavior ac t  in an H-supportive manner" 
(Edmndson and House l982:&8). 
I l locutlonary a c t s  have t o  do with "how an utterance having an 
in te rac t iona l  function is to  be characterized with regard t o  the 
speaker's meaning'' (Edmondson and House 1982:49). Edmondson and House 
propose four c lasses  with categories under each, two of these r e l a t e  t o  
issues i n  this study. 
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and the  hearer. 'Opines' and 'Tel ls '  then can be seen to  be 
complementary, i . e . ,  when a ' f a c t '  is communicated, i t ' s  a Te l l ,  when 
an lopinion' is communicated, i t 's  an Opine. Opines a re  believed by a 
speaker t o  be t rue  out of experience and judgement ra ther  than s c i e n t i f i c  
'knowledge.' However Edmondson and House (1982:58) comment t h a t  it is 
" w e l l  known that speakers, a s  human beings, do not generally pay a great  
deal  of a t t en t ion  t o  the  factlopinion dis t inct ion:  maybe we may say 
here that where you draw the  line between the  two is a matter of 
opinion. " 
'Discloses1 involve autobiographical o r  pr ivate  information about 
the  speaker which helshe thinks the  hearer may f ind  in te res t ing  or  
amusing. The hearer i s  not expected t o  hold any opinions o r  t o  s t a r t  
arguing about such content because it i s  of an autobiographical nature. 
Edmondson and House have s e t  f o r th  a comprehensive analysis  which 
takes i n t o  account w h a t  people do in conversation 1) through a formal 
description of the  in te rac t iona l  s t ruc ture ,  2) through a description of 
conversational s t ra teg ies  re f lec t ing  the soc i a l  skills of the  
par t i c ipan ts ,  3)  through a description of conversational mxhs which 
help guide a speaker's choice of which s t r a t eg i e s  t o  employ and the  
verbal  means by which those s t r a t eg i e s  a r e  manifested, and 4) through 
a description of i l locut ionary categories out l in ing the  speaker's 
in tent  in producing an utterance. In  taking a l l  these areas  in to  
account, they have produced a descr ipt ive  system which provides much 
ins ight  i n to  w h a t  people do when they converse. 
In examining the speech ac t  agreementldisa~reement a s  it natural ly  
occurs in conversation, speech-act theory is a necessary base from which 
to  begin. However, agreementldisagreement e x i s t s  a s  a response to  some 
previous utterance and as  such the relationship between the two utterances 
and the qual i ty  of that  relationship must be examined and ident i f ied.  
In  addit ion,  no uttered speech ac t  can occur isolated from any 
environmental o r  contextual factors.  These fac tors  of context and 
environment place the uttered ac t  in  a relationship with the whole of 
the conversation. For t h i s  reason the analysis of a speech ac t  within 
an in teract lonal  framevork i s  necessam for  showing how tha t  ac t  
functions within the discourse. A speech a c t  natural ly  ut tered during 
conversation must be examined from many di f fe ren t  angles in order t o  
achieve a c o q o s i t  p ic ture  of t ha t  speech act .  
XOTES 
Thes= can be distinguished a s  follows: the locutionary a c t ,  
"he said  t ha t  . . .," the i l locutionary a c t ,  "he argued/advised/etc. 
that  . . .," the  perculatory a c t ,  "he insulted/convinced, e tc .  m e  
t ha t  . . ." (Austin 1962:102). 
Also see Gricels category of Namer, Maxim 2 Avoid Ambiguity 
on page 34. 
He  l ikens the study of any purely formal theory of language to  
studying baseball  "only as  a formal system of ru les  and not a s  a 
game" (Searle 1969: 17). 
I l locutionary e f f ec t s ,  not perlocutionary effects .  
5. Searle accepts Austin's def ini t ion but not a l l  of h i s  members. 
He dist inguishes between 'ceremonial ac t s '  which require some 
ins t i tu t iona l ized  s i tuat ion for  t he i r  successful performance, and 
'vernacular ac t s '  which have no such conditions. H i s  c lass i f ica t ion  
deals only with p e r f o m t i v e  verbs of the l a t t e r  type. 
H i s  t e ~ o l o g y  follows Searle1s with Representatives, Directives, 
and C d s s i v e s  but the c lass  Searle has termed 'Expressives,' Fraser 
c a l l s  'Evaluatives.' Also, Fraser leaves out Searle 's  c l a s s  of 
'declarations' o r  performatives. 
'Mutual contextual belief is "salient contextual. information" 
(Bach and Earnish 197925) that  need not necessari ly be t rue  but t ha t  
both the speaker and hearer share and believe the other believes. In  
addition to  these contextual be l i e f s  there a r e  two more mutual be l i e f s  
tha t  the speaker and hearer share with other members of the l inguis t ic  
comunity. 'Lhgu i s t i c  presumption' is the bel ief  tha t  a l l  members 
share a couunon language and background information. 'Communicative 
presumption' is the belief t h a t  whenever a member says something, he 
does so with some recognizable i l locutionary intent .  According to  Bach 
and Harnish, a l l  three of these mutual be l i e f s  a r e  necessary for  t h e  
hearer t o  be able to  ident i fy  the  speakers intent .  
Bach and Harrdsh continue by s t a t i ng  tha t  "To assent that  P is t o  
express agreement with t h i s  claim, t o  dissent from it is t o  express 
disagreement, and to  dispute i t  is to  express the belief tSat there is 
reason not t o  believe tha t  P" (Bach and Harnish 1979:45). 
Fraser's (forthcoming) revised taxonomy would appear to  be a 
revision of h i s  1974 taxonomy i n  the l i gh t  of Bach and Harnish's analysis 
of the speaker's a t t i tudes  toward h i s  propositional content, although 
he doesn't say so. 
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'Speech ac t  verbs' are  distinguished from 'performatives' which 
a re  used to  perform l inguis t ic  ac t s  (actions,  a c t i v i t i e s ) ,  e.g.,  ' to  
order, '  ' t o  ask.' 
l1 Austin br ie f ly  achowledges responses or  sequel ac t s  (cf .  p 
l2 S a c k ,  Schegloff and Jefferson (1974: 721) s t a t e  tha t  'possible 
completion points'  "turn out to  be possible completion points of 
sentences, clauses, phrases, and one-word constructions, and multiples 
thereof," i .e. ,  a s  "syntax conceived in terms of its relevance to  
turn-taking." Ochs (1979:70) expands on t h i s  by saying, "That is, 
speaker change occurs a t  the end of an idea expressed by one participant. ' '  
l3 Unfortunately Gilson does not give any fur ther  def ini t ion of 
"disruptive interruptions" o r  "bonding interruptions.' '  
l4 Pomerantz defines an action chain as "a type of organization 
in which tm ordered actions Actionl and Action2, a r e  linked such t h a t  
the performing of A1 provides the  poss ib i l i ty  of performance of A2 a s  
an appropriate next action" (Pomerantz 1978:82). Schegloff's 'adjacency 
pa i r s '  a r e  d i f fe ren t  i n  that a f t e r  a f i r s t  pair-part is produced, i ts  
second pair-part is "conditionally relevant" (Pomerantz 1978:llO). 
Second pa r t s  of an action chain a r e  a 'may,' not a 'should.' 
l5 The w r k  presented in Sinclai r  and Brazil  (1982) and Sinclai r  
and Qulthard (1975) appears to  be essen t ia l ly  similar i n  basic 
approach to  analysis therefore the two a r e  presented together here 
(cf.  Appendix I, Table 2 for  comparison of s t ructures) .  
l6 a l l i d a y  (1970) is interested in the existence of and the 
surface ordering of elements within a sentence. He believes tha t  there 
is no reason t o  make any c lass i f ica t ion  of language use without an 
examination of grauuuar. He iden t i f i e s  three functions within the 
s t ructure  of a clause: 1) the ' ideational '  which expresses the content, 
2) the ' interpersonal'  which maintains soc ia l  re la t ions ,  and 3)  the 
'textual' which enables link t o  be made with the s i tuat ion.  
l7 The model of analysis presented by E h n d s o n  and House in 1981 
is essen t ia l ly  the samz a s  that formulated by E h n d s o n  i n  1981 although 
the E h n d s o n  and &use presentation i s  somewhat s h p l i f i e d  in the 
explanation. The description which follows is that  presented i n  both 
books. 
l8 Xot to  be confused with Grice (c:. p. 34). 
cH.APTER 111 
?BTHODS AND PROCEDUXES FOR THE ANALYSIS 
The purpose of t h i s  chapter is to  describe the methods and 
procedures carried out in order to  formulate a description of what 
const i tutes  agreementldisagreement and t o  discover the ru les  of 
speaking within which it operates in native speaker conversation. The 
empirical data base for  the  analysis  comes out of surrept i t iously 
collected conversational data so tha t  the  speech ac t  agreement1 
disagreement w i l l  be described a s  it appears i n  instances of na tura l  
usage. The type of data collected and the methods for  col lect ion a re  
discussed followed by a description of the data,  the t ranscr ipt ion 
process and the procedures for  analysis. As a method for  analysis of 
the data two subclasses of Searle 's  'Representatives,' Reportatives, 
and Q i n e s ,  a r e  proposed. 
This description of the speech a c t  agreeldisagree can then be 
applied t o  "the presentation of agreementldisagreement in several  
notional/functional based materials to  see i f  there  is any correlation 
between how these functions appear in the materials and how they appear 
in r e a l  language use." The data collected should therefore r e f l e c t  "the 
kinds of l inguis t ic  iaceraction that take place i n  r e a l  language use" 
since courses based on notional syllabuses attempt t o  equip the learner 
with "an effect ive capacity to  par t ic ipa te  in r e a l  language events" 
W i l k i n s  1973:79). 
A. Data Type and Methods of Collection 
Labov has equated 'natural  speech' with 'casual speech' by which 
"in a narrow sense, we mean the weryday speech used in informal 
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s i t u a t i o n s  when no a t t e n t i o n  is d i rec ted  t o  language" (1973:86). But 
Wolfson (1976) argues t h a t  a person w i l l  pay more a t t e n t i o n  t o  h i s  
speech any t i m e  he i s  t a l u n g  with o the rs  outs ide  h i s  in t imate  c i r c l e  
and that paying a t t e n t i o n  t o  his speech may r e s u l t  in an attempt t o  be 
l e s s  formal r a t h e r  than e r e  formal. She goes on t o  claim t h a t  " there 
is no such e n t i t y  as casual  o r  n a t u r a l  speech and that w e  (should 
s u b s t i t u t e  ins tead the  term appropriate speech" (Wolfson 1976:204). By 
'appropriate '  she says "appropriate t o  the  speech event i n  which (he)/she 
is par t ic ipat ing ' '  (Wolfson 1976:ZOZ; parentheses a r e  mine). She 
suggests t h a t  da ta  should be co l l ec ted  "by observing and recording a 
l a rge  v a r i e t y  of speech and espec ia l ly  from "those (people) 
whom ve h o w  w e l l  enough t o  see frequently i n  a l a rge  number of 
'.. 
d i f f e r e n t  s i t u a t i o n s  (so) that we can get  a view in depth of how a 
v a r i a b l e  is used" (Wolf son 1976:205; parentheses a r e  mine) .' Wolf son 
concurs with Labov's statement in 1964 t o  the e f f e c t  t h a t  "one of t h e  
most important p r inc ip les  governing v a r i a t i o n  is that of d i f f e r e n t i a l  
frequency in the  use of t h e  va r iab le  by d i f f e r e n t  groups of speakers" 
(Wolfson 1976:207). Merritt (1979:lZO) concurs with Wolfson when she 
says t h a t  some l i n g u i s t s  should inves t iga te  "the s o c i a l  use of 
language . . . (by looking) a t  na tu ra l ly  occurring ins tances  of language 
use in s i t u a t i o n s  of face-to-face in terac t ion."  One of the  reasons f o r  
the  importance of t h i s  avenue of research is given when she says,  "it 
has always been my f e e l i n g  t h a t  we do not have much access t o  speaker 's  
i n t e n t  except when w e ,  ourselves,  a r e  the  speakers: while,  on the  o ther  
hand, w e  do have access t o  hearer ' s  understanding s ince  a s  a n a l y t i c a l  
'overhearers'  we  have e s s e n t i a l l y  the  same 'information' o r  'data '  
ava i l ab le  t o  us a s  does the  hearer  o r  addressee" (Merri t t  1979:122). 
She suggests tha t  the l inguis t ic  investigations of occasions when a 
stranger speaks with a stranger might give useful ins ights  into how 
language serves a s  a commmication system because i n  such s i tuat ions  
the par t ic ipants  have no mutually shared background knowledge about 
each other. 
Therefore, in accordance with the aims and purposes for  t h i s  
research and with the suggestions l a i d  out above it was decided that  
the  data for  t h i s  study should ideal ly  come from a s  broad a 
spectrum of speech s i tua t ions  and speakers as possible, but due 
to  l imita t ions  on t i m e ,  money and researchers (one person), 
it was decided t o  l i m i t  the col lect ion of data t o  informal 
soc ia l  and business interactiozis, i . e . ,  t o  the type of l a n = a g e  
a non-ESP conversation oriented Notional/Functional ESLIEFL 
textbook might teach. 
the  data should a l l  be collected surrept i t iously in  so f a r  
a s  t h i s  would be possible. 
the ac tua l  col lect ion would be carried out (a) by recording 
conversation everywhere and anywhere it occurred using a s m a l l  
tape-recorder equipment with a microphone, (b) by writing dom 
examples when they were observed, (c) by taping talk-shows and 
discussionlinterviews on TV and the radio,  (d) by tapping the 
telephones of several  friends. 3 
whenwer conversational data were collected,  relevant 
s i tua t iona l  data were a l so  noted: location; interlocutors '  
ages, sexes, re la t ionship,  s t a tu s ,  social  distance; var ie ty  of 
English, i .e. ,  B r i t i sh lhe r i can  standard/non-standard d ia lec t  
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of American b g l i s h .  When this type of information was not 
readily available to  the researcher, approxjzations from 
observations were w t e d .  For individual examples, relevant 
contextual information was a lso noted. 
5)  the  researcher w u l d  not be included in the data collected a s  
much as  possible, and that no attempts would be made by the 
researcher t o  e l i c i t  examples of agreementjdisagreement. 
6 )  only native-speakers of English could be included i n  the  data. 
7 )  only the conversation of adul ts  mu ld  be employed. 
Data were collected from (1) face-to-face interact ions ,  service 
encounters, informal meetings and discussions, a TV discussionlintemiew, 
a party, conversations among fr iends,  overheard conversations in public 
places, and intra-family interactions;  (2) non-face-to-face interactions:  
radio talk-shows, telephone conversacbns between fr iends,  between 
acquaintances and between adversaries. Interactions occurring between 
strangers,  acquaintances, f r iends,  family members, lovers (or potent ia l ly  
so) ,  and rolel re la t ionship adversaries ( interlocutors who a re  adversaries 
due to  their inherent role l re la t ionship,  e.g., talk-show guests and 
hosts) (cf.  Appendix I, C h a r t  I fo r  a breakdown and comparison of data 
sources). 
A t  f i r s t ,  the aim w a s  to co l lec t  conversational data from as  wide 
a var ie ty  of sources a s  possible by taping on a recorder. T h e  conswing 
complete transcriptions revealed very few examples of agreement1 
disagreement so s i tuat ions  where agreementldisagreement were l ike ly  t o  
occur were concentrated on f i r  recording and transcribing,  e.g., radio 
and TV talk-show data and discussions among friends. In  the l a t t e r  case 
. 
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no attempt was made to  e l i c i t  agreement or  disagreement o r  to channel 
discussion toward controversial  topics,  and the researcher, when present, 
remained out of any discussion a s  much as  possible so that  frequency 
r a t i o s  of the occurrence of agreement and disagreement within categories 
of speech events would r e f l e c t  a normal value, other s i tua t iona l  fac tors  
taken in to  account. 
B. Description of the Data 
The conversational data used i n  thLs study were a l l  surrept i t iously 
recorded a s  i t  occurred in everyday conversational exchanges. Comparisons 
of sociol inguis t ic  information such as  relationship among inter locutors ,  
and speech events revealed that the conversations could be grouped 
together in to  eight groups. 
Appendix I ,  Chart 1 contains char ts  with idormation about the  
Situation,  Event, Location, Number of Interlocutors,  Sex, Roles, Ages, 
.Relationship, Status,  Method of Recording, Number of Mhutes,  Number 
of w i n e s ,  Agreements, and Disagreements for  each conversation. The 
conversations are  grouped into  the eight groupings mentioned above and 
the t o t a l  umber of minutes, t o t a l  number of Cpines, Agreements and 
Disagreements a r e  given for  each group along with frequency r a t i o s  of 
agreement to  Opine, and Disagreement to  Opine. Included i n  the Appendix 
is an explanation of the abbreviations used in the char ts  and def ini t ions  
of various t e r m .  
Group 1 contains seven telephone conversations between the same 
two inter locutors  who are  very good friends. The female is in the  
process of breaking u~ with her boyfriend who is also !aom to  the male 
interlocutor.  Conversation B ,  the  longest of a l l  the conversations i n  
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data being over 2% hours long, is a h s t  exclusively devoted to  tha t  
topic and contains emotionally charged exchanges. 
Group 2 contains 12 conversations, o r  segments of longer 
conversations, a l l  among the same four inter locutors  who a re  roommates. 
The conversations a l l  take place in the kitchen of t h e i r  house around 
the tab le  and include some f a i r l y  unusual topics,  e.g., the best  age 
f o r  a chi ld  to  begin formal education, but none could be considered 
disputable events, i .e . ,  'D-events' (cf .  Labov and Fanshall, Chapter 11. 
p. 55). 
Group 3 contains 11 discussions, reports  and conversations i n  
an of f ice  among different  inter locutors  about d i f fe ren t  aspects of the 
business. These were recorded surrept i t iously by a businessman fr iend 
of the researcher in h5s office.  The recordings sometimes contain gaps 
when something of a secret  nature was mentioned and the recorder turned 
of f .  C16 was a report  given of a past  s i tua t ion  and therefore contained 
no Opines. 
Group 4 contains four telephone conversations a l l  between different  
interlocutors.  In  each s i tua t ion  the inter locutors  a r e  acquaintances 
ra ther  than friends and topics  c o ~ t a i n e d  no personal information or  
expression of emtion.  
Group 5 contains four service encounters between strangers. Three 
take place in s tores  and involve the purchase o r  order of some goods. 
The fourth one takes place a t  a Post Office window, i . e . ,  C7,  and 
contains no Opines. 
Group 6 is a recorded discussion- interview involving four guests 
and two hosts. A l l  the inter locutors  were acquainted a d  there were no 
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r e a l  overtones of animosity expressed even though views were qui te  
di f ferent .  
Group 7 contains f i v e  short  conversations recorded from a radio 
t a l k  show. The host was the same i n  a l l  f i v e  cases but the  guests who 
ca l led  in were a l l  di f ferent .  With the  exception of C13 animosity was 
apparent. The host seemed to  heckel his guests. 
Group 8 contains one discussion occurring between three  professors 
and one student in one of the professor ' s  o f f ices .  A t  points  in the 
discussion s l i gh t  emotional overtones appeared a s  individuals showed 
personal c o d t m e n t  t o  t h e i r  propositions. 
Group 9 contains 22 snippi ts ,  individual examples of agreement 
and disagreement which were recorded i n  writ ing when the  researcher 
overheard them in a var ie ty  of locations. 
C. The Transcription Process 
"A pervasive sentiment among those who draw from performance data 
is that the  data they u t i l i z e  a re  more accurate than in tu i t i on  data: 
t he i r  data cons t i tu te  the  r e a l  world-what - is a s  opposed t o  w h a t  
t o  be" (Ochs 1979:43). But, in f a c t ,  the  ac tua l  performance is not the  
researcher 's  data. The performance is recorded, and the  recording of 
the  verbal  and non-verbal in te rac t iona l  behavior is transcribed onto 
paper fo r  the  researcher and fo r  those who follow h i s  research e f fo r t s .  
"What is on a t ranscr ip t  w i l l  influence and constrain w h a t  generalizations 
emerge" (Ochs 1979:45), but some degree of ' se lect ive  observation' is 
unavoidable. Ochs advises t h a t  t ranscr ipt ion should not be "random and 
implicit"  but ra ther  it should "be a se lec t ive  process re f lec t ing  
theore t ica l  goals and definit ions ' '  (Ochs 1979:44). This se lect ion should 
be encouraged since an overly deta i led t ranscr ipt ion is hard t o  follow 
and assess. 
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In transcribing the f i r s t  several  conversations, it is d i f f i c u l t  
to  be select ive because i t  is impossible to  how what i s  and what i s n ' t  
important u n t i l  some analysis is made on the data. The t ranscr ipt ion 
methodology described here is the end resu l t  of a process which evolved 
a s  analysis proceeded and revealed w h a t  was possibly important to  include 
and what was not. 
The f i r s t  consideration was the  layout of the transcription.  Tne 
researcherldata col lector / t ranscr iber  has always found it extremely 
d i f f i c u l t  to  read i d  understand a layout where speaker A i s  on the l e f t  
going do- in a column and speaker B is on the right.  Such a system 
also complicates the exact notation of speaker overlap, a f ac t  pointed 
out by Schmidt (1982) in a discussion. It was thereby decided to use 
a layout system with a l l  of the speakers s ta r t ing  the i r  turns from the 
l e f t  hand margin. 
The next concern was with the non-verbal behavior inherent in na tura l  
interaction.  To transcribe,  o r  not to  t ranscr ibe,  o r  something in 
between, was the question. Since t h i s  was a study into  the l i ngu i s t i c  
behavior of the speech act  agreeldisagree i t  was decided not to transcribe 
unless i t  was determined by the transcriber t o  be necessary for  the 
correct in terpreta t ion of the utterance,  o r  t o  es tabl ish the relationship 
between an utterance and a special  referent within the context. 'When 
t h i s  occurs, the non-verbal behavior is bracketed and inter jected into  
the utterzkce. 
Another area of concern w a s  orthography, Should the t ranscr ipt ion 
be represented phonetically; pa r t i a l l y  phonetically, e.g.,  re f lec t ing  
d ia lec ta l  differences; with modified orthography indicating the way an 
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I item is pronounced ra ther  than the  way it is wri t ten,  e.g. ,  goma, '  
'lemme see i t , '  'yah see?'  (cf .  Sacks, e t  a l .  1974). In  another 
discussion, it w a s  pointed out t h a t  such types of pronunciation a r e  
of ten izade natural ly  when reading the  t ranscr ip t  aloud a t  a na tura l  pace 
wen  i f  representation were in standard orthography. Therefore, it was 
decided t o  use staadard orthography throughout unless i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y  
was problematic without phonetic representation- happily t h i s  never 
occurred, and d i a l ec t a l  differences were not an i s sue  in t h i s  study. 
Other considerations were pauses and pause length, and speaker 
overl.ap/interruptions. Many types of sequences i n  conversation a r e  
based on turn un i t s ,  e.g., 'adjacency pa i r s '  (Schegloff and Sacks, 1973, 
a l so  c f .  pp. 41-42, Chapter I1 of this manuscript). Agreement/ 
disagreement is a response t o  a previous utterance made by another 
speaker in another turn so markers of turn un i t s  would be h p o r t a n t  
t o  note in t ranscr ipt ion.  "Turns a r e  considered t o  be verbal  un i t s  
bounded e i t he r  by the  t a l k  of another speaker of by a s ignif icant  pause" 
(Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974:703). It was decided t o  determine 
pause length by counting one-thousand one, one-thousand two, . . ., and 
tha t  pauses extending over one-thousand one were marked with the  umber ,  
e.g., ( - 5 )  is a pause the length of which extends t o  one-thousand f ive .  
Aa was  noted before (cf .  Chapter 11, pp. &O-41) the  occurrence of 
speaker overlap is not random. It occurs j u s t  before a construction is 
completed when the  hearer wants the  f l oo r  and makes a bid f o r  a turn. 
However, it was not hown ff there was any d i r ec t  re la t ion  between 
overlap and agreementldisagreement. Therefore i t  was decided t o  
careful ly  and c lear ly  note it. 
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Appendix I ,  Table 6 gives the t ranscr ipt ion s ~ o l s  and the i r  
meanings, which have been used i n  the transcription of the data for  
t h i s  study. 
D. Procedures for  the Analysis of the Data 
Having collected and transcribed the data the next step was to  
locate examples of agreement and disagreement within the data but since 
the speech a c t  agreeldisagree is a, . type of response t o  another speech 
a c t ,  it was a lso necessary to  locate  the preceding utterance t o  which 
the example of agee ld isagree  was a response. This was achieved in the 
following way: 
I )  While reading the relevant l i t e r a t u r e ,  note was taken of 
examples tha t  various authors marked as  agreement o r  disagreement, 
e.g., Pomerantz (1978:SZ) gives the following "action chain'' 
formula a s  one possible "appropriate next action'' in response 
to  a compliment: 
"Al: A compliments B 
A2: B agreesldisagrees with the complimentary assertion.' ' 
(Pomerantz 1978:82) 
2) The data was examined to  locate  examples tha t  seemed obvious 
examples of agreement or  disagreement, e.g., the use of the 
. 
performative verbs, 'agree, '  'disagree'; repe t i t ion  of the 
previous speaker's utterance with some indication that the 
second speaker was in accord o r  disaccord with i t ,  o r  e l l i p t i c a l  
versions thereof, e.g., 
Agreement: 
S16 
A: She was a nice lady :: I really liked her. 
B: I liked her too. 
Disagreement: 
S8 
A: Chinese food is so good! 
B: I don't think so. 
Also included were the types of instances that had been noted 
during the reading, such as the complement response noted 
above, e. g. , 
Disagreement: 
s 1 
k. Great speech Brown. 
B: Really wasn't very good, too brief. I wanted to 
say a lot more. 
Both the obvious examples of agreement and disagreement and 
the preceding utterances to which they were a response were 
located. 
3) A list was then made up containing two types of examples 
(a) those which the researcher was unsure about as being 
agreement/disagreement, and (b) those which the researcher was 
sure about as being agreement/disagreement. All the examples 
included the previous speaker's utterance to which the 
agreementidisagreement was a response. The researcfier then 
presented this list to three linguists in her department and 
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asked them to  note the examples of agreement and disagreement 
which they found. A meeting was then held for  a discussion of 
t he i r  findings along with t he i r  reasons for  deciding tha t  a 
par t icular  example w a s  a member of the speech a c t ,  'agree1 
disagree' o r  not. A preliminary, rough and broadly defined 
set of hypotheses was d ram up which might possibly govern the 
occurrence of agreeldisagree. 4 
4) This rough and broadly defined set of hypotheses was then 
applied t o  the r e s t  of the examples about which the researcher 
was cer ta in  consti tuted 'agreementldisagreement' (as outl ined 
in 2 above) to  determine which of the hypotheses could be 
generalized to  a broader data base, and t o  more c lear ly  define 
those tha t  did apply. 
5 )  l'he more clear ly  defined hypotheses were then applied to  the 
corpus of data a s  a whole, revealing more examples and more 
c lear ly  defining the i r  occurrence. As the data were examined, 
notes were kept on the syntact ic ,  semantic, and functional 
types of utterances which could be responded t o  with agreement/ 
disagreement. 
6 )  A t  t h i s  point it was realized tha t  there  was a aeed to  describe 
what agreementldisagreement was following as  a preceding 
utterance. Some different ia t ions  among pr ior  utterances were 
c lassff ied.  Out of t h i s  c lass i f ica t ion  two d i s t i nc t  subclasses 
within Searle's c l a s s  of Representatives a r e  proposed a s  a 
method for  analysis of the data in t h i s  study. One of these 
subclasses could be responded to  wkth agreernentldisagree!nent, 
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and t h i s  was labeled 'Cpine.' ,The other subclass could not be 
responded to  with agreement/disagreement and was labeled 
'Reportative.' The subclass 'Opine' was fur ther  broken down 
into subclasses and these were a lso described (cf.  p. 
f o r  detai led discussion). 
7) The new c lass i f ica t ions  were applied to  the  data for  
ver i f ica t ion  and were verff ied.  
8) kihat followed was a s i f t i n g  process of going back and fo r th  
between the data and rec lass i f ica t ion ,  breaking down and 
regrouping, always t rying t o  find so- pattern,  some relationship 
and some description that m u l d  f i t  a l l  the data i n  the  study 
and might possibly be generalizable beyond the data. A s  the 
process continued, the r e su l t s  described in the next chapter 
became discernible,  and when the data was analyzed the l a s t  time 
to  see  i f  those categories worked, i t  was discovered tha t  they 
did. 
The location of agreement and disagreemint in the conversational 
data was complicated by the occurrence of 'Yeah,' 'Hmm,' 'Oh,' and 
other one word wodless  noises produced following another speaker's 
Opine o r  co-occurring with an Opine as  an overlap o r  interruption. 
The question was whether these noises indicated achowledgement of the 
Opfne o r  were tokens of agreement. 
Sinclai r  and Coulthard (cf. Chapter 11, p. 58) define an 
'acknowledge' a s  a verbal or  non-verbal s ignal  confirming that the hearer 
is l is tening and understanding occurring a s  a 'response' move to  an 
'informative.' As such, it does not mark agreement. Pomerantz (cf.  
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Chapter 11, p. k 7 )  suggests t ha t  'tokens' recognize the  s t a tu s  of the  
pr ior  speaker's assessment without a specif ic  focus on the referent ,  and 
she gives 'Yeah' a s  an example. In addit ion,  her findings show tha t  
tokens a r e  followed by agreements a s  responses t o  compliments. 
Examination of the  conversational data revealed that  when 'Yeah' 
appeared a t  the  beginning of a speaker's turn and was followed in the 
same turn by a second m e ,  t ha t  second move was e i t h e r  some form of 
expression of agreement, or  it began with 'but '  followed by a second 
assessment of the  pr io r  speaker's referent .  men  'Yeah' appeared alone 
in a one utterance turn,  the  next speaker appeared t o  have understood 
it a s  agreement. Similarly the  two instances of 'Huh uh' were understood 
a s  disagreement by the  next speaker. Therefore 'Yeah' a t  the beginning 
of a turn o r  occurring alone a s  a one utterance turn was considered t o  
be a token of agreement while 'huh uh' was considered t o  be a token of 
disagreement. Additional evidence is supplied by Scheglof f (cf . 
Chapter 11, p. 45) when he allows that 'uh huh's' and the  l i k e  can be 
taken a s  indications of agreement because they indicate  that opportunit ies 
fo r  disagreement have been passed over. 
E. A Proposal fo r  Two Sub-classes of 'Representatives' 
The speech ac t  agreeldisagree6 is an a c t  performed in conjunction 
with a p r io r  utterance by the previous par t ic ipant .  Some pr ior  
utterance t o  agreementldisagreement must be produced so tha t  a relat ion-  
ship can be established,  a f i r s t  utterance 'in conjunction with1 a 
second utterance. Agreementldisagreement cannot stand alone, it must 
occur as .a  'second' in a relat ionship with a ' f i r s t . '  The nature of 
the f i r s t  utterance m u s t  be described in order t o  be able  t o  describe 
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the nature of the second utterance and to  describe the relationship 
between them. 
Examination of the data collected for  t h i s  study revealed that 
obvious examples of the speech ac t  agreen~entldisagreement appeared t o  
follow a pr ior  utterance in which a speaker expressed an assessment of 
a referent  in terms of a degree of certaintyluncertainty o r  in terms 
of an assignment of a character is t ic /qual i ty  with or  without a 
positivelnegative value judgement. In the example, 
C31:23, 25 
D: Oh, now t h a t ' s  stingy. 
A: Yeah that's def in i te ly  stingy. 
the repe t i t ion  of the or ig ina l  utterance with the addition of the 
agreement token, 'yeah, and an i n t ens i f i e r  ' de f in i t e l y t7  c lear ly  
marks agreement. 'Stingy' is a qual i ty  with a negative value assessed 
bythe speaker towards the r e f e ~ e n t  ' that . '  
C36:18, 19 
C: I don't think they're (children) ready for  social iz ing 
outside of the family, you know, before the age of about 
f i ve  o r  six. 
D: Yeah, I agree with you. 
This example employs the performative verb 'agree' to  indicate the 
speaker's agreement. The f i r s t  speaker uses the verb 'think' with the 
f i r s t  person present tense, to  indicate the degree of cer ta inty with 
which he views the t ru th  value of h i s  propositional content a t  the 
moment of speaking. 
Searle 's  system, on the whole, is t i gh te r  and nore economical 
than the others. It is the one most generally thought of as  representative 
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of Speech kt theory as  well as  the one most generally used by others 
to  build upon, or  from which t o  develop new taxonomies. Searle 's  
inclusion of the category Representative Declarations as  a sub-category 
of Declarations which includes aspects of Representatives allows for  
the poss ib i l i ty  of other such combinations a s  k c h e r h a s  shown (cf. 
pp. 24-25). In  t h i s  study utterances which express a speaker's 
assessment of a referent in terms of a degree of certaintyluncertainty 
o r  in terms of an assignment of a character is t ic lqual i ty  with or  without 
a posit ivelnegativ= value judgement a r e  t o  be specially provided for in 
Searle 's  taxonomy. They w i l l  be called 'Opines' and a re  postulated 
to  be a sub-category of Representatives. 
What of utterances which do not express such assessments, i . e . ,  
utterances which only convey o r  report  fac tua l  information to  the 
hearer without any assessment of t ha t  information on the par t  of the 
s p e a h r ?  I f  Opines appear as  a sub-category of Representatives, i t  is 
also necessary to  postulate a sub-category of 'Reportatives' which a re  
often d i s t i nc t  from Opines functionally and interact ional ly ,  and may 
be thought of as  appearing on opposite ends of a continuum. 
1. Reportatives 
rWhen Searle designated ' b m t e  fac t s '  as  being f a c t s  making up 
knowledge of physical or  mental concepts that a r e  based on empirical 
obsezvation (cf. p. 161, he was referr ing t o  the type of fac t  o r  factual  
knowledie which provides the evidence f o r  the t r u t h  of a speaker's 
proposition required by the preparatory condition for  the i l locutionary 
a c t s  ' a sser t , '  ' s t a t e , '  o r  'affirm.' As such, ' a sser t , '  ' s t a te , '  
'affirm,' along with ' report , '  'describe, '  and 'say,' a r e  members of the 
proposed sub-category, 'Reportatives' in that the proposition can be 
subjected to  t e s t s  of validation or  f a l s i f i ca t ion  in the objective 
r e a l  world. They function as  conveyors of information/knowledge 
consist ing of 'brute fac t s '  about some event o r  state- of- affairs hown 
to  the speaker but which may not be h o r n  to  the hearer. They may 
add t o  speaker-hearer shared howledge, modify shared howledge, o r  
be en t i re ly  new information/howledge. They a s s i p  no charac te r i s t ics  
o r  qua l i t i e s ,  contain no assessment of value judgement on the par t  of 
the speaker toward tha t  information/knovledge, and they express no 
degree of modality by the speaker. They express s t a t e s  of a f f a i r s  tha t  
a r e  absolute, not r e l a t i ve  to  anything a t  the time of speaking. In  the 
data they: 
may r e fe r  to  the  speaker: 
C1:43 
D: + The example I gave her was 60 minutes. 
may re fe r  t o  another person o r  to  an object ,  event or  s t a t e  of 
a f fa i r s :  
C l  : 38 
D: They a re  s t i l l  edited,  they've got to  get it d o h  
t o  exactly the r i gh t  number of minutes. 
may report  what others have said about themselves, others,  s t a t e s ,  
events, and objects: 
C l  : 30a 
D: . . . and her conmeat was tha t  ( - 2 )  every TV program 
is edited. 
In the  data a hearer may respond to  a b p o r t a t i v e  by: 
1 ) acknowledgement 
C1:64, 65, 66 
D: It's i l l ega l .  
B: Well, everything is. 
c: # Hum. 
2) confirmation of the t ru th  value of the proposition 
CA:112, 113 
. A :  They c a l l  you Mark the Clown. 
B: That's w h a t  they do. 
3) denial  o r  correction of the  t ru th  value of the proposition 
C11:18, 19 
B: # Right, but  you do - I guess you didn ' t  hear it on 
ABC the  other night ,  t h a t  we're going to pick up 
the  lossess  that the  banks1 (. . .) 
A: Xo, we're not picking 
up the  lossess. 
2. Opines 
In  t h i s  study an utterance was c l a s s i f i ed  a s  an Opine i f  in 
that utterance the  speaker assesses a re fe ren t  by assigning i t  
. 
1) some degree of certainty/uncertainty a s  i n  
a )  its likelihood of occurrence or  of being a s t a t e  of a f f a i r s  
b) its frequency of occurrence, 
c )  i ts  approximate s i ze  or  amount. 
2 )  some charac te r i s t i c  o r  qual i ty  with or  without a posit ive1 
negative value judgement (compare with ~dmndson ' s  'Opine1 and 
'Tel l , '  c f .  pp. 65-66). 
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'Judgements,' 'beliefs. '  'opinions, '  'evaluations, '  'approxinations,' 
 estimation^,^ 'assessments,' and other such re la ted speech ac t s  make 
up the sub-category 'Opine.' A l l  these ac t s  above a re  re la ted i n  that 
they share some of the a t t r i bu t e s  of Reportatives. Both Reportatives 
and Opines a re  sub-categories of Representatives, e.g., the 'direction 
of f i t '  fo r  both is words-to-the-world. They also share some of the 
a t t r i bu t e s  of Expressives which express the speaker's feel ings  and 
a t t i t udes  about the  s t a t e  of a f f a i r s  referred t o  i n  the expressed 
proposition (cf. p. 21). Rowever, i n  Expressives the t ru th  of the 
proposition is presupposed, while in Opines the s p e a h r  and hearer do 
not necessari ly hold the same assessment of the s t a t e  of a f f a i r s  being 
referred to .  I n  an Opine, the t m t h  s t a tu s  of the proposition is 
negotiable in t h a t  the s t a t e  of a f f a i r s  referred to  is not subject to  
h e d i a t e  empirical ve r i f i ca t i an  a s  being e i the r  ' T N ~ '  o r  'False.' 
Opines r e f l e c t  a subjective r e a l i t y  as  opposed to  Reportatives which 
r e f l e c t  an objective r e a l i t y  and a re  subject t o  t e s t s  of validation 
o r  f a l s i f i ca t ion .  Opines express s t a t e s  of a f f a i r s  tha t  are  r e l a t i ve ,  
not absolute a t  the time of speaking. 8 
a)  Characterist ics of Opines 
A speaker assesses a referent  by assigning i t  some degree of 
certainty/mcer:ainty a s  i n  
a) its likelihood of occurrence o r  of being a s t a t e  of a f f a i r s .  
This charac te r i s t ic  contains two classes:  what can be termed 
'Tentatives' and 'Suppositions. ' 
Tentatives a r e  represented by epistemic modality: possibil i ty- 
probabi l iw,  necessity, the ten ta t ive  Â £ o  'might,' 'would,' 'should,' 
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and Tag Questions and Xegative Questions. Represented in the data 
were the verbs: 'would' as  the most frequent, e.g., 'That would be a 
9 
method,' 'may,' 'might,' 'can,' 'could,' 'must,' and 'have to '  meaning 
no other poss ib i l i ty ,  'not necessari ly,  don't have to . '  Adverbs included 
'aaybe' a s  the most frequent, e.g., 'Maybe I agree,' 'probably,' 
'certainly, '  'of course (not). '  A Nouu phrase which occurred was 
'Adj.lN or  something,' e.g., 'It's the f l u  o r  something.' 
The expression of necessity with 'mustT and 'have to '  can be used 
t o  issue a command o r  order,  e.g., 'You must go to  the dent i s t  a t  
2:3OSt when the speaker is in a posit ion of authority over the hearer. 
The speaker may f e e l  tha t  going t o  the dent i s t  i s  i n  the best i n t e r e s t s  
of the hearer, and thereby be implying an evaluation, but the force of 
command comes from h i s  authority and the hearer is not in a posit ion to 
agree o r  disagree with an *lied Opine issued from an authority. 
Commands and orders were wt couuted a s  Opines in this study. 10 
On the other hand, the expression of necessity with 'must' and 
'have to '  can be used to  mean 'no other poss ib i l i ty , '  e.g., 
CS: 13 
A: It 's a new book so i t  must be England. 
The sa les  g i r l  assesses the location of a book's publisher a s  England 
because it is not in the American book list and therefore there is no 
other poss ib i l i ty  except England in her judgement. 'Xust' and 'have to '  
with the meaning 'no other poss ib i l i ty '  a r e  considered @ines. 11 
'Should' is a member of the tentat ive forms along with 'may' and 
'might' when it expresses "extreme likelihood or  a reasonable assumption 
or  conclusion . . . it implicit ly allows for  the speaker to be mistaken" 
(Pahe r  1979:49), e.g., 
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Sl 
A: He should have.arrived by now. The plane was t o  land a t  
8:SO and i t ' s  now 9:30. 
Futuri ty expressed with the  modal ' w i l l '  was not counted a s  an 
'Opine' even though future  occurrences o r  s t a t e s  of a f f a i r s  cannot be 
empirically ver i f ied  a s  t r ue  or  f a l s e  a t  the  moment of speaking. The 
qual i ty  of vo l i t i on  on the par t  of the  speaker excludes fu ture  ' w i l l '  
from inclusion i n  the c l a s s  of Opines. 
CB: 260 
A: I'll ju s t  go take a sleeping p i l l  and go t o  sleep. 
Tag questions and negative questions a l so  express tentativeness 
(cf. pp. 36, 59, 1 1- L i t .  review). Negative questions imply "disbelief 
i n  the  pos s ib i l i t y  of a negative answer" (Leech 1977). Tag questions 
ask the  hearer t o  support the  proposition which the  s p e a h r  believes 
t o  be ccue. 
'Suppositions' can be recognized a s  such i f  an utterance can be 
preceded by 'As f a r  a s  I can ascer ta in  from w h a t  information you have 
given me or  t h a t  I already have, I can suppose . . .' The point is t h a t  
the  speaker is knowingly making a supposition based on i~~fo rma t ion  which 
he considers t o  be incomplete or  not empirically ve r i f i ab l e  a t  the 
moment of speaking. -1es from the data f e l l  in to  two groupings. 
1) Suppositions based on mental perceptions included the  verbs 
'I think' as the  most frequent, 'I guess,' 'I believe, '  and 
'I fee l . '  
2)  Suppositions based on physical perceptions included the verbs 
'it sounds ( l i ke ) '  and ' i t  looks ( l i ke ) .  
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In t h i s  data,  the expression 'supposed t o '  i s  considered t o  be a 
Reportative and is not counted a s  an Opine, e-g . ,  
C8:6 
A: You're supposed t o  be here from 12:OO r i gh t ?  
This is an obligation,  and l i k e  a command leaves no options f o r  
agreement o r  disagreement open fo r  the hearer. 
The expressions 'it depends on, '  e.g., 
C9:31a 
A: Nice yeah. It a l l  depends on the  s t y l e  of the shoe 
B: umhum yeah 
some people rea l ly  (. . .) them and some people don't.  
and ' i t ' s  up to you,' e.g., 
C9:83 
A: You want the  boxes, i t ' s  up to  you. 
can be considered Reportatives a s  In, 'I report  the  f a c t  tha t  i t ' s  up 
to  you,' o r  Opines a s  In, 'I suppose. it a l l  depends on the  s ty l e  . . . .' 
A constraint  which appeared on suppositions is tha t  they be in 
the present tense,  and f i r s t  person singular except fo r  the  two 
expressions above. It must be a supposition made a t  the  time of speaking, 
past  suppositions nay have been ver i f ied  o r  the  hearer may have changed 
h i s  a t t i tude .  Also an utterance a s  'He thinks t h a t ' s  $4.00,' could 
I be a Reportative a s ,  'I report that . . ., o r ,  'He said t ha t  he thinks 
t h a t ' s  $4.00.' On the other hand, i t  could be an Opine a s  'I suppose 
he thinks t h a t ' s  $4.00.' The decision a s  t o  which c l a s s  such an 
utterance belongs t o  r e s t s  on other s i t ua t i ona l  fac tors  and of ten it 
is not possible to determine. 13 
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An utterance is c lass i f ied  a s  an Opine i f  i n  tha t  utterance the 
speaker assesses a referent  by assigning it some degree of cer ta inty1 
uncertainty as  in  
b) its frequency of occurrence 
This charac te r i s t ic  includes the adverbs of frequency. Examples 
included 'sometimes' a s  the most frequent, e.g.,  'I am a t  sometimes 
, , c o ~ u l s i v e l y  , neurotically . . . ah, uh, you 'mow, usually,  ' ' (not) 
often, '  'always.' 
c )  its approximate s i z e  or  amount. 
This charac te r i s t ic  includes approximations and estimations, e.g., 
'some' a s  the most frequent, e.g.. 'Yes, well some of them a re  but , '  
'a l o t  o f , '  'most,' 'a l i t t l e , '  ' a  few,' 'mostly,' 'more,' ' m y , '  
'a great  deal  of , '  ' l e s s l w r e  than,' ' (not)  enough.' 
A speaker assesses a referent  by assigning it some a t t r i b u t e  
charac te r i s t ic  or  qual i ty  with o r  without a positivelnegative value 
judsenent. 
Attributes,  character is t ics  or  qua l i t i e s  with a value judgement 
a r e  subjective  evaluation^'^ and the data include the Adjectives 'good,' 
'nice, '  and 'bet ter '  a s  t he  most frequent, e.g., 'I w i l l  get be t t e r ,  t ha t  
I can promise,' 'neat , '  'strange, '  ' f a r  out ,' ' (not) worth,' ' a l r igh t , '  
v v . e  
'ok,' 'beaut i ful , '  ' special , '  ' p re t ty , '  'not good,' 'great ,  ~ i n e , '  
'not tha t  great ,  ' 'crazy,' ' t e r r i b l e ,  ' 'bad, ' 'wrong (not working), ' 
'sharp' ( in te l l igen t ) .  Nouns include 'the devi l '  (!iBR), e.g., 'You've 
got to  give the devi l  h i s  due,' ' f au l t  ,' 'good w i l l , '  'benefit  ,' 
' c r i t ic ism, '  'compliment,' 'excellence.' Verbs include 'I l i ke , '  '1 
want,' 'help, '  'I hate , '  'should,' 1.5 t throw away,' 'I kope,' e.g., 'I 
l i k e  these.' The same constraint  on verbs that appeared with Suppositions 
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can be seen to be operating here as  well (cf .  p .  17). Adverbs included 
'too + Adj.' 'so + Adj.' ' i n  our i n t e r e s t , '  e.g.,  'That was so E n d  of 
you. I 
Some expressions which occurred are  'never mind,' and ' i t  doesn't 
matter' both meaning something is not important, 'I wonder i f  . . . 
would be be t t e r , '  'I 've never thought about i t , '  'not much of a  . . . , I  
' it would be be t te r  to  . . . , I  ' ( I f  I were you) I would not worry about 
it ,' ' it 's about t h e , '  ' it would be much be t t e r  i f  . . . , ' ' I ' m  glad 
t o  say. ' 
Other conditionals, not included above, a r e  problematic and 
can be Opines or  not. kamples from the data include the following: 
1) C8:39 
A: I f  yau keep them l ike  tha t ,  you might destroy the stones. 
3 C9:64 
A: This i s  a  nice color,  ff you have things to  wear with it. 
3 )  C10:4 
A: I f  he is an American c i t i zen ,  he has every r ight  to 
s e n e  in the US mili tary.  
4) CB:276 
A: If I get out from under t h i s  (.I  t r i p  1'11 be (. . . ) . 
Fzample 1) was counted as  a negative evaluation, i . e . ,  'keeping 
them l i k e  t.hat is bad' because of the negative resu l t .  
Example 2) was counted a s  an Q i n e  because i t  is a  posi t ive  
evaluation i n  that 'the color is nice i f  you have things' and ' the color 
is not nice i f  you don't have things to  wear with i t . '  
Example 3 )  was counted as  a  b p o r t a t i v e  because being an -American 
or  not is an absolute s i tuat ion not a  re la t ive  one and h i s  having the 
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' r i gh t '  o r  not is dependent on tha t  absolute condition. 
Example 4 )  could be an Evaluation a s  ' A t  the  time when I get out 
from under this t r i p ,  I ' l l  be (. . . ) , I  or  i t  could be a Tentative 
with ' i f '  indicating a poss ib i l i ty  that A w i l l  not 'get out from under 
t h i s  t r ip . '  Either way it is an Opine. 
Again, the decision as  t o  whether or  not a given conditional is 
an Opine o r  not depends on other s i tua t iona l  factors  and a t  times it 
was fmpossible t o  determine. 
Examples which report  some f ac t  o r  s t a t e  about the mental o r  
physical condition of the speaker were not considered Opines even 
though they may contain evaluative adjectives. The hearer assumes the 
proposition i s  t rue  because the speaker is using himself a s  the re fe ren t ,  
e.g., C3:3 
A: I f e e l  t e r r ib l e .  
C3:28 
I'm hungry. 
c3: 33 
A: Well, I had be t t e r  go back to  work. 
C14:18a 
A: I agree. 
Gn the other hand, examples which included a referent  other than 
the speaker were counted a s  Opines. He i s  assessing something outside 
himseLf, something other than his o m  condition. 
e.g., C28:14 
A: I ' m  happy about that .  
CB:128 
A: Well, it rea l ly  hur ts ,  when somebody - when you spend time 
with somebody . 
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Opines occur simply a s  the opinion held by the speaker about 
so= referent.  They can also occur a s  compliments, e.g.,  
Sl 
A: Great speech Brown. 
Sometimes they occur as  confirmation checks 
Cl : 143 
C: You've done the socio course haven't you? 
In  addition of fe rs ,  advice, recommendations and apologies can be 
said to  contain an implicit  Opine regarding benefit  to  the hearer. 
Offers a r e  ac t s  t o  be carr ied out by the speaker, but the of fe r  is made 
because the speaker believes the ac t  w i l l  benefit  the hearer. The same 
is t rue  of advice and recommendation although the ac t  in question is to  
be carr ied out by the hearer for  his own benefit .  Apologies have the 
implicit  speaker bel ief  that some a c t  carried out by the speaker has or  
will be of negative value t o  the hearer. In  t h i s  study of fe rs  and 
apologies were not counted a s  Opines since the implication is a weak one. 
Eowever, recommendations and advice were counted a s  Opines since the 
implication of posit ive or  negative value for  the hearer is much 
stronger. A s  advice o r  recommendation 'should' and 'ought t o '  mark 
Opines. 
Attributes,  character is t ics  o r  qua l i t i e s  without a value judgement 
a r e  also subjective waluat ions  and the data includes the Adjectives 
'smaller' a s  the most frequent, 'too much . . .,' 'slow,' 'surprising, '  
' ( too) big, '  '(too) easy,' 'understandable.' Nouns include 'wrong 
with (not operating properly), '  'of in terest . '  Adverbs include ' sor t  o f , '  
' l i t e r a l l y , '  'very,' 'rather. '  
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h o t h e r  charac te r i s t i c  of Opines, although not a defining one, 
is that a speaker may assign only one Opine marker to a proposition or  
he may assign mare than one. 
Cl: 87a 
D: + It should probably be j u s t  p i l o t  tes ted.  . . . 
where both 'should1 and 'probably' a re  both w i n e  markers. 
C32:1S, 19 
C: I don't r ea l l y  r ea l l y  think you should have laws against  
' 
any kind of a drug. 
B: I think maybe I agree with Bette. 
This double marking is probably an attempt by the  speaker t o  
emphasize his uncertainty o r  the subjective qual i ty  of h i s  utterance. 
According t o  &use and Kasper (1981:167) such utterances would "lower 
the  degree t o  which X commits himself t o  the  s t a t e  of a f f a i r s  referred 
t o  in the proposition.'' 
A charac te r i s t i c  which w i n e s  share with Reportatives is that of 
embedding. 
1) A Reportative can be embedded in an Opine, e.g., 
I think he said he went t o  Waikiki. 
The Opine appears a s  the supposition, 'I t h h k , '  while 'he sa id  he 
. 
went t o  \?aikikil is the Reportative. This is counted a s  an Opine. 
2 )  A Reportative can be embedded in a Reportative, e.g., 
I report  that  he said  he went t o  Wai ' d i .  
'I report '  and 'he said t h a t  he went t o  Waikiki' a r e  both ~ e p o r t a t i v e s .  
This is counted a s  a Reportative. 
3) An Opine can be embedded i n  a.Reportative,  e.g.,  
I report  that t h i s  is good. 
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The Reportative appears a s  'I report, '  while ' t h i s  is good' is a 
pos i t ive  evaluation of the referent ' t h i s . '  This is counted a s  an 
Opine. 
4) An Opine can be embedded in an Opine, e . g . ,  
I think t h i s  is good. 
'I  think' i s  a tentat ive  Opine, and ' t h i s  is good' is an evaluation 
Opine. 
SOTES 
Her data c i ted  fo r  the study she was conducting a t  the  time 
Include "conversations between fr iends ,  people speaking i n  public 
meetings, both from the stage and from the audience, work s i tua t ions  
where the  par t ic ipants  a re  colleagues and those in which there  a r e  
asymmetrical re la t ionships  involved, conversations between children and 
parents and between parents and children,  narra t ives  recorded from IV 
talk'shows and newspapers, from conversations during service  encounters, 
and from those among neighbors a s  wel l  a s  among family members" 
(Wolf son 1976: 204). 
Regarding the  col lect ion of data  she says, "one can obtain data 
by l i s ten ing  and, i f  possible,  recording wherever people meet and 
speak. . . . One has only t o  l i s t e n  and wri te  quickly, o r ,  if the  
noise l eve l  permits, record. These a re ,  a s  Labov has so t ru ly  termed 
them, anonymous observations. From the point of view of the  speaker, 
they have not occurred a t  a l l .  From the point of view of e th ics ,  
It need only be said  t ha t  the  investigation is looking only a t  speech 
forms; he nei ther  knows nor cares who the  par t ic ipan ts  a re  and h i s  
observing has nothing to  do with gathering information spec i f ic  t o  
individuals" (Wolf son 1976:204). 
I n  the  cases where a telephone was tapped, it was not possible 
t ha t  the  inter locutors  be unaware t h a t  data  was being col lected,  both 
par t ic ipants  always had t o  know. In some of the  service-encounters 
taped, the  researcher asked a f r iend to  buy something or  t o  do some 
errand and the  researcher tagged along to  tape it. In  these cases,  one 
of the  inter locutors  knew she was being taped. 
Some of these preliminary hypotheses included: 
-Agree/disagree may only occur a s  a response t o  an 'opinion.' 
-The speech a c t s  'confirmation' or  'denial , '  'acceptance' o r  
' re ject ion '  did not cons t i tu te  'agreement/disagreement.' 
-An opinion was not something t h a t  w a s  'binary, '  i .e . ,  
e i t he r  'x '  o r  'not x, '  e.g., 'He is 72.' 
-An 'opinion' was a b e l i e f ,  a c r i t i c i sm,  a value judgement 
o r  evaluation. 
-A 'statement' was about a f a c t  that was ve r i f i ab l e  a s  t r ue  
o r  fa l se .  
-Opinions and agreement/disagreement belonged to  Sear le ' s  
c l a s s  of Representative. 
When e i t he r  occurred alone a s  a one utterance turn it was 
considered t o  be a re f lec t ion  of the  same l eve l  of assessment of the  
referent  a s  tha t  of the i n i t i a t i o n  Opine since no exp l i c i t  expression 
of upgrading o r  down scaling was produced (cf.  Chapter IV). 
I 
I 
The speech ac t  'agreement/disagreement/ examined in t h i s  thes i s  
is the speech a c t  'agreement withldisagreement with.' 'Agreement t o /  
disagreement to '  is another speech ac t  involving the performance of 
some action subsequent to  and a s  a consequence of the speech act  
agreement to/disagreement to. 
In  addition to  being an in t ens i f i e r ,  ' de f in i te ly t is also a 
cer ta inty marker. 
%or descriptive statements the question of t r u t h  o r  f a l s i t y  is 
objectively decideable, because t o  know the meaning of the descriptive 
expressions is t o  know under w h a t  objectively ascertainable conditions 
the statements which contain them a re  t rue o r  fa lse .  . . . To know 
the meaning of evaluative expressions I s  not by i t s e l f  suf f ic ien t  fo r  
knowing under w h a t  conditions the statements'containing t h e m  a r e  t rue 
o r  f a l s e ,  because the meaning of the expressions is such that  the 
statements a r e  not capable of objective o r  fac tua l  t r u t h  o r  f a l s i t y  
a t  a l l .  . . . 
Descriptive statements a r e  thus objective evaluative statements 
subjective. . . ." (Searle 1969:183). 
k t h  can and could occur in Opines a s  poss ib i l i ty  and ab i l i t y  
although it occurred more frequently as  poss ib i l i ty .  
10 I .e. ,  examples of deontic modality were not considered t o  be 
Opines. 
Palmer (l979:43), following Kartunnen (1972: 12). s t a t e s  that 
" factual asser t ion is not an expression of cer ta in ty  o r  of IOU% 
probability; ra ther ,  it makes no epistemic judgement a t  a l l .  Epistemic 
necessity, unlike fac tua l  asser t ion,  makes such a judgeuent: making the 
strongest of a l l  judgenents i s  not the  same a s  making a factual  
assert ion.  Indeed, in language, a factual  asser t ion makes a stronger 
claim than the strongest of a l l  epistemic judgements." Factual 
asser t ion i s  a Reportative, epistemic necessity i s  an %he. 
l2 Palmer (1979~72) re fe rs  to  t h i s  type of verb a s  "private verbs." 
l3 Throughout t h i s  study when it was not possible to  determine the 
c lass i f ica t ion  of a par t icular  example, it was not counted a s  an Opine. 
l4 and "are judged by the speakers perception" (Richards 1983, 
pr ivate  discussion). 
fShouldl here is the 'shouldf of advice and recommendations 
which indicates that some s i tua t ion  or condition X is be t t e r  o r  worse 
(with a negative) for  the hearer than the s i tua t ion  or  condition a t  the 
time of speaking. 
W T E R  I V  
THF, SPEECH ACT A G ~ I D I S A G R E ~ 1 E N T  
This chapter reports the r e s u l t s  of the research done on the 
speech act agreementldisagreement and discusses those resu l t s .  The 
r e su l t s  begin with a def ini t ion of the speech a c t  along with its 
s t ruc tu ra l  character is t ics .  Then the r e su l t  tha t  agreement occurs 
more frequently than disagreement is discussed and possible reasons 
f o r  the  r e su l t  that Opines occur much more frequently than agreement1 
disagreement a r e  suggested. Following tha t  is a discussion of the 
s i x  levels  of poli teness which were found t o  make up t h i s  speech ac t .  
The sociol inguis t ic  var iables  collected in the data a r e  then discussed. 
The speech act as  a function in discourse is explained and possible 
responses t o  it a re  suggested. The relevance of the findings from t h i s  
research to  the ESLIEFL classroom/learner a r e  suggested by discussing 
the s t ruc tu ra l  poli teness fac tors  of the speech ac t  which should be 
'horn t o  an intermediate leve l  learner.  Following tha t  the levels  and 
forms of the speech a c t  which should be included in an intermediate 
leve l  student's reper toire  are  suggested. 
When a speaker assesses a referent  by assigning i t  
1) some degree of certaintyluncertainty a s  in 
a)  i t s  likelihood of occurrence o r  of being a s t a t e  of a f f a i r s  
b) its frequency of occurrence 
c )  its approximate s i ze  or  amount. 
2) some a t t r i bu te ,  charac te r i s t ic  o r  qual i ty  with or without 
a positivelnegative value judgenent 
then 1) Agreement can optionally Zollow a s  a response i f  the responder 
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holds the same assessment of the same referent a s  the producer of 
the pr ior  Opine, 
o r  2) Disagreement can optionally follow a s  a response i f  the 
responder holds a d i f fe ren t  of a qual i f ied assessment of the sane 
referent a s  the producer of the pr ior  Opine. 
This speech act usually occurs a s  a declarative sentence which 
typical ly  is also an Opine.' The s t ructure  is sequential in tha t  it 
appears only a s  
1) Action2 of an 'action chain' (cf. p. 47 and f.n. 14 in Chapter 
11) with Actionl being an w i n e ,  o r  a s  
2) a response to  an w i n e ,  and a s  such it cannot be used to  
i n i t i a t e  a sequence, of a s  an Actionl. There must be a previous 
utterance, Opine. 2 
CB:171-2 Agre-nt as  Action2 following an Opine: 
B: He's a ra t .  A rat fink. 
A: He rea l ly  is. 
Agreement a s  Action pr ior  t o  an Opine. 1 
*A: He  rea l ly  is. 
B: Ee's a r a t .  A r a t  fink. 
Fab. Agreement without a pr ior  utterance, Opine. 
A: - 
*B: I agree. 
Fab. Agreement a s  Action2 following a Reportative. 
A: He said that i t  was yesterday. 
*B: I disagree. 
102 
The data in t h i s  study indicate  tha t  Agreements a r e  the preferred 
seconds occurring 137 times a s  a response to  1,170 occurrence of Opines, 
while Disagreements a r e  the dispreferred seconds occurring only 49 times 
i n  response t o  Q ~ i n e s . ~  The reason for  t h i s  p re fe ren t ia l  difference 
is not d i f f i c u l t  to  understand a s  the  rwiew of t h c l i t e r a t u r e  on 
poli teness indicates. 
Leech (cf. p. 37) maintains that conf l ic t  or  s i tua t ions  that  lead 
t o  conf l ic t  should be avoided. Disagreement can be taken a s  a c r i t i c i sm 
of the pr ior  speaker and cr i t ic isms threaten the hearer 's  face accordkg 
t~ Brown and Levinson (cf. p. 38). Labov and Fanshall (cf. pp. 53-54) 
suggest tha t  cr i t ic isms along with challenges lower the s t a tu s  of the 
other participant.  Edmondson and House (cf .  p. 64) give " h t i c i p a t e  
any case in which you might give offense'' a s  one of t h e i r  ' social  ru les  
of conduct.' L a h f f  (cf. p. 35) notes t h a t  the need for  poli teness 
supercedes that for  c l a r i t y  because fol lowhg the 'Rules of Politeness' 
w i l l  cause the interlocutor "to think well of one." She mentions 
"malchg A f e e l  good-be friendly" a s  one of the Poli teness ru les .  
Disagreement which is heard a s  a c r i t i c i sm wouldn't cause a hearer to  
f e e l  good. Rehbein and Ehlich (cf .  p. 51) e-xpress the idea tha t  a 
negative a t t i tude  held by a hearer may break off fur ther  re la t ions  while 
a posi t ive  a t t i t ude  would continue the relationship.  Brown and 
Levinson (cf.  ?. 39) suggest that a person's face is vulnerable in 
face-Lo-face interact ion and cooperation in face maintenance is 
necessary in such s i tua t ions  of interaction.  
The l i t e r a t u r e  mu ld  indicate tha t  disagreement has negative 
interact ional  qua l i t i e s  which could potent ia l ly  resu l t  i n  a breech in 
the relationship. Therefore an interlocutor must weigh the degree of 
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potent ia l  r i s k  involved against h i s  desirelneed to  be honest and to  
express h i s  own feelings and a t t i tudes .  
On the other hand, agreement has posit ive interact ional  qua l i t i es  
expressing fr iendl iness  and support for  the hearer which make him fee l  
he is liked and appreciated. 
The data collected for t h i s  study h d i c a t e  tha t  Opines occur 
frequently in discourse. Being marked for  uncertainty and being 
expressions of the speaker's o m  subjective feel ings  and a t t i t udes ,  
the i r  asser t ive  force is diminished, they are  l e s s  d i r ec t ,  which, a s  
Leech (cf. p. 3 7 )  suggests, means they are  more po l i t e  and tac t fu l .  
For Brown and Levinson (cf. p. 38) ,  they a re  a type of 'negative 
poli teness, '  and when they occur as  tag questions o r  a s  negative 
questions Sinclai r  and Brazil  (cf. p. 5 9 )  suggest tha t  the hearer 's  
happy because he has some indication of the speaker's position. However 
the data indicate tha t  the speech act  agreementldisagreement occurs 
re la t ive ly  infrequently i n  discourse. 
In the normal course of a conversation, speakers of ten  produce 
more than one speech act  during the i r  turn a t  ta lk .  'Opines,' therefore, 
may occur a s  one i n  a succession of other a c t s  and, according to  Sinclair  
and Coulthard (cf. p. 5 7 1 ,  the hearer knows he only has to  respond to  the 
last one which has the discourse function of being the in i t i a t i ng  move 
so tha t  unless an Opine occurs a s  an ' i n i t i a t i ng  move,' a next speaker 
is under no obligation to  produce agreementldisagreement. 
On the other hand, a speaker desireslneeds to  express h i s  own 
sincere feelings and a t t i t udes  i n  an assessment of a referent while a t  
the same tlme hershe desireslneeds to  have the interlocutor think w e l l  
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of himlher by acting in a polite manner. As has been noted above, 
indirectness which expresses a lesser degree of forcefulness and 
less speaker commitment to a proposition is a manifestation of politeness. 
Opines, by definition, are the expression of a speaker's feelings and 
attitudes as an assessrent of a referent and, at the same time, are 
indirect in that they also display less speaker codtaent to hislher 
proposition than do Reportatives. wines, therefore, offer the perfect 
solution for the speaker. However, by producing his own subjective 
assessment of a referent in an Opine as an 'initiation' move, a speaker 
is voluntarily placing himself in a position where he can be threatened, 
i.e., his assessment can be challenged by his interlocutor. Xe is 
dependent, therefore, on his interlocutor's cooperation in maintaining 
his (the initiator's) face (cf. Brown and Levinson, p. 38). This 
obligates the responder to some extent to be polite and to protect the 
initiator's face by agreeing or not disagreeing, or at least by 
providing an accounting for his disagreement. 
The data show individual expressions of agreementldisagreement 
appearing under points along a continuum of politeness and tact. This 
scale proceeds from a point of maximum H-support/minhum threat, ' ~ m l , '  
at the farthest end of the Agreement scale to a point of minimum 
. 
H-supportlmaximum threat, 'Opposite,' at the farthest end of the 
Disagreement scale. Six levels of politeness could be distinguished 
along this continuum. 
A. AgreementIDisagreement: A Scale of Six Levels of Politeness 
In producing the speech act agreenent/disagreement the resoonder 
produces an utterance in response to an Opine offered by the prior 
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speaker by producing his own assessment of the  same re fe ren t  by 
assigning i t  a(n) 
Most Po l i t e  Least Po l i t e  
I I I 1 I - I 
Equal Upgraded Scaled-kwn Qualified Different  Opposite 
assessment in r e l a t i on  t o  that of the  o r i g ina l l y  proffered assessment. 
'Equal,' 'Upgraded,' and 'Scaled-Down' a r e  t he  three  l eve l s  of 
Agreement, while 'Qualified, '  'Different , '  and '@pos i te l  a r e  the  
three  l eve l s  of Disagreement. 
Assessment s h i f t s  in responses were determined according t o  the  
def in i t ion  of an @ h e .  If the degree of c e r t a i n ty  changed t o  a stronger 
degree, the  respondent's assessment was  determined t o  be 'upgraded.' 
I f  the degree of ce r ta in ty  became less, it w a s  considered t o  be 
lscaled-down.' I f  a term assigning a cha rac t e r i s t i c  o r  qua l i ty  were 
strengthened, e.g., 'uuusual' t o  'weird,' o r  an i n t e n s i f i e r  were added, 
it was considered t o  be an 'upgrade.' I f  pos i t ive  o r  negative 
evaluations were made s t ronger ,  e.g., 'good' to  ' b e t t e r , '  'bad' t o  
'worst, ' it w a s  a l so  considered t o  be an 'upgrade,' while 'scaled-down' 
were the  opposite cases, e.g., ' t e r r i b l e '  t o  'bad' o r  'huge' t o  'b ig , '  
o r  the dropping of an i n t ens i f i e r .  'Equal' assessments were cases of 
repeated assessment terms o r  rephrasings but  with assessments that 
were of similar level, e.g., ' la rge '  t o  'big. ' 
Determination of the l eve l  of agreementldisagreement by a comparison 
of the responder's assessment t o  that produced by the p r io r  speaker is 
a fu r the r  indication of the  in te rac t iona l  qua l i ty  between the i n i t i a t i o n  
utterance and the  response. 
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In the following discussion, the different  levels  w i l l  be i l l u s t r a t e d  
by means of the s i tua t iona l  context. Speaker assesses a referent 'X' 1 
by assigning i t  'R' degree of cer ta inty andlor 'El charac te r i s t ic  or  
qual i ty  with o r  without positivelnegative value. (For char ts  
containing sociol inguis t ic  information c f .  Appendix I ,  Chart I . )  The 
sub-categories a r e  l i s t e d  according to the  frequency of t he i r  occurrence 
in the data. 
I. 's.' Speaker2 assesses 'X' by assigning it ' R f  andlor 
'E' with o r  without positive/negative value, i .e. ,  +A a manner that  is 
equal t o  the degree andlor charac te r i s t ic  assigned it by Speaker This 1. 
type of response was the most frequent in the data occurring a t o t a l  
of 80 times. It is considered to  be a t  the  fa r thes t  end of the Agreement 
scale expressing maximum X-support and minimuin threat  because it places 
the  relationship in a posit ion of balance and harmony, of speaker-hearer 
equali ty,  and creates  a feel ing of good-will. The relationship can 
continue employing this shared attitude/lu~owledge a s  a building block 
upon which t o  grow. This type of agreement w a s  generally found t o  occur 
throughout a l l  the data and would be c ruc ia l  to  an ESLIEFL learner.  
1) a token of agreement a s  a one-word utterance (cf.  pp. 45, 47).  
This occurs 34 tlmes making it the wst connuon form of agreement. It 
occurs nine times a s  an interruption: 2 t h e s  in Group 2 ,  and 7 times 
i n  Group 8 indicating that topics e l i c i t i n g  personal c o d t m e n t s  a r e  a lso 
important here as  w e l l  in contributing to  the  occurrence of interruption.  
There a r e  25 examples of tokens occurring without interruption of t h e  
pr ior  speaker. Appearing 12 tbes i n  Group 1. 3 times i n  Group 2 ,  1 time 
in Group 3 ,  1 time in Group 4 ,  6 times i n  Group 5 ,  1 time in Group 8 ,  
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and 1 t i m e  ia Group 9 would indicate  its usefulness in telephone 
c~ave r sa t i ons  between fr iends  and in service encounters. Tokens a r e  an 
easy and useful  too l  fo r  ESLIFXL students t o  acquire. 
CB:38, 39 
A: It is the only sensible thing t o  do Nark. Fxerything 
e l s e  is stupid. 
B: Yeah. 
2)  repe t i t ion  of assessment employing a verb of supposition (cf. 
p. 90) and/or e l l i p s i s .  This occurred a t o t a l  of 15 times: 2 times in 
Group I ,  8 times in Group 2, 1 time ia Group 4, 1 time in Group 5 ,  
1 time in Group 7 ,  and 2 times i n  Group 9 indicating i t  is used among 
fr iends  but could a lso be employed in a l l  types of s i tuat ions .  The 
frequency with which it occurs would make t h i s  an essen t ia l  form f o r  
ESL/EFL learners  besides being an easy one. 
C34:30, 31 
D: Oh Gary, but you miss a l l  the  fun. 
A: Yeah, t ha t ' s  what I t b k .  
3) d i rec t  repe t i t ion  of assessment occurs 14 times: 4 times i n  
Group 1, 3 times h Group 2, 1 time i n  Group 3 ,  1 time in Group 5,  
3 times in Group 8 ,  and 2 times in Group 9 fadicating general 
d i s t r ibu t ion  aad frequency of occurrence which would make t h i s  type a 
useful t oo l  f o r  q r e s s i n g  agreement fo r  E S L I m  students. 
Cl :  53 
D: Freeman Reports is good 
C: It i sgood .  
4) repe t i t ion  of assessment rephrasing the pr io r  assessmeat but 
on the  same level .  This occurred s& times: 2 times in Group 1, 1 time 
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in Group 4 ,  1 time in Group 7, and 2 times in Group 8. Again d i s t r ibu t ion  
is f a i r l y  even making t h i s  a useful  expression of agreement. 
CB:270, 271 
A: Things are r ea l l y  good fo r  you now, huh? 
B: Sure, i t ' s  f a r  out ( - 3 )  well ,  keep br igh t ,  huh? 
5)  equal l eve l  of assessment indicated by S2's in terrupt ion of 
S l l s  turn at  speaking in order t o  f i n i s h  the  utterance for  Sl. This 
occurred f i v e  times: 1 t h e  in Group 1,  1 time in Group 3, and 3 times 
in Group 8. These interrupt ions  with agreement occurred with some 
emotional overtones where topics involved personal commitments. 
C1:129a, 130, 129b 
B: They're not necessari ly comparable. 
1 
C? ho t  comparable. 
6) repe t i t ion  of an assessment by an exp l i c i t  performative 
occurring four  times: 2 times in Group 1, 1 time in Group 8 ,  and 
1 the in Group 9, an adversary re la t ionship indicating that both types 
of s i tua t ion ,  adversity and good friendship allow d i rec t  comunication 
of speaker feelings. 
C36:18, 19 
C: 1 don't think they're (children) ready fo r  socia l iz ing 
outside of the family, you know, before the  age of about 
5 o r  6. 
D: Yeah, I agree with you. 
7 )  Token plus support/expander. There a re  two examples i n  the 
data,  both from Group 2, among f r ieads  (cf . Appendix I ,  Table 8 ,  
Examples 79-80). (Cf. Appendix I, Table 8 ,  Examples 1-80 f o r  data 
c l a s s i f i ed  a s  'Equal' assessments,) 
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11. 'Uugraded.' Speaker assesses 'X' by assigning it 'R' plus 2 
and/or 'Ef plus with or  without positive/negative value. This is the 
second most frequently occurring form of agreement appearing in the 
data 38 times. It is considered to  be l e s s  H-supportive, and more 
threatening than the 'Equal' because even though the speaker i s  
expressing a higher leve l  of assessment, it is s t i l l  a dif ferent  
assessment so that the relationship does not r e f l e c t  the same measure 
of balance and harmony a s  from an 'Equal.' This type of agreement was 
also found to  occur throughout the data. 
l a )  upgrading an assessment with a stronger evaluation accomplished 
by an in t ens i f i e r  but not to  the leve l  of a fac t .  This occurred nine 
times: 2 times in Group 1, 3 times in Group 2, 2 times in Group 3 ,  
1 time in Group 7, and 1 time i n  Group 9 indicating that  t h i s  type also 
occurs mast frequently when a speaker is among fr iends or  colleagues 
and its frequency of use would make i t  a form ESLIEFL students should 
be aware of. 
C25:21, 22 
C: You're ra ther  formalist ic.  
D: Very much so. 
lb) tokens of agreement appear in three types of combinations 
t o t a l l i ng  nine times. 
a )  token and ' r ight '  upgrading the assessment t o  the leve l  of a 
fact .  This occurred three times: 1 time in Group 2, 1 time 
in Group 5,  and 1 t i m e  in Group 8. 
Cl:141, 142 
A: Goffman's s t d f  probably 
C: Yeah r igh t .  
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b) token and supportlevidence upgrading the assessment to  the 
leve l  of a fact .  This occurred three times: 1 time i n  Group 3, 
1 time in Group 8, and 1 time in Group 9. 
s20 
A: I think -they (poinsett ias) grow here, don't they. 
B: Yeah, there 's  a gorgeous bush of them just  down the h i l l .  
c) token and an expression upgrading the leve l  of assessment. 
This occurs chree times: 1 t i m e  in Group 1, 1 time in Group 2,  
and 1 time in Group 7. 
CA:69, 70 
B: Oh: that (cold) sounds bad. 
A: Ub I ' m  going t o  die. And then everybody'll be sorry. 
(cf. Appendix I, Table 8 ,  Examples 81-118 for  data classffied 
a s  'Upgraded' assessment. 1 
2) upgrading an assessment by ra i s ing  the leve l  of cer ta inty but 
not t o  the leve l  of fact .  T h i s  occurred seven times: 1 time in  Group 1. 
3 times in Group 2 ,  1 time in Group 8,  and 2 times in Group 9 indicating 
that  t h i s  occurs usually among friends and again would be useful to  an 
ESL/EFL learner but not a s  easy as  some others. 
C35: 21, 22 
B: It (house cleaning) depends on how nany other people you 
affect .  
A: Well, of course. 
3a) Upgrading of assessment occurring with a Verb of Supposition 
so that the sueaker is upgrading his assessment but adding a marker 
which lowers the degree to  which he is comi t t ed  to  t h a t  assessment. 
This occurs four times: 3 times in Group 3, and 1 time in Group 8 
indicating that  i t  occurs in s i tua t ions  where par t ic ipants  are  colleagues 
and a r e  perhaps more formal and guarded. 
ClS:lO, 11 
A: It seems that everything here embates from the top. 
B: Yes, yes-uh 1-1 think that  is r i g h t ,  t h i s  would be another 
basic  difference. 
3b) upgrading an assessment with a stronger term of evaluation 
but not t o  the leve l  of a fact .  This occurs four times: 1 time in 
Group 8, and 3 times in Group 9. The occurrences i n  Group 9 were a l l  
produced by women. 
S17 
A: Isn ' t  he cute. 
B: 0::h h::s adorable. 
4) an expl ic i t  performative with an in t ens i f i e r  occurs three times: 
1 t i m e  in Group 2 ,  1 t i m e  in Group 3, and 1 time in Group 9. 
CB:40, 41 
A: Doesn't make any sense f o r  me to  be gett ing hurt over and 
over again. 
B: Well t ha t ' s  certainly- I agree with that .  
5) an upgraded assessment to  the leve l  of a f a c t ,  i .e . ,  upgraded 
to  the  leve l  of a confirma,tion, without any uucertainty markers occurred 
only twice: 1 t i m e  in Group 2 and 1 t i m e  in Group 7 ,  i - e . ,  among 
friends and in an adversity relationship where d i rec t  expressions can 
be used. 
C35:19, 20 
A: I don't think i t ' s  (house cleaning) so important i f .  you're 
comfortable. I don't think i c  makes much difference. 
C: That's true. That's true.  
111. 'Scaled-dovn.' Speaker2 assesses 'X' by assigning it 'R' 
minus andlor 'E '  minus with or  without positivelnegative value. This 
is the f i f t h  most frequently occurring form of the speech a c t  
agreementldisagreement appearing only 19 times i n  the data. Scaled down 
agreement and qual i f ied agreement, which is rea l ly  disagreement, a r e  
very similar to  the extent tha t  it is sometimes d f f f i c u l t  t o  dist inguish 
them. It is considered t o  be l e s s  H-supportive and more threatening 
than the 'Upgrade.' In  addition t o  being a d i f fe ren t  assessment, the  
speaker is downgrading the leve l  so t h a t  it is the c losest  form of 
agreement t o  disagreement. The relationship between the inter locutors  
r e f l ec t s  l e s s  harmony and good w i l l  than in the Upgrade. This type of 
agrsement a lso occurs throughout the data. 
1) scaling down an assessment by the use of a more moderate 
evaluation term. This occurs seven times: 1 time i n  Group I ,  1 time i n  
Group 4 ,  1 time in Group 5, and 4 times in Group 9. Frequency makes 
t h i s  a useful type for  ESLIEFL learners t o  know. 
C9:30, 31a 
B: I rea l ly  l i k e  these. These're greac. 
A: Nice yeah. It a l l  depends on the s t y l e  of the shoe. 
2 )  scaling down an assessment by decreasing the degree of 
certainty.  This appeared four times: 2 times i n  Group I ,  1 time in 
Group 5,  and 1 time in Group 8. 
CB:25, 26 
B: You how perfectly w e l l  what's going on, don't you. 
A:. I guess I must. I ought to  by now. 
3) scaling d m  of an assessment is accomplished through 
redirecting a posit ive evaluation. This occurs three times: 1 time 
in Group 1,  2 times in Group 5. 
C9:28, 29 
B: Oh these 're beautiful .  
A: They f i t  you (. . .) too. 
(Cf. Appendix 1 ,  Table 8, Examples 119-137 for  data c lass i f ied  a s  
' Scaled-down' assessments. ) 
4a) scaling down an assessment by the removal of an in tens i f ie r .  
This occurred two times: 1 t h e  in Group 3,  and 1 time in Group 4. 
C22:9, 10 
A: This must be very expensive . . . 
B: Yes i t  is an expensive technique. 
4b) an expl ic i t  performative appearing with a scaled down degree 
of cer ta inty occurs two times: both in Group 2. 
C32:18, 19 
C: I think the choice should be up to the individual. 
B: I think maybe I agree with Bette though-I mean why should 
there  be a l a w  against drugs. 
5 )  scaling down an assessment by the use of a more moderate 
fn tens i f ie r .  This occurred only once i n  Group 2 (cf. Appendix I ,  
Example 121). 
IV. 'Qualified.' Speaker2 assesses 'X' by assigning it 'R' 
and/or 'E' with o r  without positivelnegative value, o r  upgraded 'R'  
and/or 'E,' or  scaled down 'R' andlor 'E,' with a qual i f icat ion added. 
This is the 'I agree but . . .' type of disagreement. It is the second 
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most frequently occurring type of disagreement i n  the  da ta  occurring 
21 times, and is the  four th  most frequent  type of speech a c t  agreement1 
disagreement i n  the  data.  It is considered t o  be the  most 3-supportive 
and least threatening type of disagreement although i t  is l e s s  
E-supportive and more threatening than the  lowest l e v e l  of agreement, 
'Scaled down.' It occurs in two par t s .  Pa r t  1 is agreement which 
can be the  same l e v e l  of assessment, o r  upgraded, o r  scaled down from 
t h a t  of the  p r i o r  Opine. Pa r t  2 contains t h e  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  which the  
speaker assigns t o  h i s  previous agreement in Par t  1. This q u a l i f i c a t i o n  
usually takes  the  foam of some explanation by c i t i n g  an exception t o  
the  p r i o r ' s  r e f e r e n t  and h i s l h e r  assessment of it. Most of t h e  da ta  
appearing in this category used the  marker 'but '  a s  an introduction t o  
Par t  2 although no e x p l i c i t  marker appeared i n  some examples and 
'though' appeared once. Occasionally a speaker began h i s  response with 
'but '  o r  with a token of agreement followed by 'but . '  This form is 
considered t o  be the  most p o l i t e  form of disagreement due t o  the  f a c t  
t h a t  by beginning with agreement it shows support f o r  the  hearer  and 
f r i end l iness  towards him thereby reducing t h e  fo rce  of the  t h r e a t  of 
the  disagreement. It represents  a so lu t ion  t o  the  dilenuna of 'not  
disagreeing'  but  s t i l l  expressing a d i f f e r e n t  assessment. This type of 
disagreement is found throughout the  data. Because of its high l e v e l  
of pol i teness  and frequency of occurrence, this would be a good type 
of disagreement f o r  ESLIEFL lea rners  t o  be exposed to .  
1 )  t h e  speaker's qua l i f i ca t ion  takes  the  form of 'Opine But Opine' 
and occurs 11 times: 3 times i n  Group 2 ,  1 time i n  Group 3 ,  1 time in 
Group 5 ,  2 t hes  in Group 6 ,  2 times in Group 7 ,  and 2 times in Group 8 
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indicating frequency of use in s i tuat ions  where soc ia l  relationships 
a r e  not so so l id  o r  i n  adverse relationships.  The Opine appearing in 
Part 1 a s  agreerent is a 'Scaled down' assessment of the pr ior  
speaker's Opine in 9 of the 10 instances and it is an 'Equal' l eve l  
Opine in the other instance. 'Shis 'scaling down' in Part  1 could s e n e  
a s  a w m i n g  to  the hearer of possible disagreement. It is possible 
that 'Scaled down' agrement is P a r t  1 of 'Qualified'  disagreement 
without the following expression of explanation. 
C9:64 ,  65 
A: This is a nice color i f  you have things to  wear with it. 
B: Well the color would be ok, but the s t y l e  i s  (. . .). 
S guess for  today ju s t  these two then. 
2) the  speaker's qual i f icat ion takes e l l i p t ed  forms of Part 1- 
agree, o r  Par t  2-disagree 
a )  the response begins with 'but.' T%is occurs three times: 
1 t i m e  in Group 1, 1 time in Group 2, and 1 t h e  i n  Group 8. 
~~:27,.28 
B: (LEI You didn't how tha t ?  
A: But I guess I wasn't accepting it. 
b) the response begins with a token of agreenent followed by an 
Opine. This occurs once i n  Group 8 (cf.  Appenaix I ,  Table 8 ,  
Example 152). 
c) the response begins with a token of agreement folloved by a 
bporca t ive ,  i .e. ,  as  an exception. This occurs once in 
Group 7 (cf. Appendix I ,  Table 8, Fxample 153). 
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d) the  response takes the  form of 'Reportative But FL%portative' 
with the  intemening 'But' removed. This occurs once in 
Group 7 (cf. Appendix I, Table 8 ,  Example 154). 
e )  the speaker enploys 'though' instead of 'but '  and follows it 
with an Cpine. This occurs once in Group 2 (cf. Appendix I, 
Table 8 ,  Example 155). 
(Cf .  Appendix I, Table 8, Examples 149-155 fo r  data c l a s s i f i ed  a s  
'Qualified' disagreement. ) 
3) the  speaker's qua l i f i ca t ion  takes the  form of 'Reportative 
But Opine' and occurs two times: 1 time in Group 1, and 1 time in 
Group 7. The agreement expressed by the speaker i n  Part 1 a s  a 
Reportative upgrades the assessment t o  the  leve l  of a fac t .  The f a c t  
t ha t  Part  2 is an Cpine indicates  that the speaker is lowering h i s  
degree of commitment t o  the  disagreement (as i n  l) 'above),  thereby 
reducing the  force  of the  th rea t .  
C32:6, 7 ,  8 
A: But I think . . . that's good (.I because I think of ten 
people depend on (.) medicines too much when they could 
get by without taking s t u f f .  
D: + lmm 
C: Well I 'mow but-uh h you how,  I don't r ea l l y  think you 
should have l a w s  against  any kind of a drug. 
4) the  speaker's qual i f icat ion takes the  form of 'Reportative 
But Reportative' and occurs once in Group 8 in an adversity relat ionship.  
The level  of assessment in both Part 1 and Part  2 is ra ised t o  tha t  of 
a f a c t  indicating the speaker's comitmezt t o  both par t s  (cf .  Appendix I ,  
Table 8, Example 158). 
V. 'Different. '  Speaker2 assesses 'X' by assigning i t  a 
d i f fe ren t ,  'T,' degree of cer ta inty and/or a d i f fe ren t ,  IF,' 
charac te r i s t ic  o r  quali ty with o r  without positive/negative value. This 
is not an opposite assessment t o  that of the pr ior  speakers, it is a 
dif ferent  assessment. This occurs only twice: 1 time in Group 7 ,  and 
1 time i n  Group 8 neither of which is an example of closely sol id  
relationships.  Both examples occur a s  interruptions and display 
emotional overtones. The example in Group 7 occurs in an exp l i c i t l y  
adverse relationship and the one i n  Group 8 is a sarcast ic  joke. (Cf. 
Appendix I, Table 8, m l e s  159, 160.) By proposing a 'Different'  
assessment from the prior speaker's instead of an 'Opposite' assessment, 
the speaker can reduce the threat  of disagreement but not to  the  extent 
tha t  a 'Qualified'  assessment does. 
VI. 'Opposite.' Speaker2 assesses 'X' by assigning it 'Negative R,' 
or  opposite 'Re andlor 'Negative E,' or  opposite 'E' with o r  without 
positivelnegative value. Vot only a d i f fe ren t  assessment, t h i s  
re-assessment of 'X' stands in opposition t o  the assessment made by the 
prior speaker. This is the most frequent type of disagreement X found 
in the  data occurring 25 times, and it is the th i rd  most commn form of 
the  speech ac: agreeumddisagreement. It is considered t o  be a t  the 
fa r thes t  end of the  disagreement scale of 2oli teness displaying minimum 
H-support/maxhmn threat  because it ca r r i e s  the greatest  r i s k  to  the 
continuation of the  relationship.  Harmony is damaged and the speaker- 
hearer equality balance in strained. Following this type of disagreement 
there expl ic i t ly  ex i s t s  no shared knowledge between the speaker and 
hearer toward that  par t icular  referent.  The responder's desire/need to 
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be t ru th fu l  overrides h i s  desirelneed to  be po l i te .  He runs the r i s k  
of offending the hearer and damaging h i s  face. 
This type of disagreement i s  both the mst frequent which appeared 
in the data and the leas t  po l i te .  However, most of the examples 
found in the data occurred with some form of accounting a s  an explanation, 
reason or  cause f o r  the disagreement. Another s t ra tegy for  reducing 
the threat  of an opposite assessment was the use of uncertainty markers 
to  show a lower degree of speaker commitment to  h i s  assessment. C u t  of 
25 occurrences of Cpposites, only seven occurred without an accounting 
o r  an uncertainty marker. Three of these were tokens of disagreement 
and four were expl ic i t  negatives. 
1) an opposite assessment is produced through the use of an 
expl ic i t  negative together with an accounting realized as  a second 
assessment o r  a s  a causelreason f o r  the  disagreement. This occurs 
seven times: 2 tines in Group 1, 1 t i m e  in Group 2, 1 time in Group 3 ,  
1 t h e  in Group 5 ,  1 time i n  Group 6 ,  and 1 time in Group 7 indicating 
a frequent and general useabi l i ty  of t h i s  Â£o  making it a good one for  
ESLIEFL learners to  be familiar with. 
c 9 : 3 3 ,  34 
A: You don't want t o  t r y  these on too? 
B: No huh uh. No, I want these. 
2a) an opposite assessment is produced without the use of an 
expl ic i t  negative through the use of an antonym or  through the 
expression of an accounting only. This occurs four t b e s :  1 in Group 1, 
1 in Group 2,  1 in Group 8, and 1 i n  Group 9. 
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C1:96, 97 
D: I f  you do it that way Mike, with one person on one s ide  
and the other person on the  other ,  its very h a r d  t o  
record overlaps. 
A: + It 's easy t o  record overlaps, t ha t ' s  just-oh well-I 
mean i t  depends on w h a t  d e t a i l  you want on an overlap. 
2b) an opposite assessment is produced through the  use of an 
exp l i c i t  negative with an uncertainty marker, but no accounting t o  
reduce the  force  of the assessment. Although the  uncertainty marker 
displays a lower degree of commitment t o  tha t  assessment by the  speaker. 
This type occurs four times: 1 time in Group 1, and 3 times in Group 9. 
S8 
A: Chinese food is so good. 
B: I don't think so. 
2c) an opposite assessment i s  produced through the  use of an 
exp l i c i t  negative without any accoimting. This occurs four times: 
1 t i m e  in Group 1, 1 time in Group 2 ,  and 2 times i n  Group 7. The 
emmple in Group 1 occurs i n  a very sol id  relat ionship during a moment 
of depression. The example fn Group 2 occurs among good fr iends  and 
displays shock. Group 7 is an expl ic i t  adversary relat ionship and the  
emmples occur during an emotionally charged exchange. This would 
indicate ckat this f o m  occurs in moments of s t r e s s  in s i tua t ions  where 
speakers may d i rec t ly  express cheir  feelings.  
C12:16, 17 
B: Well see,  the Bible-the Lord wrote the  
i Bible i 
A: I don't believe that e i ther .  
120 
3a) an opposite assessment is produced through the use of an 
exp l i c i t  negative together with an uncertainty marker and an accounting 
as a second assessment o r  a s  a reason for  the disagreement. This 
occurs three times: 1 time in Group 1. and 2 times in Group 2, a l l  
among friends.  
C33:21, 23 
B: I rea l ly  do. 1-1 think from the beginning children 
should have the i r  own rooms. 
C: I don't. I think-uh for  l i k e  a s m a l l  baby, you how,  
u n t i l  you're maybe a t  l e a s t  a year o r  2 years old-uh 
just the sense of security that develops in a child in-in 
the presence of other people. 
3b) an opposite assessment i s  produced through the use of a token 
of disagreement (Huh uh). This occurs one t h e  a s  a token alone without 
an accounting in Group 5,  and once a s  a token plus a negative in 
Group 5,  and once a s  a token plus an accounting in Group 1. 
C8:12, 13 
A: Too easy (.) you need a t  l ea s t  ( - 2 )  half a s i ze  smaller. 
B: Huh uh (shaking head). 
(Cf. Appendix I ,  Table 8, Bamples 161-195 for  data c lass i f ied  a s  
'Opposite disagreement.) 
The frequency of occurrence of t h i s  type of disagreement, i . e . ,  
makes it important f o r  ESL/EFL learners ' to  how,  but a t  the 
same t i m e  i t  should be pointed out to  them tha t  t h i s  type of disagreement 
can bring about speaker-hearer disharmony and negative a t t i t udes  
because of i ts  threatening nature. Therefore, they should be made 
familiar with the s t ra tegies  employed by native speakers i n  reducing 
this th rea t ,  i . e . ,  uncertainty marh r s ,  and accounting. 
Sociolinguistic variables a r e  important considerations in 
discourse analysis a s  pointed out by Erwin-Tripp (cf. p. 33) and 
others. Nevertheless the r e s u l t s  of this study did not reveal any 
of the variables collected a s  being decisive factors  affect ing the 
occurrence of the speech ac t  agreementldisagreement. 
This research was conducted for  the  purpose of examining the speech 
a c t  apeement/disagreement in 'natural  conversation' which is how it 
is purported t o  be presented in most Notional/Fmctional texts.  The 
data collected,  therefore,  had t o  be data tha t  could be used a s  a basis  
f o r  comparison to  the presentation of the same speech act  in Notional1 
Functional texts.  Unfortunately, the data collected did not show any 
s ignif icant  re la t ionships  because the ranges within the variables were 
not wide enough and the number of conversations w a s  not suff ic ient .  4 
However, frequency r a t i o s  of agreement t o  Opines, and disagreement t o  
Opines were calculated f o r  each of the eight groups5 (cf. Appendix I ,  
Table 5). The data i s  insuff ic ient  and not decisive but i t  does 
indicate that  interactions among strangers in service encounters have 
higher percentages of both agreement and disagreement. Adversity ro les  
among strangers have the leas t  agreement and the most disagreement. 
Adversity ro les  among acquaintances have re la t ive ly  low levels  of each. 
Acquaintances on the telephone agree much more frequently than they 
disagree. Friends and colleagues appear t o  be rnked so tha t  obviously 
other variables a r e  a t  work, topic may be one. The r e su l t s  would indicate 
tha t  people express agreementldisagreement more often when the 
relationship is not one in which they have a vested in te res t .  But this 
conclusion is very ten ta t ive  and needs fur ther  research for  
ver i f ica t ion .  
Further research re la ted  t o  t ha t  presented here would be an 
investigation i n to  which var iables  (including tha t  of topic  and 
probably m r e  importantly, t ha t  of individual personali ty) o r  combination 
of var iables  a f f ec t  a speaker in choosing which category of agreement1 
disagreement t o  produce as a second following an i n i t i a t i o n  Opine. 
This would seem t o  be a =re relevant avenue of research than t h a t  
in to  the  frequency of occurrence of agreementldisagreement. 
I n  discourse, an Opine can function a s  an ' I n i t i a t i on  move' o r  
a !Proffer f (cf .  Appendix I ,  Table 2) t o  open an exchange. Agreement 
follows a s  a 'response' move fo r  S inc la i r  and Coulthard and a s  a 
*Sat isfy1 f o r  Kdwmdson. Disagreement, on the  other hand, is a 
!responsef m v e  f o r  Sincla i r  and Coulthard which can be optionally 
followed by a 'comment' o r  a 'follow-up' t o  close the  'exchange.' For 
Edmondson, disagreement occurs as a 'contra'  or  'counter' and must be 
followed by a 'Satisfy '  before the  'exchange' can be completed. 
As Rehbein and Ehlich (cf.  p. 50 )  have gointed ou t ,  a hearer has 
options open t o  him followfng a noncomprehension. Disagreement, being 
an Action2 in a 'action chain,' is an optional,  although dispreferred,  
response t o  an i n i t i a t i o n  Opine. A hearer who holds a d i f fe ren t  
assessment of a referent  from that of the  p r b r  speaker's i n i t i a t i o n  
move has the  same options. Ee may indicate h i s  disagreement o r  not. If 
he chooses t o  express h i s  disagreement, the hearer who i n i t i a t e d  the 
or ig ina l  Opine a lso has options open t o  him. Xe may choose not t o  
respond, o r  he may change the topic  t o  reduce fur ther  t h r ea t l r i sk  t o  
the relat ionship by recurring disagrement.  He may produce a 'confirm 
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checkf to  be cer ta in  t ha t  t he  disagreement actual ly  occurred, a s  a 
'pre-sequence' before producing disagreement again (cf. Sacks, p .  43). 
He may put off a response with o r  without an accounting (cf. Labov and 
Fanshall, p. 5 5 ) .  He may support h i s  o r ig ina l  Opine with evidence, 
contradict  his OWI i n i t i a t i n g  C@ine, 'mitigate' o r  aggravate his 
or ig ina l  Opine, o r  break the re la t ion  (cf. p. 5 5 ) .  
I f ,  on the other hand, a hearer shares the  speaker's assessment 
of the referent ,  o r  determines tha t  any form of disagreement would 
present too great a r i s k  t o  the relationship,  he may produce the 
preferred response t o  an i n i t i a t i o n  Opine, 'agreement.' Agreement 
which is a type of ' sa t i s fy '  according t o  Edmondson (cf. p. 61) allows 
the ongoing exchange t o  come to  an end and the speakers a r e  f r ee  to  
proceed t o  a next topic o r  t o  terminate the interaction (cf. Appendix I, 
Table 8, examples of next speaker response mves  following disagreement). 
B. Relevance to  the ESLIEFL Learner 
This research has been carr ied out with t he  h t e n t  of applying 
the findings to  the ESLIEFL si tuat ion,  i .e . ,  to  the needs of the 
ESL/E!FL learner. A l l  of the r e s u l t s  might be useful andlor in te res t ing  
f o r  a very advanced learner but would not be necessary for  the needs of 
the  typical  learner. Therefore, this discussion w i l l  center on those 
resu l t s  that  mu ld  be necessary for  an intermediate learner to know o r  
be aware of in order to  produce, understand, and respond t o  the speech 
ac t  agreeidisagree. 
1) Structural  Factors 
a )  Action2 in an Action chain. ~gr&e/disagree occur only a s  
optional responses t o  an Action which functions as  an i n i t i a t i o n  move 1 
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being e i the r  the l a s t  nove in the pr ior  speaker's turn or  an only w v e  
i n  h i s  turn. 
b) Action must occur as  an i n i t i a t i o n  Opine, not an i n i t i a t i o n  1 
Reportative; an Opine being a marked subjective assessment of a referent 
in that it expresses some degree of uncertainty andlor assigns some 
charac te r i s t ic  andlor value to  the referent.  Opines a r e  not fac tua l  
asser t ions ,  a s  a r e  Reportatives. 
c )  When the hearer shares the  same assessment of the same 
referent ,  he may respond t o  an i n i t i a t i o n  Opine with some form of 
agreement. When the hearer holds a d i f fe ren t  assessment of the  same 
referent ,  he may respond with some f o m  of disagreement. It is important 
that  the referent be the same in both cases, only the assessment changes 
i n  the case of disagreement. 
d) The declarative form of sentence is the most typ ica l  found 
in this speech act .  
e )  Agreement is the preferred second following an Opine while 
disagreement is the dispreferred second. 
A presentation of this speech ac t  which deviates from the above 
factors  would not be  t ru ly  representative of the r e a l  world occurrence 
of agreementldisagre-nt. 
2) Politeness ?actors 
Brown and Levinson (1978) claim that concepts of 'face' and 
poli teness a r e  universal. ?his may be t rue ,  but dif ferent  cul tures  
appear t o  assigu different  levels  of importance t o  the various concepts 
and to  employ different  means in expressing them. ESLIEFL students 
should perhaps be reminded of some of the basic concepts of politeness 
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which a re  universals. More importantly, they should be made aware of 
the  levels  of importance and the mans  of expression used t o  perform 
agreementldisagreement in English speaking cultures. The following is 
a list of universal fac tors  of agreementldisagreement which students and 
teachers a l i ke  should be aware of when studying t h i s  speech ac t  in English. 
a )  In usual fr iendly conversational interact ions  it is 
generally more important to  create  a posi t ive  a t t i t ude  in the hearer 
toward the speaker than to  be c lear .  A posi t ive  a t t i t ude  w i l l  bprove 
the qual i ty  of the relationship and/or allow i t  t o  continue, while a 
negative attitude would danage it o r  even break it. 
b)  Posit ive a t t i t udes  a r e  generated by poli teness,  and two 
rules  of poli teness d i rec t ly  affect ing t h i s  speech ac t  a r e  
i )  mke  the other person f e e l  good, i.e.,  be friendly.  
i i )  an t ic ipa te  cases of possibly giving offense t o  the 
other person and make adjustments in your actions 
accordingly. 
c) wines are  more po l i t e  expressions than are Reportatives. 
Uncertainty and subject ivi ty  on the par t  of the speaker soften the i r  
asser t ive  force. k i n g  l e s s  d i r ec t ,  they a re  more po l i te .  Tag questions 
and negative questions a r e  useful forms of i n i t i a t i o n  Opines because 
they e l i c i t  agreement, and mke the hearer more comfortable i n  knowing 
the speaker's position. 
d) Agreement contains posi t ive  interact ional  qua l i t i es .  It 
expresses f r iendl iness  and supports the hearer 's  self-image (face).  
The hearer f e e l s  he is liked and appreciated and creates an atmosphere 
of good dl1 in  which the relationship can continue to  grow. Agreement 
is pol i te .  
126 
e) Disagreement contains negative interact ional  qua l i t i es .  
It expresses c r i t i c i sm and challenges the hearer 's  self-image, i .e . ,  it 
damages h i s  face and lowers h i s  s ta tus .  It creates  an atmosphere of 
tension in which the relationship is damaged o r  broken. Disagreement 
is not po l i te .  
f )  A person's ' f ace r is vulnerable in face-to-face interact ions  
and i t  is generally a ru l e  in such s i tua t ions  for  par t ic ipants  to  
cooperate in maintaining each other ' s  face. Relationships in which the 
par t ic ipants  a r e  involved i n  exp l i c i t  adversary ro les  a r e  exceptions, 
but these a r e  not the norm. 
g) Agreen~entldisagreement occurs l e s s  frequently when the 
inter locutors  highly value the relationship between them. 7 
3) Politeness Levels and Forms of AgreementlDisagreement 
The r e s u l t s  of this study have indicated t h a t  forms of 
agreementldisagreement occur on a scale  from most p o l i t e  t o  least poli te.  
S i x  categories were proposed with 30 sub-categories. A l l  occurred in 
native speaker data,  a l l  may potent ia l ly  be hpor t an t  for  the E S L I m  
learner t o  be able to  recognize and produce. But an intermediate 
student needs t o  be familiar with a broad range of speech ac t s ,  it 
simply would be unrea l i s t ic  to  require him to be f luent  with a l l  of them. 
Therefore, a choice was made a s  to  which categories and sub-categories 
would be the most essen t ia l  for  himiher to  learn in an intermediate 
leve l  presentation of agreementldisagreement. The factors  taken into  
consideration in making these choices were: 
i )  frequency of occurrence of a form. The m r e  frequently 
native speakers produce a form, the more l ike ly  it is tha t  
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the ESLiEFL learner w i l l  encounter it ,  and would be in 
si tuat ions  where he could produce i t  appropriately. 
poli teness leve ls  of both categories and sub-categories. 
breadth of d i s t r ibu t ion  of occurrence. Related t o  ( i )  
and ( i i )  above, this factor  is re la ted  to  the number of 
s i tua t ions  in which a form could be used appropriately. 
ease of learnabi l i ty  and production f o r  the learner. 
Some forms which would be useful f o r  the learner t o  bow 
according to  the three factors  above a re  also d i f f i c u l t  
for  a learner to  master, e.g., ra i s ing  degree of cer ta inty 
under 'Upgraded' which involves subst i tut ion of modality 
markers. In general modality in English is d i f f i c u l t  fo r  
most intermediate leve l  students to  cope with. Such 
forms should be presented f o r  recognition only a t  t h i s  
l eve l ,  mastery of production being l e f t  f o r  a l a t e r  time. 
The following list consis ts  of the forms chosen according to  the 
above factors.  Those forms marked with a 'P' a r e  those which a learner 
should acquire for  'Production' a s  well a s  recognition. Those marked 
with a 'Rf a re  those which a learner a t  this leve l  should acquire f o r  
'Recognition' only. For examples of each sub-category see the discussion 
above and the Appendix, Table 8. (Cf. Appendix I, Table 5 for  a 
breakdown of t he  Forms and Frequencies of the  Speech Act Agreementi 
Disagreement l i s t e d  by categories of Politeness.) 
Agreement: 
1) 'Equal' assessments 
P - di rec t  repet i t ion 
P - Verb of Supposition andlor e l l i p s i s  
R - rephrasing 
P - token only without in terrupt ion 
R - token only a s  in te rmpt ion  
2) 'Upgraded' assessments 
P - added in t ens i f i e r  but not t o  f a c t  
P - tokens plus ' r igh t , '  support, upgrading 
R - ra i s ing  degree of ce r ta in ty  
3 )  'Scaled-down' assessments 
P - more moderate term of evaluation 
R - decreasing degree of ce r ta in ty  
4 )  'Qualified' assessments 
P - 'Opine' But 'Opine' 
P - 'Reportative' But 'Opine' 
P - 'Reportative' But 'Reportative' 
P - response beginning with But 
R - token plus 'Opine' o r  'Reportative' 
R - 'Reportative' - 'Reportative' 
R - though plus 'Opine' 
5 )  'De fe ren t '  assessment 
R 
6 )  'Opposite' assessment 
P - expl ic i t  negative plus accounting 
P - exp l i c i t  negative plus uncertainty marker and accounting 
P - antonym or  accounting only without exp l i c i t  negative 
R - e s p l i c i t  negative plus uncertainty m r k e r ,  no accounting 
R - token of disa.greement 
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No occurrence of the perfornative verb 'disagree' occurred ia the 
data. The performative verb 'agree' occurred infrequently as a direct 
fom in each of the three levels of agreement. None of these foms 
are included in the list above because of their infrequency of 
occurrence and directness. Also an ESL/EFl learner at the intermediate 
level would probably be familiar with these vocabulary items and would 
recognize their meanings ff heard. 
In Chapter V, the presentation of the speech act agreement1 
disagreement as it appears in twu conversational Notional/Functional 
ESLIEFL textbooks will be examined in light of the factors outlined 
above. 
NOTES 
There a r e  exceptions when agreefdisagree occurs .as a Reportative. 
These w i l l  be noted i n  the  following discussion. 
In the  data there  were no examples found of s ide  sequences 
occurring betveen the Opine and the  responding agreementfdisagreement. 
The only examples of other speaker turns  occurring between the two 
a c t s  were in conversations involving more than two par t ic ipants .  
Agreement and disagreement, once defined, were eas i ly  countable 
since they occur a s  individual m v e s  in discourse. Opines, on the 
other hand, presented problems. Within one move there  can be more 
than one marker of uncertainty, e.g., ' I  th iak maybe I agree with 
Beth.' The problem was whether t o  count ' think'  and 'maybe' a s  two 
Opines therefore counting Opine markers, o r  t o  count moves a s  being 
one Opine whether they contained one o r  two markers. Agreement and 
disagreement occur a s  moves and therefore it w a s  decided t o  count Opines 
a s  moves ra ther  than by markers. 
Also, the  conversations themselves f i t  in to  eight groupings 
displaying many s h i l a r  var iables  within each group thus reducing the 
a f fec t ive  number of comparable un i t s  t o  e igh t ,  not a suf f ic ien t  number 
t o  produce r e l i a b l e  resu l t s .  
' Group 9, being a random se lec t ion  of overheard examples, would 
not have been comparable. 
This study cannot produce empirical evidence fo r  these proposed 
o p t b n s  open t o  a next-speaker a f t e r  disagreement. This area awaits 
fur ther  research. 
' This has been included here a s  a fac tor  but i t  requires 
ver i f ica t ion  t o  support i ts  inclusion. 
CHAPTER V 
COW.4RISON OF FINDINGS WITH '??do CONVERSATIONAL 
NOTIONAL FUNCTIONAL ESLIEFL TEXTBOOKS 
Two conversational ESLIEFL textbooks were selected fo r  comparison 
with the  findings of t h i s  study. They were chosen because they both 
exp l i c i t l y  present the speech ac t  agreementldisagreement fo r  the  
student t o  master.' Impact by Watcyn-Jones, a t ex t  the  researcher has 
used i n  an EFL s i tua t ion  fo r  two years,  is fo r  intermediate and 
advanced students. Advanced Speaking Sk i l l s  by Harmer and Arnold i s  
fo r  advauced students. The purpose of t h i s  investigation is t o  determine 
the  degree t o  which these two textbooks present the  speech ac t  
agreementldisagreement a s  i t  appears natural ly  in native-speaker discourse. 
The basis  fo r  the comparison w i l l  be the  fac tors  discussed in f iapter  I V  
(cf. p. 
Grmer,  J. and J. Arnold. 1978. Advanced speak in^ Ski l l s .  
bugman. The introduction s t a t e s  t ha t  "the m a i n  concern of t h i s  course 
is appropriateness, tha t  is the choice of a way of saying something 
which expresses our a t t i t ude  appropriately, i . e . ,  showing that  we a re  
being 'pol i te , '  'informal,' ' tenta t ive , '  and so on" (Harmer and Arnold 
1978:vii). They l a t e r  mention that  one of the  aims of the  book is "to 
enable the  students t o  choose ways of saying things which a re  appropriate 
t o  d i f fe ren t  situations' '  (Harmer and Arnold 1978:~).  They list several  
'a t t i tudes '  which they consider t o  be c ruc i a l  f o r  the learner t o  be 
aware of and for  h b l h e r  t o  be able t o  assign t o  par t i cu la r  language 
foms.  For example, 'Tentative' means "unsure" and is used 
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a )  "when we are  genuinely unsure of our f a c t s  o r  of how we f e e l ,  
b) when we want t o  give the  impression of being unsure in order 
t o  be t a c t f u l  and diplomatic" (Harmer and Arnold 1978:mii) .  
As an example they give: "If we want t o  disagree with a superior,  it 
would probably be too strong t o  say, 'I can' t  agree with you' and it 
would be more appropriate t o  be ten ta t ive ,  say ' I ' m  not sure i f  I ' d  
agree with you"' (Harmer and Arnold 1978:mii). 
'Direct' is defined a s  the  opposite of ' tenta t ive '  and gives the 
hearer the  hp re s s ion  that the  speaker is very sure. This impression 
they maintain "is appropriate i f ,  f o r  example, we want t o  agree with 
someone, but it can sound presumptuous and rude i n  a great  many s i tua t ions  
and would be inappropriate in such s i tua t ions  (e.g., invi t ing a superior 
t o  a party)'' (Banner and Arnold 1978:mii). 
'Poli te '  language is used "when we want t o  sound par t icu la r ly  
'po l i t e '  w i t b u t  being ' tentative '"  (Harmer and Arnold 1978:miii) .  2 
They suggest that  "in most s i tua t ions  w e  use 'normal/neutral' 
language,'' expressing a ~ r m a l l n e u t r a l  a t t i t u d e  (Harmer and Amold 1978: 
m i i i )  . 
Each 'part '  of the  t ex t  presents a " specific language area," e.g., 
Section I11 Part  1 presents 'Opinionating.' A diagram 'followed by a 
model comersation show how the language works, and a chart  lists 
appropriate h g u a g e  t o  use. This 'presentation' is followed by a 
'controlled praccice.' a ' s i tua t iona l  pract ice , '  and ' ro le  simulation 
practice, '  a l l  practicing the  forms given in the chart.  
The introduction mentions that "the teacher should point out any 
areas of par t icular  grammatical d f f f icu l ty"  in the forms l i s t e d  in 
the charts .  The presupposition that  a l l  teachers would recognize such 
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'areas,' would know the grammatical point and would be able t o  explain 
it has not been born out by this researcher 's  experience. The tex t  has 
no teacher 's  book and very l i t t l e  in the introduction to  inform an 
uutrained and/or inexperienced teacher. Other than w h a t  was quoted 
above there is no Information given t o  help e i ther  the teacher or  t he  
student in real iz ing the in t r icac ies  of appropriate language use. 
The diagram presenting the language of 'opinionating' i s  a s  
follows: 
Asking f o r  Opinions I 
4 
Expressing Personal Opinions 
Ekpressing 
Agreement 
Expressing 
Disagreement 
This char t  indicates t h a t  agreen~ent/disagreaent a r e  responses t o  
an expression of personal opinion, but nothing is mentioned about such 
responses being made t o  the l a s t  move of a p r ior  speaker's turn,  
The model conversation Is a s  follows: 
A = interviewer, young woman 
B = interviewee, middle-aged male po l i t i c ian  
C = intemiewee, middleaged female po l i t i c ian  
A: ?hrk Cmmings, how do you f e e l  about this l a t e s t  tax increase? 
B: Well, a s  f a r  a s  I ' m  concerned it is of course regrettable.  But it 
Is necessary, I ' m  afraid.  
C: I wouldn't go along with you there Xark. The government could have 
avoided t h i s  increase i f  only they'd . . . 
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T h i s  model gives an example of an opinion which f i t s  t h e  desc r ip t i on  
of t h e  proposed sub-class Opine used in this study- 'regrettable '  is a 
value judgement, fnecessary'  and ' I f m  a f r a i d f  a r e  markers of t en ta t iveness*  
The disagreement which f o l h w s  mentions t he  same re fe r en t  ( a - ~ b r i c  
' t h i s ' )  wi th  an accouriti.ng f o r  an opposite assessment and it appears as 
a dec la ra t ive  sentence. However this is the  only 'model given- ' mere 
is 'model' f o r  agreement which is the preferred second f 0 1 1 0 ~ g  
Opine. The l ea rner  must infer a l o t  from one model. 
The text makes no mention of any of t he  aspects  of po l i t enes s  
a f f ec t i ng  the production of agreement/disagreement, un iversa l s  o r  
cu l tu r e  spec i f ic .  Either it assumes t h a t  s tudents  (and teachers)  are 
already aware of these  o r  it assumes t h a t  they a r e  outs ide  t h e  area of 
language.3 In  either case, a rash  assumption. 
The universal  pos i t ive  q u a l i t i e s  of agreement (which make it the 
preferred second) a r e  not  pointed out  t o  t h e  lea rners ,  and no examples 
o r  ind ica t ions  of possible  offense r e su l t i ng  from disagreement a r e  given. 
Form of Agreement /Disagreement 
Each form of agreementldisagreement presented i n  the  c h a r t s  ( in 
t ab l e  f o m )  which the  learner  is t o  acquire f o r  production and 
recognit ion w i l l  be discussed in turn. 
Expressions of Agreement: 
a )  I f d go along with you. {on t h a t  t h e r e j  
b)  I take your point. 
c) (Yes) I ' d  tend t o  agree with YOU. { there  on t ha t}  ' t e n t a t i V e t  
d) I couldn' t  agree more. 'd i rect :  strong'  
e) I ' m  wi th  you {on that there} finformal '  
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a)  This is an idiomatic expression of agreement which could be 
c lass i f ied  a s  an idiomatic performative with o r  without anaphoric 
reference to  the referent.  It is a member of the category 'Equal' and 
a sub-class that  ranked s i x  out of seven in frequency of occurrence. 
b) Another idiomatic expression but without spec i f ic  reference t o  
the referent  t h i s  may be an idiomatic token but it w i l l  be counted here 
a s  an 'Equal,' an idiomatic performative because i ts  force is stronger 
than tha t  of a token. 
c )  A 'scaled-down' expl ic i t  performative with a scaled down degree 
of certainty.  i.e., speaker coiimitment. This type occurred twice in 
the data ranking fourth out of six sub-categories of scaled down. 
d) An upgraded expl ic i t  performative with an in t ens i f i e r ,  t h i s  ranked 
fourth out of f i ve  sub-categories of upgrades. 
e) Another idiomatic expression of agreement with o r  without anaphoric 
reference t o  the referent.  
Three of the f ive  forms occurred a s  idiomatic expressions of 
agreement which may be acquired and stored as  lex ica l  items. The data 
in this study did not contain the idioms presented here. This does not 
mean that  they don't occur, only tha t  they didn ' t  occur once out of 
136 occurrences of agreement in conversation among native soakers. The 
expl ic i t  perfornative verb, agree, occurred more frequently. Is it 
necessary for  ESLIEFL learners t o  learn formulas which do not occur 
with more frequency? Even the sub-category in which they belong is 
infrequently employed. Before memorization of such forms perhaps it 
would have been more appropriate in terms of frequency, poli teness,  and 
ease of learnabi l i ty ,  fo r  the learner to  have been presented with 
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'd i rect  repet i t ion '  of the pr ior  speaker's Opine; and 'V of Supposition 
and/or e l l i p s i s , '  e-g. ,  ' I  think so too, '  'So do I.' 
Both the 'scaled down' and 'upgraded' expressions occur re la t ive ly  
infrequently In the native speaker data. The addition of an in t ens i f i e r  
o r  an upgraded t e rn  of evaluation, e.g., 'good' t o  'be t te r , '  would have 
been more useful a s  forms of upgrades while the use of a more moderate 
term of evaluation, e.g., 'worse' t o  'bad,' or  decreasing the degree of 
cer ta in ty ,  e.g., 'probably' t o  'possibly, '  would be more frequently 
appropriate a s  scaled down forms. 
A s  both 'Equals,' and 'upgrades,' tokens alone, e -g . ,  'yes' or  
'yeah,' o r  in conjunction with other expressions a r e  the  most frequent 
types of expression of agreement and occur In a l l  the types of 
s i tua t ions  collected In the data,  but they a r e  not found in t h i s  
textbook. 
Expressions of D i s a ~ e m e n t :  
a )  Do you rea l ly  think so? 
b) I wouldn't go along with you {there on tha t}  
c) I ' m  not rea l ly  sure i f  I would. 
agree 
g o  along 
On that> ' tentat ive1 1 trith you {there 
d) I wouldn't agree. 'd i rect '  
e )  I can' t  accept that .  'direct:strongl 
f) You can't be serious, 'very strong:Informal1 
mus t  be joking 
a) In the  data for  t h i s  study this expression would not have been 
counted a s  an expression of disagreement. It would have been considered 
a confirmation, o r  opinion 'check' perhaps a s  a 'pre-sequence' (cf .  
p.  43. 
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b) This wouid have been counted a s  an 'Opposite' sub-categorized a s  
an expl ic i t  negative without accouuting, number three out of four in r a t e  
of frequency. 
c )  An opposite sub-categorized a s  an exp l i c i t  negative plus an 
uncertainty marker, t h i s  has the same r a t e  of frequency a s  b) although 
the addit ion of the  uncertainty marker makes it l e s s  d i r ec t  and more 
pol i te .  
d) This belongs t o  a subcategory of 'Opposite' which didn't occur 
in the data ,  i . e . ,  an expl ic i t  negative performative plus uncertainty 
marker, without accounting. It has more force  than any form found 
occurring in the  strongest adversity re la t ionships  among strangers. 
e )  This would be an 'Opposite' which would occur a s  an expl ic i t  
negative without accounting, number three  out of four in frequency. 
f )  This is a d i r ec t  challenge t o  the speaker which t h i s  t ex t  suggests 
would be appropriate fo r  use ammg friends. This goes counter t o  the  
ten ta t ive  findings discussed on p. 121 above. 
None of these expressions occurred i n  the  data although three of 
them belong to  sub-categories which did occur in the data with very low 
frequency . 
So forms of the category 'Qualif ied'  appeared a t  a l l .  Those a r e  
the mst p o l i t e  f o r m  being a s o r t  of solution t o  the  preferred vs. 
dispreferred dilemma facing a hearer who does not want t o  disagree 
but who vants t o  express a di f ferent  assessment.' 
A l l  of the  forms which were presented were 'Opposites' and were 
qui te  d i rec t  expressions. Are forms t h a t  occur ra ther  infrequently, 
a r e  d i rec t  and therefore not po l i t e  f o m s  which could be appropriately 
used in a var ie ty  of s i tuat ions? Not according to  the  findings of t h i s  
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study. Ewes t h i s  t ex t  present the  speech ac t  a s  it nonually occurs 
in conversation among nat ive  speakers? No, not according to  the  
, 
f indings here. 
Watcyn-Jones, P. 1979. Impact. Penguin. This t e x t  explains its 
aims a s  giving "intermediate and advanced students thorough and meaningful 
pract ice  in the  language they w i l l  need t o  master in order t o  be able  
t o  perfonn b p o r t a n t  l i ngu i s t i c  functions" GTatcyn-Joces 1979:ll). Each 
unit begins with a specia l ly  wri t ten dialog containing many examples 
of the  re la ted  functions t o  be covered in the uni t .  This is followed 
by a sect ion in which "the function is presented and the  appropriate 
language needed t o  perform it introduced, c lea r ly  set out i n  subs t i tu t ion  
tables" (Uatcyn-Jones 1979:lZ). The introduction indicates  t h a t  "the 
teacher reads the  description of the function t o  be taught and explains 
it to  the  student" (Watcyn-Jones 1979:13). The description of the  
function agreement/disagreement is in four parts:  1) 'How t o  agree 
strongly with a person,' 2) 'How t o  half-agree with an opinion,' 3) 'How 
to  disagree po l i t e ly  with an opinion,' 4 )  'How t o  disagree strongly 
with an opinion.' Each par t  is followed by a char t  l i s t i n g  several  
expressions which are examples of the  description.  This then is 
followed by pair-practice. The description above i s  the so le  and t o t a l  
description/explanation of the  function i n h  book fo r  both teachers 
and students. Apparently there is an underlying assumption :hat t h i s  
speech ac t  has the same def ini t ion,  constra ints  on usage, and fac tors  
of poli teness a f fec t ing  its production and reception, across a l l  cultures.  
%re research is needed t o  ver i fy  such an assumption. 
Advanced Speaking Sk i l l s  gives def ini t ions  of a t t i t udes  expressed 
by cer ta in  f o r m ,  and at  least claims t o  be teaching appropriate language 
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based on what appears t o  be the authors' in tui t ion.  Inpact makes no 
such claim and the author 's  in tu i t ion  seems to  be directed towards 
l i s t i n g  a s  many forms of agreementldisagreement a s  possible. 
Under 'How to  agree strongly' the following expressions a r e  
presented. 
a )  So do I. 
b) I (quite) agree. 
c )  I en t i r e ly  agree with you. 
d) they cer ta inly should 
yes e )  they should, shouldn't they? 
f )  you're qui te  r ight .  
g) that's jus t  how I see it. 
h) that's exactly ny opinion. 
i )  that's how I fee l .  
j )  exactly! 
The use of a token is presented and a ,  b (without i n t ens i f i e r ) ,  g and i 
a re  a l l  'Equals.' a and i a r e  members of the most frequently occurring 
sub-category of 'Quals' while 'b' and 'g'  are  members of a low- 
frequency and d i rec t  sub-category. b (with in tens i f ie r ) .  Being 'Equals,' 
a l l  of them a re  pol i te .  c ,  d ,  f ,  h, and j a r e  a l l  'upgraded.' b ,  c ,  
and f are  members of infrequently occurzbg categories while d, h ,  and j 
are d e r s  of a frequent sub-category. There was only one example of 
'scaled-down,' i.e., 'e '  but this is problematic in that without the 
pr ior  *ine i t ' s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  bow how the agreeing speaker means h i s  
utterance. Examples a ,  b ,  and i occurred specif ical ly  b the data,  once 
each. 
Examples of 'How t o  half-agree with an Opinion,' are: 
a )  Well, yes 
b) Yes, I agree 
c )  Yes, perhaps 
d) Yes, in a way 
e)  l%m, possibly but ( i t  would be a very 
f )  Yes, I agree to  a point d i f f i c u l t  thing to do). 
g) Yes, I suppose so 
h) Y e s ,  I dare say you're r i gh t  
A l l  of these belong t o  the category of disagreement 'Qualify, '  
i - e . ,  'Agree But Disagree.' c ,  d, e ,  f ,  g, and h a r e  a l l  examples of 
the most frequently occurring sub-category while a and b occur l e s s  
frequently. None of the expressions occurred i n  my data. 
Under 'How t o  disagree po l i te ly  uf th  an opinion' are: 
a )  I ' m  not so sure real ly .  
b) Do you think so? 
c)  Well, it depends. 
d) I'm not so certain.  
e )  Well, I don't know. 
f )  W e l l ,  I'm not so sure about t h a t .  
g) Mum, I'm not rea l ly  sure you're r ight .  
h) No, I don't think so rea l ly .  
When these types of expressions occurred i n  the data,  they were 
usually followed by type of accounting, a s  an explanation, reason 
or  cause of the disagreement. As presented here they would a l l  belong 
t o  a middle frequency sub-category of '@posite. '  b is again an 
exception a s  noted above. 

decide how t o  r ea l i ze  an a t t i t ude  outside the meagre number of examples 
presented in the tex t .  Impact is be t t e r  in p re sen tkg  more examples 
and witbin the context of a model conversation but there i s  no concern 
given t o  spsaker a t t i tudes .  
The introductory model dialog/conversation i n  both t ex t s  i s  a 
specially writ ten one exp l i c i t l y  containing the expressions to  be taught. 
There a r e  no examples of the occurrence of t h i s  speech ac t  a s  It appears 
in r e a l  normal native-speaker interaction.  Impact is a b i t  be t t e r  in 
t h a t  the w d e l  conversation is longer. 
Both texts present example expressions a s  lists in a char t ,  i .e.,  
phrase-book fashion, a s  lex ica l  Items t o  be memorized through practice 
so tha t  they can be plugged verbatim into the learner ' s  speech whenever 
he so desires. The speech ac t  agreementldisagreement is presented a s  
being realized mostly by marked formulaic expressions ra ther  than a s  
second speaker's concept re la ted t o  the p r i m  speaker's assessment of a 
referent.  
The research carried out b t h i s  study was for  the  purpose of 
formulating a description of w h a t  const i tutes  agreement/disagreement and 
of discwering the ru les  of speaking within which It operates In  native 
speaicer conversation. The findings were then applied t o  two conversation 
oriented notional functional EL/= textbooks to  determine the degree 
to which the presentation of t h i s  speech act correlated with i ts  
appearance in native speaker conversation. The r e su l t s  of these 
comparisons show tha t  the native speaker in tu i t ion  of the wri ters  of these 
two textbooks does not accurately r e f l ec t  what native speakers 
actual ly  say in expressing agreement and disagreement. Perhaps textbook 
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writers should be more careful about making claims that their texts 
are teaching authentic language ua t i l  they can base their materials on 
more empirical research iato what authentic laaguage really is. 
Many textbooks do not explicitly present this speech act as an 
item to be acquired by the learners. 
'Iu this study, tentativeness was considered as a manifestation 
of politeness because it expresses a lowered degree of commitment on the 
part of the speaker, thus softening the assertive force of the 
proposition. 
Lauguitge use is one of the prime manifestations of politeness 
and it should not be assumed that learners from other cultures are 
aware of their own culture's rules of politeness and ways of manifesting 
them much less that they be aware of those of another culture. Pragmatics 
is a part of linguistics. It is the opinion of this researcher that 
even though rules of politeness are universal many students are not 
explicitly aware of them and that reminding them of these rules would 
make them more sociolinguistically aware of the world. 
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APPENDIX I 
Chart 1 
Breakdown and Comparison of Data Sources 
Group 1. 7 telephone conversations with the same 2 interlocutorn who are very good friends. 
Situation Tel Te 1 Te 1 Tel Te 1 Tel Te 1 
Event C C C C C C C 
Location H-H 11-11 11-H H-ll H-H H-ll H-11 
No. of Interlocutors 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Sex A-F.0-H A-F.B-tl A-F.8-H A-F.B-M A-F.0-M A-F.B-M A=F.B=M 
Roles 
Ages A-28.B-33 A-28.8-33 A-28.B-33 A-28.8-33 A-28.B-33 A-28.0-33 A-28.B-33 
Relationship F F F F F F F 
Statue A-R A 5  0 A-B A-B A-8 A-B A-B 
Full Tra08cription Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Method RT RT RT RT RT RT RT TOTALS 
No. of Minutes 45-50 135-145 40-45 5-10 4-8 5-10 20-25 254-293 
Opines 45 129 21 1 3 6 20 225 
Agree 10 13 3 0 0 1 3 30 
Disagree 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 8 
- 
Frequency Ration: 
AID to Opines: 0.1688 
Agreement to Opines: 0.1333 
Oiaaereement to Opines: 0.0355 
APPENDIX I 
Chart 1. (Continued) Breakdown and Comparison of Data Sources 
Group 2. 12 conversations o r  segments of longer conversations a l l  among the same 4 interlocutors  who are 
roomaten i n  the ir  kitclien. 
Si tuat ion 
Event 
Location 
No. of Interlocutors  
Sex 
Roles 
Age 
Relationship 
Status  
Full Transcription 
Method 
No. of  Minutes 
148i1)es 
Agree 
llisaaree 
F-Q 
c 
H 
4 
A=M.B-F 
C-F.0-M 
25-35 
v 
A-B-C-D 
Y 
R 
10-15 
22 
4 
0 
F-F 
c 
I1 
4 
F-F 
c 
H 
4 
F-F 
c 
I1 
4 
F-F F-F F-F F-F 
c c c c 
11 I1 11 H 
4 4 4 4 
F-F 
c 
H 
6 
F-F 
c 
11 
4 
frequency Ratiue: 
AID t o  Opines 0.1769 
Agreement t o  Opines: 0.1316 
Diaa~retimenl to Opines: 0.0452 
APPENDIX I 
Chart 1. (Contimicd) Breakdown and Comparison of Data Sources 
Group 3. 11 discussions,  r epor t s  and conversations i n  an o f f i c e  among d i f f e r e n t  i n t e r l o c u t o r s  about 
d i f f e r e n t  aspec t s  of business. 
C15 C16 C17 C18 C19 C20 
Si tuat iot i  Q-F F-k' F-F F- F F-F F-F 
Event 0 R D D D C 
locat ion 0 tin 0 0 0 R 
Ho. of In te r locu tors  2 1 3 3 2 4 
sex 
Roles 
Relationslhip 
S t a t u s  
Ful l  Transcription 
Method 
No. of Minutes 
Opines 
Agree 
Disagree 
A-M.0-M 
A-questioner 
8- infor ina~t  
A-40-50 
B-40-50 
BC 
A-B 
Y 
R 
20-25 
47 
3 
0 
A-M 
Reporter 
35-45 
BC 
ti 
R 
10-15 
0 
0 
0 
A-M 
B-Q.c-H 
ASC-reporter 
Bques t ioner  
A-30-40 
0-30-40 
c-35-45 
BC 
A-B-C 
Y 
R 
20-25 
18 
3 
0 
A-M 
B-M.C-M 
A-35-45 
B-30-40 
c-35-45 
BC 
A-aB-C 
Y 
R 
25-30 
36 
0 
I 
A-coap. rep.  
U-labor expert  
A-40-50 
B-40-50 
BC 
A-B 
Y 
R 
15-20 
38 
0 
0 
A-M .B-H 
C-M ,D=H 
35-45 
BC 
A=B=C=D 
Y 
R 
15-20 
39 
3 
I 
Frequency Ratios: 
A I D  t o  Opines: 0.0511 
A reemant t o  Opines: 0.0447 
faagreement  t o  Opines: 0.0063 
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APPENCIX I 
ntlnued) Breakdown and Corn] in of nal :a Sources 
Group 5. 4 service encounters between strangers, 3 in stores and I in the post office. 
Situation 
Event 
Incation 
No. of Interlocutors 
sex 
Roles 
Ages 
Relationship 
stat"- 
Full Transcription 
Mctliod 
No. of Minutes 
Opines 
Agree 
Disagree 
F-F 
SE 
bookstore 
order 
desk 
2 
A-F,B-F 
A-27 
6-55 
s 
A-B 
Y 
R 
30-35 
6 
2 
0 
F-F 
SE 
post 
off ice 
2 
A-F .B-F 
A-customer 
A-30 
B-40 
s 
A-B 
Y 
R 
5-10 
2 
0 
0 
F- F 
SE 
jewelry 
store 
2 
A-F.6-F 
A-sales 
B-customer 
A-45 
B-30 
s 
A z B  
Y 
R 
60-65 
22 
5 
2 
P-F 
SE 
shoe 
store 
2 
A-U. B-F 
A-aalee 
B-cuetomer 
A-25 
0-30 
s 
A 2 6  
Y 
R TOTALS 
50-55 145-165 
18 48 
6 13 
2 4 
Frequency Ratios: AID to Opines: 0.3541 
Agreement to Opines: 0.2708 
Disagreement to Opines: 0.0833 
APPENDIX 1 
Chart 1. (Continued) Breakdown and Comparison of Data Sources 
Group 6. 1 discussion interview recorded from a TV 
program. The 6 in te r locu tors  here acquaintances ' 
but expressed d i f f e r i n g  views so It wsa counted 
aa an adversi ty  re la t ionsh ip .  
S i tua t ion  
Event 
Location 
N o  of  In te r locu tors  
Sex 
Roles 
ARCS 
Relationship 
S ta tus  
F u l l  Transcr ipt ion 
Method 
No. of Minutes 
Opinee 
Agree 
Disagree 
F-F 
D-I 
TV s tud io  
6 
A,B,C,D,E,F-M 
D&F=liost/interviewer 
A.B.C.D=guests 
45-70 
AR 
A-B-C-D=F.=F 
Y 
RTV 
30 
114 
I 
3 
Frequency Ratios: A I D  t o  Opine: 0.035 
Agreement t o  Opine: 0.008 
Disagreement t o  Opine: 0.026 
APPENDIX I 
Chart 1. (Continued) Breakdown and Comparison of Data Sources 
Group 7 .  5 conversat ions  recorded from a rad io  t a l k  show. The host  was t h e  same i n  a l l  S. 
but  t h e  gues t s  who c a l l e d  i n  were a l l  d i f f e r e n t .  The r e l a t i o n s h i p  l a  clafisified 
a s  d e f i n i t e l y  advers i ty ,  except C13 which displayed no man i fes t a t ions  of advers i ty .  
C10 Cl l C12 C13 C14 
S i t u a t i o n  Te 1 Tel  Te l  Te 1 Tel  
Event D U D D D 
r ad io  r a d i o  r a d i o  r ad io  r ad io  
t a l k  show t a l k  show t a l k  sliow t a l k  show t a l k  show 
Locution RS-11 RS-I1 RS-H RS-I1 RS-H 
No. of I n t e r l o c u t o r s  2 2 2 2 2 
Sex AaH.6-F A-M.B-M A-I4,B-M A^M.B=M A-M.8-M 
Roles A-host A-host A-lioat A-ho~t  A-host 
1- ca l l e r  B-calleK B-caller B-caller 6 -ca l l e r  
Ages A-40-50 A-40-45 A-40-45 A-40-45 A-40-45 
6-30-40 6-35-45 0-20-30 B-30-40 B-60-70 
Bola l lo i l~ l i ip  AR AR AR S AR 
S t a t u s  A , B  A z B  A > B A-B A L B  
F u l l  T ransc r ip t ion  K Y Y Y K 
Method RR RR RE RR ER TOTAI S 
Ho. of Minutes 10-15 20-25 10-15 10-15 15-20 65-90 
Opines 4 20 6 1 1 3  44 
Agree 0 1 0 0 4 5 
Disagree 1 2 2 0 5 10 
Frequency Ratios: A I D  t o  Opines: 0.3409 Disagreement t o  Opines: 0.227 
Agreement t o  Opines; 0.1136 
= = = = = = = = = - = = = = = = =  
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Table 4 
Breakdown and Comparison of Data Sources (Explanations) 
Fxplanation of Abbreviations 
Situation: F-F = Face t o  Face, Tel = Telephone 
Event: SE = Service Encounter, C = Conversation, R = Report, 
M = Meeting, D = Discussion, D I  - Discussion Interview 
Location: E - Ecine. S = School, R = Restaurant, 0 = Office, 
RS = Radio Studio, P = Public 
Relationship: F = Friends, S = Strangers, A = Acquaintances, 
AX = Adversary b l e s ,  BC = Business Colleagues, 
PC = Professional Colleagues, F = Family 
Ful l  Transcription: Y = Yes, N = No (select%ons were extracted) 
Method of Collection: R = Recording, RT = Recorded Telephone, 
WN = Written Note, Rl'V = Recorded from 73'. RR = Recorded from Radio 
Definitions of Terms 
Conversation: "Any s t re tch  of t a l k  which involves two or  more speakers 
and in which what is said i s  more or  less unprepared, and not 
over t ly  predetermined in terms of topic  o r  procedtre" 
Report: An account presented i n  a f0-1 and organized form usually 
by one person without any interact ion with any other in ter locutors .  
Meeting: A formal gathering of two or  more people fo r  the  express 
purpose of coming t o  some jo in t  understanding about an overtly 
predetermined topic  by means of an organized set of procedures. 

APPENDIX I 
Table 
Frequency Ratios  
Agreement t o  Opines Disagreement t o  Opines 
Group 5 (Strangers  -27 .23 (Adversity Roles Group 7 
Service Encounters) Strangers)  
Group 4 (Acquaintances-- -14 .08 (Strangers  
 el.) Service Encounters) Group 5 
Group 1 (Friends)  -13 -05  (Friends)  Group 2 
Group 2 (Friends) -13 -05 (Profess ional  Group 8 
Colleagues) 
Group 3 (Business - 0 4  -04 (Friends) 
Calleagues) 
Group 1 
Group 8 (Profess ional  - 0 2  .03 (Adversity Roles-- Group 6 
Colleagues) Acquaintances) 
Group 6 (Adversity Roles-- -01 -01 (Business Group 3 
Acquaintances) Colleagues) 
Group 7 (Adversity Roles-- -01 -00 (Acquaintances-- Group 4 
Strangera)  Tel . )  
APPENDIX I 
Table 6  
'Equal' (80) 
1)  Token only (34) 
as in te r rup t ion  (9) 
2  - G2 
7  - G8 
without in te r rup t ion  (25) 
12 - GI 1  --G4 
3  - G2 6 - G5 
1  - G3 1  - G8 
1  - G9 
2) V OF p up position andlor 
e l l i p s i s  (15) 
2 - G I  I - G 5  
8 - G 2  1 - G 7  
1 - G 4  2 - G 9  
3) Direct  r e p e t i t i o n  (14) 
4 - G I  1 - G 5  
3  - (2 3  - G8 
1 - G 3  2 - 0 9  
4 )  Rephrasing (6) 
2 - G I  1 - G 7  
I - G 4  2 - G 8  
5)  Interrupt ion and 
f i n i ~ l t i n g  ( 5 )  
1  - G I ,  1  - c 3 , 3  - G 8  
6) Ilepetitiou of asnessmemt by 
e x p l i c i t  performative (4)  
2  - GI 
Upgraded (38) 
l a )  Added i n t e n s i f i e r  
(not t o  Fact) (9) 
2  - 6 1  1  - G7 
3 - G 2  1 - G 9  
2  - G3 
l b )  Token plus  (9) 
a)  plus ' r i g h t '  (3) 
( t o  f a c t )  
1  -G2,  1 - c 5 ,  1  -G8 
b) p lus  support (3) 
( t o  Fact) 
1  - G3, 1 - G3, 1  - c9  
c) plus  upgradins ( 3 )  
(not f a c t )  
1  - G I ,  1  -G2,  1  -G7 
2) r a i e l n g  degree of c e r t a i n t y  
(not t o  f a c t )  (7) 
1 - G I  1 - G 8  
3 - G 2  2 - G 9  
3a) V of s u ~ ~ o s i t i ~ n  with 
Scaled-down (19) 
1 )  tbre moderate term of 
evaluat ion (7) 
1  - G4 
1  - G5 
4  = c9  
2) D e c r e a s i n ~  degree of c e r t a i n t y  (4) 
2  - GI 
I  - G5 
1  - G8 
3) red i rec t ion  of pos i t ive  
evaluat ion (3)  
1  = G I ,  2  - G 5  
4a) removal of i n t e n ~ i f i c r  (2) 
1  -G3,  1  -G4 
4b) e x p l i c i t  performative witla 
scaled d o w  de8ree of . 
c e r t a i n t y  (2) 
2  = G2 
5)  mre modarate i n t e n s i f i e r  ( I )  
1  - G2 
- upgrad& (4)  
3  - G3, I  - G8 
3b) Stronger term of evaluat ion 
(not t o  a f a c t )  (4) 
1  - c 9 ,  3  - c 9  
4) Expl ic i t  perfornat ive with 
i n t e n e i f i e r  (3) 
1  - G I ,  1  -G3,  1 - c 9  
5) 1'0 a Fact without uncertainty 
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Table 7 
Transcript ion Symbols 
speaker A w a s  interrupted by speaker B and stopped 
speaking while A was speaking. 
speaker B interrupted speaker A ' s  speech without 
a turn. 
between utterances with no time gap (no pause 
between the  end of one utterance and the  beginning 
of the  next) (0) 
s t ressed word o r  utterance is underlined (0) 
very s l i gh t  pause (0) 
pause longer than - 1  
discourse not transcribed 
unclear reading (words on tape a r e  incomprehensible) 
point of self-interruptionlrepair ( 0 )  
lengthened sy l lab le  (each : = one "beat") (0) 
period a t  end of sentences (L&E) 
exclamation mark following exclamatory utterances (0) 
coma shows f a l l i n g  intonation that does not aim 
towards the  lowest p i tch  leve l ,  but l w e l s  off o r  
rises s l i gh t ly  (as  in counting 1, 2 ,  3, e tc . )  (L&F) 
question mark shows a syntactic question only, but 
in e l l i p t i c a l  fragments o r  declarative f o m s  it 
marks r i s ing  intonation (L&F) 
whisper or  sa id  in a very low voice a s  when the  
speaker is speaking to himlherself (0) 
laughter heard a s  audible in-breath (0) 
audible in-breath (0) 
Table 7. (Continued) Transcription Symbols 
h audible out-breath (0) 
N.B. The l e t t e r s  in brackets a f t e r  the explanation of the  symbol 
indicates  the  i n i t i a l  of the source. 
Labov, W. and Fanshall. 1977. Therapeutic Discourse. Xew York: 
Academic Press. 40-43. 
Ochs, E. 1979. "Transcription a s  theory." Ochs & Schieffe l in  
(eds.). Develoumental Pragmatics. New York: Academic 
Press. 43-72. 
Schmidt, R. 1982. Private comersation.  
NUMBEREXG SYSTEM 
The numbering within the conversations has been done according to  
the  speaker. Each consecutive speaker change has been given a 
consecutive number, but if the speaker appears t o  be only momentarily 
interrupted by another speaker and goes on continuing to  develop the  
same t r a i n  of thought a f t e r  the  interrupt ion,  the  par t  before the  
interrupt ion is given a nwnber and the  l e t t e r  'a , '  e.g., la .  The par t  
a f t e r  the  interruption is labeled with the  same number but a s  'b,' e.g., 
lb. A l s o ,  when the  end of a page in te r rup ts  a speaker, the  f i r s t  par t  
is labeled 'a , '  and the par t  on the  following page is labeled 'b.r 
Cbnventional English orthography is used throughout. The 
phonological aspects of normal native-speaker spoken discourse such a s  
' b d  o f '  d ' k i n d a , '  have been l e f t  out of the  writ ten t ranscr ipt ion 
except where they a r e  unusually obvious in the tapes. 
Intonation marking has been supplied where the  interpreta t ion of 
the utterance m y  depend on the  intonation. 
PAUSES 
(pause) = pause of some duration while some intervening action 
takes par t  on the par t  of one or  both of the  interlocutors.  
APPENDIX I 
Table 8 
Fkplanation of the F'resentation of the Examples of 
Agreement/Disagreement Taken from the Conversational Data 
Model 
-
5 Topic I s  TV shows. 
c1:53* 54 
D: Freeman Reports is good. 
C: It's good. 
The number t o  the extreme l e f t  is the Example Number (5). Some 
faformation about the context/situation follows the Example Number i f  
such information is needed for comprehension of the utterances (Topic 
is TV showa). Belw the contextual information the number or l e t t e r  
of the conversation is given (Cl), and the l ine  numbers (53, 54) within 
that  conversation. Interlocutors are  specified by l e t t e r .  Chart 1 
glves the ~ c i o l i n g u i s t i c  information for  each Conversation, Table 4 
gives the e6lanat ion of the abbreviations used i n  the chart,  and 
Table 7 gtves the transcription symbols. 
The Examples are  grouped according t o  the Scale of Politeness and 
frequency of occurrence of each sub-category according to the description 
outlined in Chapter IV, p. 103- and Table 6 of the Appendix. 
A s t a r  (*) placed before the l e t t e r  indicating the interlocutor 
specifies wNch turn contains the example of agreementldisagreement . 
I. I W '  
1) Token only  
C1:49, 50. 51 
B: f Yeah but  that is a staged th ing  isn ' t  it. 
*A: Yeah 
D: + It appears t o  be so s taged,  b u t  it is. 
(Topic is TV shows that are ed i t ed . )  
C1:44a, 45, 44b 
B: f That I ' m  s u r e  is r e a l l y  
doctored up But you s e e  C n '  N- 
*C: Yeah Yeah 
B: t h e  n i g h t  that guy was a t  t h e  Washington monuuent 
C 3 l : l l .  12 
D: Well ,maybe i t ' s  a confusion of terms. A person,  I 
th ink ,  can be  s t ingy ,  then a person can b e  t h r i f t y .  
And so  many times those  two terms are-uh confused. 
*C : Yeah 
(Topic is how t o  keep up with a l l  t h e  new developments 
in t h e  world.) 
C30:3, 4 ,  5 
B: Even i n  your o m  f i e l d ,  you h o w ,  you'd have t o  
read 20 o r  30 magazines a month in order  t o  keep up. 
A: J u s t  t o  know w h a t ' s  happening, t h a t ' s  r i g h t  
*B: Yeah 
A: + And e s p e c i a l l y  so  when you consider t h e  whole world. 
5 (Overheard a t  a party.)  
S13 
A: He couldn't get over w h a t  a good buy tha t  was. 
*B: Yeah. 
6 (Topic is s i tua t ions  of adversary relationship.)  
c1:20, 21 
A: o r  in department meetin8s. yeah 
*C : yeah, yeah 
7 (Topic is the  var iab les  wMch a f fec t  discourse. ) 
Cl:lS, 17 
A: Of course it might, yeah, i t  might cross-cut these 
things 'n there might be other  dimensions l ike  sex 
probably plays a r o l e  in 
*c: Y U  
& this 'n age 'n you name it 'n that's why I say 
why these three  rather than some of the  others. 
8 (Topic is TV shows that a r e  edited.) 
Cl: 64. 4s 
B: + That I ' m  sure  is r e a l l y  
doctored up. But you see, C 'n N 
*C: Yeah Yeah 
B: the night  t h a t  guy w a s  a t  the  Washfagton Monument. 
- - 
9 
C1:49, 50 
B: f Yeah but that is a staged thing, i s n ' t  it. 
*A: Yeah 
10 (Topic is ESL textbooks.) 
Cl:57. 58 
A: . . . the kind of s t u f f  they a r e  purporting t o  
teach is usually informal conversation among 
*C: Yeah 
A: equal s t a t u s  peers . . . 
11 (Topic is va r i ab l e s  t h a t  a f f ec t  sa les . )  
C17:10, 11 
B: Yes t h a t ' s  q u i t e  obvious because the  two graphs 
look so s imilar .  
*C: Yes 
12 ('them' r e f e r s  t o  a p a i r  of shoes customer B wants t o  
buy. 
C9:68, 69 
A: Yeah it 's too bad we don't have them. 
*B: Yeah. 
13 (A is  a shoe salesman, B is h i s  customer.) 
C9:26, 27 
A: They look l i k e  they f i t  you f ine .  Lengthwise they're 
a l l  r igh t .  
*B: Yeah. 
14 (Topic is a p a i r  of suede boots customer B is contemplating.) 
C9:50, 51 - 
A: These a r e  suede 'n i f  you're going t o  go t o  Chicago 
you-you'll need t o  spray them with a water protector .  
*B: Oh yeah. 
172 
15 (Topic is the price of a book A wants to buy and send 
by mail.) 
C6:32, 33 
A: Seventeen dollars that's probably hard bound isn't it? 
*Bs Uh huh. 
16 
C6:68, 69 
A: So you're ok In any event. 
*B: Yeah. 
17 
C6:64, 65 
A: Ok (.2) I don't understand what happened between 
seven o'clock and eight thirty that would make 
not occur. 
*B: Yeah 
18 (Topic is the fact that B didn't do something he Ã§ai 
he was going to do.) 
C6:36, 37 
A: It's very unusual behavior. 
*B: Yeah. 
19 
CC:46, 47 
A: Next Saturday's the night, though, huh? 
*B: Yeah. 
173 
20 (Topic is A ' s  new boyfriend who seems very nice.)  
CC:40, 41 
A: (LF) So I ' l l  f i nd  out ,  huh? 
*B: Yeah. 
21 (A apologizes f o r  t roubl ing B with her boyfrined problems.) 
CB:214, 215 
A: I ' m  sorry.  It 'll be over soon. 
*%: Yeah, yeah. 
22 (Topic is how t o  make the  best  use of the  huge'awunt of 
information ava i l ab l e '  t o  people.) 
C30:15, 16 
D: You have t o  l ea rn  t o  pick and choose information too. 
*C: Yeah. 
23 (Topic concerns t he  v a s t  amount of information avai lable . )  
B: Even in your own f i e l d ,  you know, you'd have t o  read 
twenty or  t h i r t y  magazines a month i n  order  t o  keep up. 
A: Ju s t  t o  know what's happening, t h a t ' s  r i g h t .  
*D: Yeah. 
24 (Discussion is about a presentat ion B is going t o  make 
. 
i n  a few minutes but he has made no preparations.) 
CF:24, 25 
A: Oh dear! (LF) That should be i n t e r e s t i ng .  - 
*B: Yeah. 
25 (A is ta lk ing  about how wel l  she t r e a t s  her boyfriend but 
how badly he t r e a t s  her . )  
B:52, 53 
A: Nobody's worth tha t .  
*B: , Yeah. 
26 (Topic is A ' s  boyfriend and why she must break up with 
him.> 
B:38, 39 
A: It is t h e  only sensible  thing t o  do Hark. 
Everything else Is stupid. 
*B: Yeah. 
27 
A:7. 8 
B: Oh the  cold is  worse. 
*A: Yeah. 
28 (A has a bad cold and B is describing how he supposes 
she feels .  ) 
A:9, 10 
B: and your head is exploding 
*A: Yeah 
29 (Speaker B t he  customer, is refer r ing  t o  two r ings  worn 
together.) 
. 
C8:63, 64 
B: This is n ice  too with jus t  another one, you know, 
smaller one with rubies 'r something. 
*A: i> Yeah. 
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30 ( In  65, speaker B is r e f e r r i ng  t o  "the two" r ings  
worn together.  
C8:65, 66 
B: Yeah the  two together ' re  r e a l l y  pret ty .  
*A: Yeah. 
3 1 
CB:9, 10 
B: You're going ou t  tonorrow? 
*A: Yeah. 
32 ' 
Cl:75, 76 
D: Depends on whether you want t o  simply c o l l e c t  a b ig  
range of ways of agreeing o r  disagreeing o r  whether 
you want t o  r e l a t e  then t o  those var iables .  
*B: Yeah! 
33 
C34:32, 33 
B: You know, every time the  plane t a x i s  and the  minute 
i t  leaves t he  ground, I think its l i k e  a miracle. 
*A: Yeah. 
. 
34 (Speaker B ca l led  Speaker A t o  request  permission t o  
tape record a discussion.  Speaker A refuses  with an 
Opine. ) 
C5:4. 5 
A: A s  f o r  the  tape recording I don't think i t  may be a 
good idea. 
*B: NO. ( i t ' s  not a good idea) 
V of Supposition andlor e l l i p s i s  
35 (Discussion centering around 'emotions.') 
C28:25, 26 
C: Well, sometimes, you know, you can understand a 
s i tua t ion ,  but ,  uh-h-still be upset by it. 
*B: I th ink  so. 
36 (Topic is the  age chi ldren should start school.) 
C36:9, 10 
A: I th ink  it depends very much on tha t  family's 
s i t u a t i o n  and t h a t  par t icu lar  child.  
*B: Yeah, I think so. 
37 (Conversation is  about f ly ing  in airplanes. D has sa id  
t h a t  he's a f ra id  of f ly ing  and so he takes a sleeping 
p i l l  before take-of f . ) 
C34:30, 31 
D: Oh Gary, but you m i s s  a l l  the  fun. 
*A: Yeah, that's what I think. 
38 
C33:21, 22 
B: I r e a l l y  do. 1-1 think from the  beginning chi ldren 
. 
should have their own room. 
*A: Yeah, I think so too. 
39 
C35:31, 32 
C: Housecleaning! Yeah, I jus t  have to. 
*D: Yeah, yeah, yeah (.) I f e e l  the same way. 
40 (Overheard in a p r i va t e  home B played a record 
e spec i a l l y  f o r  A. ) 
A: Its the  l o v e l i e s t  record I 've  ever heard. 
B: well thank you. 
A: And t he  organ-the organ music came ou t  so beau t i f u l l y  
in it. 
*B: I thought it d id  too. 
41 (Topic is A ' s  breaking up wi th  he r  boyfriend.) 
CB:94, 95 
A: Guess it happens t o  everybody, huh? 
*B: Far a s  I know. A l l  t h e  normal people. Maybe t h e  
prophets are d i f f e r en t .  But as f a r  as t h e  normal 
people are concerned, I th ink t h a t  is so. 
42 (The t op i c  is A , s  bad cold and how she f e e l s . )  
CA:ll, 12 
B: The world i s n ' t  understanding. 
*A: Nope. 
4 3  
C3:26, 27, 28 
A: Boy, have I got some f a t  gekkos. 
B: Oh, t h a t ' s  neat.  
*A: Yeah. i t  is (neat ) .  
44 (Spoken a f t e r  t he  customer has received t h e  r i n g  she  had 
repaired. )  
C8:54, 55 
A: Looks l i k e  a brand new r ing.  
*B: I know, now it does (look new). 
.c is taking f lying lesson 
C34:9, 10. 11, 12a. 13 
D: Everytine I get on a plane my-the palms of my hands 
start t o  perspire. 
A: Oh, I l i k e  flying. 
*C: I do too Gary (speaker D), but 
A: Really Bette? 
C: (.) uh, I took f ly ing  lessons 
myself simply because I w a s  so t e r r i f i ed .  
B: 'Did you rea l ly?  
46 ( ' that '  r e f e r s  t o  waiting f o r  a taxi but none comes.) 
C26:4, 5 
B: Oh, I hate  t o  w a i t  l i k e  that, you know. 
*D: I do too. 
47 
C25:l. 2 
A: I like giving g i f t s  very much on times when I jus t  
f e e l  l i k e  doing it. 
*B: I do too. And I give g i f t s  t o  a l o t  of people 
tha t  way. 
. 
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48 (In 2 speaker B is r e f e r r i ng  t o  a p o l i t i c a l  "system.") 
C14:2, 3 ,  4, 5 ,  6 
B: It would be much b e t t e r  i f  we had a l i t t le  d i f f e r en t  
s y a t m i  1 and-uh ( . ) yes 
! i 
A: ! !Harry Truman's' 'one of my 
f avo r i t e  people 
B: uh huh. Well-uh he was r e a l l y  a 
dynamic person. 
*A: Yes he was. 
49 (Overheard in l i b r a r y  between 2 female students.)  
s22 
A: You look t i r ed .  
*B: You're r i gh t .  I am ( t i r e d ) .  
3)  Direct  r epe t i t i on  
50 
c1:53, 54 
D: Ere- Reports i s  good. 
*C: It's good. 
5 1  (Topic is method of t ranscr ip t ion . )  
A: It's much more d i f f i c u l t  t o  read i t  t h a t  way i f  you 
a r e  going t o  read over speakers-awkward that way, 
you have t o  read over speakers. 
*B: It is s o r t  of awkward, I find.  
52 ('one' r e fe r s  to  one type of discourse.) 
C1:166a, 167a. 166b 
C: I would say jus t  the general 
conversation one f o r  
*B: Yeah, general comersa t  ion 
C: (. ) language teaching might be more useful ,  n 'es t  pas? 
53 (In a previous turn it was opined that a person could be 
stingy and thr i f ty . )  
C31:14, 15 
C: And a person can be poor too. 
W: And poor. 
54 (D had gone t o  a pharmacy t o  get some medicine.) 
C32:4, 5 
B: Didn't he have i t ?  
*D: Yeah, he had it. And it was the  kind of medicine 
I had bought before but-uh apparently now you have 
t o  have a prescription from the doctor t o  buy it. 
55 (B is a customer t rying on shoes in a shoe s to re  and 
A is the salesman.) 
C9:24, 25 
B: These' l l  s t r e t ch ,  won't they. 
*A: Yeah they w i l l  s t r e t ch ,  yeah. (.I You'll have t o  
wear t h e m  a few tines. 
56 (Examining a graph of s a l e s  s t a t i s t i c s . )  
C17:17, 18 
B: It's a very bumpy curve though. i s n ' t  i t ?  
*A: Yes it-it's very bumpy and i t  shows some t rends,  
and t rends that we might hope t o  be ab l e  t o  model 
by reference t o  other  var iab les  a s  ye t  unconsidered. 
57 (Topic is management t ra in ing  courses.) 
C25:14, 15, 16 
B: Do you see  a growth i n  t h a t  area? 
C: No, I don't myself. 
*B: No, I don't  e i t h e r .  
58 (A is breaking up with her boyfriend.) 
CB:160, 161 
A: Oh Mark, it 's goins t o  s top hur t ing i s n ' t  i t ?  
*B: Yeah it 's going t o  stop. It's going t o  s top f o r  
sure that's the  one cer ta in ly .  
59 CA:l7, 18 
B: Oh that sounds r e a l l y  ser ious ,  t h a t ' s  a bad cough. 
*A: Uh. i t 's  a bad cold. 
60 (Topic is A ' s  head cold.)  
CA:18, 19 
k Uh, it 's a bad cold. 
*B: It 's a bad cold,  yes. 
61 (A has a bad, cold. 
CA:5, 6 
B: You sound l i k e  you're s t i l l  dying. 
*A: I am dying. 
182 
62 (Overheard in pr iva te  home.) 
S l l  
A: He should have arr ived by now. The plane was  t o  land 
at 8:50 and it 's now 9:N. 
*B: - should be here then. The p b n e  w i l l  r i ng  any minute. 
63 (Overheard a t  a par ty  after these 2 interlocutors had 
met the  guvernor's vife . )  
S16 
&. She is a n ice  lady::I r e a l l y  l iked  her. 
*B: I l iked  her too. 
Rephrasing 
64 (Topic is the  paper a student wrote f o r  D.) 
C 1 : l l .  12 
D: U s  h y p o t b s i s  was the more disagreement you have, 
the more interrupt ion there would be 
*& 1 As was mine-would 
be mine as -11 (. . .) 
(Implication - A has the same hypothesis a s  the person D 
is refer r ing  to)  
65 (Speaker B is an engineering technician ta lking t o  a host 
on a radio t a l k  show.) 
C11:28, 29 
B: We're get t ing Vietnamese t e c b n i c ~ s .  They're very 
sharp. They've been here th ree  years  'n they how as 
much a s  an engineer that's been i n  the business 
fo r ty  years. 
*A: 1 yeah that's w h a t  I mean vhen I say we have the 
benef i t s  of the great brain drain. 
66 (Topic of conversation is the  research B is doing.) 
CA:58, 59, 60. 6 I  
A: So is the  desocs working good? 
B: Oh the  desocs is j u s t  rushing ou t- i t ' s  pul l ing 
everything out. J u s t  l i k e  a comb. 
A: Far out.  
*B: Yeah. Like taking an enema, you know? Cleans 
everythiqg up. 
67 ("Things" in 270 r e f e r  t o  the  general  s t a t e  of a f f a i r s  
in B ' s  l i f e . )  
CB:270, 271 
A: Things a r e  r e a l l y  good f o r  you now, huh? 
*B: Sure, i t ' s  f a r  out.  C.3) W e l l ,  keep b r igh t ,  huh? 
68 (In 13 'that' r e f e r s  t o  a proposed t r i p  t o  Maui.) 
c3:13, 14 
A: But I ' d  s o r t a  l i k e  t o  see Luci l l e  get  away f o r  a 
couple of days 'n that-that-would be nice .  
*B: Yeah maybe she would ( l i k e  t o  get  away) yeah t h a t  
would be a good idea. 
69 (Topic is t o  use TV f o r  teaching o r  not.)  
Cl:57b, 59 
A: . . . Oh, I ' m  not saying that it w i l l  be, but t h a t  
i t 's  another way in to  t h i s  
'cause maybe we do not want t o  use TV. 
*C: That's what I was saying t o  you ( s p e a b r  B) the  
o ther  day. 
5) Interrupt ion and f inishing 
70 
Cl :  87a. 88, 87b 
D: )1 It should probably be jus t  p i l o t  tes ted ,  j u s t  
col lect ing l i t t l e  preliminary data 
at f i r s t  t o  see what kinds of var iab les  a r e  going 
*B: see what you run into. 
D: t o  have t o  be carefu l ly  recorded. 
71 (Topic is the variables  tha t  a f f e c t  discourse.) 
Cl:l9, 20 
D: . . . I would think would be whether o r  not there w a s  
Ã§ exp l i c i t  adversary re la t ionship  as in-uh::some 
of t h e  TV t t u f f  where they have some of the  people 
on who are exp l i c i t l y  there  t o  present d i f f e ren t  
points  of view 
*A: o r  in department meetings, yeah. 
72 (Topic i s  differences in management s t y l e s  cross- culturally.)  
Cl5:ll, 12 
B: I think tha t  possibly there is less delegation of 
certain matters 
*A: And t h i s  would lead t o  a slowing 
down In the decision making process. 
73 (Topic is what kinds of data a re  best  f o r  a ce r t a in  study.) 
CAsl28, 129 
A: The thing is t h a t  it 's not t h a t  it 's not relevant data ,  
It's just  tha t  it is (. . .)-we almost know in advance 
tha t  i t ' s  sampling d i f fe rent  kinds of discourse hence, 
comparable. 
uh:::(.) 
*B: They're not necessar i ly  comparable. 
74 
Cl:l29a, 130 
B: They're not necessar i ly  
*C not comparable 
6) Expl ic i t  Perfonnative 
75 (A is a lawyer who has been c r i t i c i z e d  f o r  making too 
much money. Taken as se lec t ion  from tape of TV 
discussion program. ) 
S3:l. 2 
B: I f e e l  I am a c r e d i t  t o  my profession. I have given 
indigenes t he  r i g h t  t o  have f r e e  counsel and I have 
given people who were never ab l e  t o  go 
t o  court  
*A: ok, I agree with t h a t ,  I agree with tha t .  
76 (Topic is the  age chi ldren should s t a r t  school.) 
C36:18, 19 
C: I don't th ink they ' re  (children) ready f o r  soc i a l i z ing  
ou ts ide  of the  family, you know, before  t he  age of 
about f i v e  o r  s ix .  
*D: Yeah, I agree with you. 
77 (Topic is recording conversations without the  p a r t i c i p a n t s -  - 
permission.) 
C7:70, 72 
D: l* Whether its publ ic ,  p r iva t e ,  s t a t e  t o  s t a t e ,  t he  law 
varies.  The f a c t  of the  matter is though t h a t  nobody 
is going to  know. 
*A: I agree. 
78 (Conversation is about the age chi ldren should s t a r t  
school. ) 
C36: I7 
*A: Well Bette says t h a t  education &-is repressive 
and I agree. 
7) Token plus support 
79 (Topic concerns the problems involved i n  being an 
'Informed adul t . ' )  
C30:13, 14 
B: But a t  the  same time you f e e l  t h a t  way, you think 
t h a t  as a (. . .) educated adul t ,  you have t o  keep 
up with-with ce r t a in  in te rna t ional  events and a f f a i r s  
o r  else not r e a l l y  be a responsible person. 
*C: Yeah:::yeah you know that- that ' s  it-it's your 
responsibi l i ty  in making decisions about not only 
your ova life, but you know-uh o ther  things,  
contributing in some way and you have t o  be informed 
t o  be able  t o  do tha t .  
80 (Discussion is about keeping up with the  news and information.) 
C30:l. 2 
C: You know, I f e e l  r e a l l y  dumb. Co, there ' s  so  much t h a t  
1 don't know and so much happening and so much t o  read 
tha t  1-1 can't  process a l l  the  information available. 
Do you a l l  f e e l  t he  same way? 
187 
*D: 1-1 know-yeah, I know what you mean-There's so much 
t o  f ind  out  about in so many d i f f e r en t  ways nowadays. 
W e  have te lev is ion ,  we have radio,  we have a l l  s o r t s  
of magazines. 
11. 'Upgraded' 
l a )  Added i n t e n s i f i e r  (not t o  f a c t )  
81 
C14:l. 2a 
A: I think it 's about time we had non-politicians i n  
o f f i c e  from place t o  place. 
*B: Well, it would be much b e t t e r ,  I think.  
82 (Topic is gift- giving habits.  
C25:21, 22 
C: You're ra ther  formal is t ic .  
*D: Very much so. 
83 (The topic  is taking f ly ing  lessons.) 
34:4, 5 
B: Uh-huh. I ' d  l i k e  t o ,  ac tua l ly .  
*A: So would I, very much. 
84 (Topic is A ' s  boyfriend.) 
CB:42, 43 
A: Well, it r e a l l y  hur t s  when somebody-when you spend time 
with somebody, when they're s i ck  and take care  of them 
and-and then you get s ick  taking care  of them and they 
disappear cause they got something b e t t e r  t o  do and 
t e l l  you a-a l i e .  I mean can ' t  you see t h a t  t ha t  
would hurt  anybody? 
*B: Yes I do, I mean t h a t ' s  t e r r i b l e .  That ' s  very unfriendly. 
188 
85 (Discussion is about how t o  dea l  with the  vas t  amunt  of 
information that i s  available.)  
C30:18, 19 
k Yeah, that's a good point though, pickhag and choosing 
information l ike  (. . .) and being able  t o  depend on 
the  sources of your information. 
*B: lkall~! 
86 (Rat f i n k  r e f e r s  t o  A ' s  boyfriend.) 
CB:171, 172 
B: He's a rat. A rat fink. 
*A: He r ea l ly  is. 
87 (Extracted from tape of a party A and B a r e  looking a t  
p ic tures  of furniture.)  
S19 
k Aren't they pret ty .  
*B: They ce r t a in ly  are.  
88 (Conversation is about the  importance of house cleaning.) 
C3.5~36, 37 
A: But I jus t  don't think i t 's  so important. S m t l m e s ,  
maybe. 
*C: Yeah. There's a l o t  more important things t o  do. 
89 
C17:9, 10 
A: I think there are two things t o  note about this- 
uh-uh 
*B: Yen tha t ' s  qu i te  obvious because the 2 graphs 
look so similar. 
lb )  Token plus 
90 (A is recoumending authors.) 
C1:141, 142 
A: Goffman's s tu f f  probably 
*C: Yeah r ight .  
91 (Topic is how t o  make the best  use of the vas t  amonnt of 
information avai lable  to  people.) 
C30:7, 8 
You know now, whereas before our sphere of in t e res t  
w a s  maybe jus t  our couatry o r  our area,  because of 
comunications systems-uh your sphere of in t e re s t  
is the whole world. 
* Yeah, yeah, t ha t ' s  r ight .  
92 (Saleswoman A doesn't want B ' s  r i ng  broken.) 
C8:71,  72 
A: I don't want you t o  have it broken. 
*B: Yeah, r ight .  
93 (Extracted from a tape of a party. A is B ' s  stepmother.) 
s20 
A: 1 think they (poinset t ias)  grow here,  don't they. 
*B: Yeah. There's a gorgeous bush of them jus t  down the 
h i l l .  
94 (Topic is management s t y l e s  across cultures.)  
C15:2, 3 
B: I t b k  they (French companies) do go out of their 
way t o  involve themselves ln-ln-vith t h e i r  employees. 
*A: Yes, I 've noticed speaklug t o  the French employees. 
95 
C1:140, 141 
C: . . . we could s p i t  out names here forever 
*A: Yeah B r m  'n Levenson 
B: Yeah, uh huh 
96 (Topic is A 1 s  bad cold. A supposes she dl1 d i e  a s  a 
r e s u l t  of the bad cold.) 
m 6 9 ,  70 
B: Oh: that (cold) munds bad. 
*A: U~I, I ' m  goma die. And then everybody '11 be sorry. 
97 (Discussion centerlug around g i f  t-giving. 
C25:lS. 16 
D: I l i k e  t o  give g i f t s -  
*B: Yeah, I know you do. 
98 (Topic is the unemplopent insurance system.) 
C14:14a, 15. 14b, 16, 14c 
B: (.) Um huh. Well there a r e  some f a u l t s  
- 
lu it t h e r e l s  some good polnts  in it but  
*A: Oh yeah! 
B: there ' s  some bad f a u l t s  who keeps these Idads of 
*A: always ! 
B: programs golng. The people who a re  i n  government who 
have jobs. 
2) Raising degree of ce r t a in ty  
99 (Conversation is about the  importance of keeping one's  
apartment c lean and neat .)  
C35:21, 22 
B: It (house cleaning) depends on how many othez people 
you a f f ec t .  
*A; Well, o f  course. 
100 
C32:16, 17 
A: Sharon, you t o l d  me recent ly  about somebody who took 
an overdose of vitamin C. People a r e  taking a l o t  
of v i t &  C and he took too much. That could happen 
t o  anybody. Didn't you t e l l  me t h a t ?  
*B: Yeah, it could happen t o  anybody of course. 
101 (Topic is d i s c o u r s  variables.)  
C1:14, 15 
B: Well that may a l so  vary within these (. . .) 
*A: of course it might 
yeah i t  might cross-cut. . . 
102 (Overheard i n  reception room waiting t o  e n t e r  the  t ea  
ceremony room.) 
S7:5, 6 
A: I suppose i t  w i l l  be crowded. 
*B: Probably. 
103 (Preceding utterance was narrat ion of something t h a t  1 
someone did.) 
C31:23, 24, 25 
D: Oh, now that's stingy. 
C: Yeah wel l '  
*k Yeah that's de f in i t e ly  stingy. 
104 
cc: 34. 35 
A: Maybe w h a t  I r e a l l y  need is a n ice ,  f a the r  h g e  type 
man w h o ' l l  take care of me. (LF) Smbody  who is 
1 
enough older than me t o  be my f a the r ,  who'll t r e a t  1 
me good and buy me things. Maybe tha t ' s  what I need. 
Wouldn't that be n ice  t o  have? I don't suppose that 
I 
would make any sense t o  you but t h a t  would be nice. 
*B: W e l l  (-2) I wouldn't doubt it. 
I 
105 (Overheard at l ib ra ry  reference desk. 2 l ibrar ians.)  1 
s4:1, 2, 3 
A: I ' m  having trouble with t h i s  typewriter again. Could 
I 
- 
you help m e  with i t ?  I 
- .  
- B: I'll t r y ,  but don't know i f  I can, i t 's r e a l l y  a - 
complicated machine. 1 
*k. For sure. You can say tha t  again. - - I 
193 
3a) Verb of supposition with upgrading 
106 (Topic is d i f fe rences  in maaagement s t y l e s  c ros s  cu l tu r a l l y . )  
C15:lO. 11 
A: It seems tha t  everything here eminates from the top. 
*B: Yes, yes-uh 1-1 th ink  that is r i g h t ,  t h i s  would be 
another bas ic  difference.  
107 
C1:129, 130, 131 
B: They're no t  necessar i ly  comparable. 
c : ! not  comparable 
*A: Well, not only t h a t ,  which-uh I think is r i g h t ,  
but a l s o ,  . . . 
108 C20:7, 8 
A: Well, I th ink  i f  1-1 can buy the  idea of more 
productivity.  I consider, with respec t ,  t he  idea of 
a longer working week wishful thinking which w i l l  
never happen. 
*B: I be l ieve  you're r i gh t .  Of course i t 's  going t o  be  
very d i f f i c u l t  t o  avoid t h i s  trend completely. 
( ' t rend'  f o r  shor te r  working hours) 
109 (Topic is management-labor problems. 1 
A: But 1 do th ink  that a very tough stand is  appropriate.  
*B: I think you make a very good point lbb that-uh i n  
negot ia t ions  i t  tends t o  be s o r t  of one way. 
3b) Stronger term of evaluation (mt to a fact) 
110 (Topic is what affects the way people agree and disagree.} 
C1:168c, 171 
A: + ub and-uh status you caa bet your life is goiag to 
affect, you b o w ,  how people do it. 
*B: (.I Yeah, that's going to be crucial. 
111 (Extracted from tape of a party. A - a guest, b = the 
hostess. A is admiring the v%ew from B's apartmat. 
A is B's father.) 
S18 
A: Very pleasaat spot b e .  
*B: Yeah-it's my favorite of all the places I've ever 
lived. 
k Icanseewhy. 
112 (Overheard st drugstore. 2 wmea admiring another 
vommls baby.) 
S17 
A: Isn't he cute. 
*B: 0: :h he: :s adorable. 
113 (Overheard as a coaversatioaal opener outside a church.) 
s2 
- 
- 
A: It's a beautiful day out isn't it? 
- 
- 
*B: Yeah it's just gorgeous. - 
I1 4) Explic i t  performative with i n t e n s i f i e r  
114 (A is ge t t i ng  hur t  by her boyfriend.) 
- 
CB:40, 41 
A: Doesn't m a b  any sense f o r  m e  t o  be  g e t t i n g  hu r t  
over and over and over and over again. 
*B: Well that's cer ta inly- I  agree with that. 
115 C20:Z. 4 
A: I think tha t  we would a l l  agree that-er carrying- 
forcing exporting i ndus t r i e s  t o  ca r ry  a higher cost- 
burden is ce r t a in ly  not the way t o  solve t h i s  problem. 
*B: I agree f u l l y ,  because-& with  the  higher cos t  of 
production, the  products-uh are becoming uncompetitive 
in the  world. 
116 (Overheard within family context. I n  I, B h p l i e s  t h a t  
marrying "him" was a s tupid th ing  t o  do. A agrees  with  
B ' s  evaluation about her ex-husband.) 
S5:l. 2 
B: my i n  t he  world d id  you every marry G. 
*A: I agree en t i r e ly .  
5 )  To a f a c t  without uncertainty 
117 (Conversation is about how clean people keep t h e i r  apartments.) 
C35:19, 20 - 
- 
A: I don't th ink  i t 's  (cleaning the  house) so fmportant - 
i f  you're comfortable. I don't th ink  it makes s o  
- 
much difference.  - -- 
- 
- 
*C: That 's  true.  That's t rue .  
- 
118 (Topic is the unemployment insurance system.) 
C14:14c, 17, 14d 
B: Who k e p s  these kinds of programs going a l l  the time? 
It's the people who a r e  in govermmt who have jobs. 
They want t o  get the i r  pay checks They're 
*A: That's r i g h t  ' 
B: the ones that's rea l ly  put t ing this on. 
111. ' Scaled-dom' 
I )  More underate cerm of evaluation 
119 (herheard  a t  l i b ra ry  between s t u d a t s . )  
s12 
A: I 've been offered a scholarship a t  Columbia. 
B: That's fan tas t ic .  
*A: Im't that good. 
. B: It's marvelow. 
120 (Overheard outside l ibrary  between 2 male students  who 
are onjoylag the view. ) 
S15 
A: Foxy lady. 
*B: Yeah, she's a pre t ty  g i r l .  
121 ( a t r a c t e d  from a tape of a party. The interlocutors a re  
admiring a plant i n  the hostesses home.) 
& Yeah, i s n e t  tt (a plant)  veird. It has s o m e  - a r  
- 
I i t t l e  flowers on it. 
*B: It & unusual. I l i k e  it though. 
122 (A has boyfriend problems.) 
CB:128, 129 
A: I f e e l  l ike such a jerk. I ' m  fucking s i c k  because 
I took care  of him. Do you know w h a t  an i d i o t  t h a t  
makes me f e e l  l i k e ?  
*B: Yeah, it's rough, kid. 
123 ('These" i n  30 r e f e r  t o  a pa i r  of shoes speaker B is 
t ry ing  on. Speaker A is the salesman.) 
C9:30, 31a 
B: I r e a l l y  l i k e  these. These're great .  
*A: Nice yeah. It a l l  depends on the s t y l e  of the  shoe. 
124 
C3:29, 30, 31, 32 
B: How do you l i k e  where you're l i v ing  now? 
A: Oh, I r e a l l y  r e a l l y  l i k e  it! 
B: It's a l o t  b e t t e r  huh. 
*A: Yeah! Well it's too 'cause, you know, i t 's  a 
teacher. 
125 (Overheard a f t e r  Brown had made a speech a t  a conference.) 
Sl 
k G r e a t  speech Brown. 
*B: Really waan'c very good, too b r i e f .  
2) Decreasing degree of ce r t a in ty  - - 
126 (Topic L s  A ' s  boyfriend who t r e a t s  her badly.) 
-- 
CB:25, 26 
B: You know per fec t ly  w e l l  what's going on. Don't you? 
*A: I guess I must. I ought t o  by now. 
127 (Topic is the  cost  of mailing a book.) 
C6:47, 48 
A: Oh God it would be expensive wouldn't it (.2) it's 
hard back. 
*B: (.2) Could be yeah (.) regular mail ok. 
128 (Discussion topic  is var iab les  a f fec t ing  discourse.) 
Cl:ll, 14, 15 
A: The reason I bring it up is, you know, that it might 
be the  case t h a t  ra ther  than d i f fe rent  discourse 
domains o r  types l i k e  t h i s ,  t h e i r  relevant sorts of 
domains could be in terms of s t a t u s  of inter locutors  
like high t o  l o w  o r  equal s t a t u s  vs  low to  high. We 
know it va r i e s  o r  some things vary t h a t  way. 
*B: Well t h a t  may a l s o  vary within these (. . .) 
A: Of course, it 
might yeah. 
129 (B calls A a witch in jest because she can understand him. 
A has a bad cold so she f e e l s  "drained.") 
CA:ll5, 116 
B: (LF) You're a very wise witch. 
*A: Sometimes. Right now I f e e l  l i k e  my powers a r e  
drained. 
3) Redirection of pos i t ive  evaluation 
130 (Topic is a pa i r  of shoes A is trying on.) 
C9:28, 29 
B: Oh these ' re  beaut i ful .  
*A: They f i t  you (. . .) too. 
131 (A saleswoman in a jewelry s t o r e  (A) admires a 
customer's r ing.)  
C8:49, 50, 51 
B: This is (. . .) the  diamond is o ld  
but (.) I remade it 
A: ' Yeah but i t 's set so nice .  
*B: # Yeah, t h i s  is my own design. 
132 (Topic of conversation is A ' s  r e l a t i o n  with  her  boyfriend.) 
CB:92. 93, 94 
A: h I ju s t  don't l i k e  t o  have somebody t h a t  I want 
no t  want me. 
B: Well:::youSre-you're faced with t h a t ,  r i g h t  now. 
*A: Guess it happens t o  everybody, huh? 
4a) Removal of i n t e n s i f i e r  
133 (Topic i s  a new production technique i n  manufacturing.) 
C22:9, 10 
A: This must be very expensive but i f  you syndicate the  
- 
work then you can reduce cos t s  t o  a c e r t a i n  extent .  . 
*B: Yes it is an expensive technique and-uh the  r a t i ona l e  
fo r  syndicating it has got a l o t  t o  do with that-uh 
l i n e  of thought. 
200 
134 (In 15 and 16 ' tha t '  r e fe r s  t o  the s i tua t ion  of A and B 
giving each other the same Christmas present.  A was 
shopping fo r  the same pen t o  give B a s  B gave A, but 
. 
A couldn't f ind tha t  pen.) 
C3:lS. 16 
B: That would have been r e a l l y  surprising. I ' ll be 
darned. 
*A. Oh t h a t  would have been too much. 
Explici t  perfonnative with scaled down degree of ce r t a in ty  
135 (Conversation is about the  bes t  age f o r  a chi ld  t o  s t a r t  
school.) 
C36:12, 13 
C: I think our educational system is very s t ructured and 
very repressive,  you're ju s t  s t a r t i n g  the  process 
a couple of years e a r l i e r  i f  you 
*B: I w e l l  i f  i t 's more of 
the same thing, I agree, I think. 
136 
C32:18, 19 
C: Well I know, but-uh you know, I don't r e a l l y  think you 
- 
should have laws against any kind of drug. I think 
the  choice should be up t o  the Individual. 
- 
. - 
*B: I think maybe I agree with Bette though, I mean, why 
I 
should there be a law against drugs? 
5 )  More moderate i n t e n s i f i e r  
137 
C31:l .  2 ,  3, 4 
C: You bow,  I used t o  have t h i s  boyfriend who w a s  so 
s t i ngy  that he bought me  paper f lowers 'cause they 
wiuld last longer (LF). 
B: Really? 
A: Well, t h a t ' s  a good idea. 
*D: That's p r e t t y  s t ingy.  That ' s  p r e t t y  s t ingy.  
I V .  'Qua l i f i ed '  
I )  Opine But Opine 
138 
C14:13, 14a, 15, 16, 14c. 17, 14d 
A: I'll t e l l  you w h a t  I th ink  t he  problem is 'n you can 
d i sagree  with m e  i f  you want (.I I th ink  t h e  memploy- 
meat insurance makes it too each f o r  people no t  t o  
work. (.I they can make more money on unemployment 
sometimes than they can working on a job 'n i t 's t e r r i b l e .  
B: (.) Urn huh w e l l  there a r e  some f a u l t s  i n  
it. t h e r e ' s  some good po in t s  i n  it bu t  
- 
- - 
A: Oh Yeah 
- 
- 
*B: t h e r e ' s  some bad f a u l t s .  Ubo keeps these kinds of - 
A: always - - 
- 
- 
B: programs going a l l  the time. It's the  people who a r e  - 
4 i n  government who have jobs. They w a n t  t o  ge t  t h e l r  
pay checks They're t he  one ' s  who're 
- 
A: That's r i g h t  
B: r e a l l y  pu t t ing  this on. 
l39 (Top ; b u s  that a r e  ed i te  :d. Another part 
202 
:icipant 
believes a l l  l V  shows a r e  edited. B does not agree. Here 
he compromises and the topic s N f t s . )  
C1:47d, 57d 
*B: People were ca l l ing  in on the spot, you could c a l l  
i n  l i v e  and t a l k  t o  h i s  so, I m e a n ,  there may be 
aspects  edited, but I ' m  sure some of that s tu f f  (.) 
A: :Anyway another i ssue  re a l l  t h i s  . . . 
140 (Discussion topic concerna unemployment.) 
C11:26, 27 
B: Yeah, but where are you going t o  ge t  the sk t l l ed  
people Ira? I 'm an engineering technician 
*A: well now 
wait. Now that's ( .I  another thing. Uh, if you're 
saying that there a ren ' t  enough people with these 
s k i l l s  (.I then you maybe-you might have a point. 
But in general the  reason is t o  encourage more 
people t o  h i r e  regular ap loyees .  
141 (Topic is 'expressing anger.' "It" in 23 r e f e r s  t o  ' the 
feel ing of anger.') 
C28:23, 24 
- -- 
C: Actually that's (breaking dishes) a be t t e r  way of 
coping with it ,  you know, ra ther  than ge t t ing  in to  - - 
- 
- - 
a row with someone. 
*B: Maybe, but it doesn't r ea l ly  solve the problem, i f  
there 's  a problem. 

144 (Topic is TV shows that  a r e  edited.) 
C1:46, 47a 
A: And I ge t  the impression tha t  tha t  is l i v e  a t  the 
time they f i r s t  broadcast it 'cause it 's videoed then 
but I think it's-uh:but I don't think t h a t ' s  it, 
is I t ?  
*B: Well i t  may be i t  to  some extent but t o  the  way 
t h a t  Dick-sure 60 minutes is a carefu l ly  staged thing, 
but I suspect tha t  a l o t  of these C 'n N reports-  
there1s one woman on . . . 
145 (Buying a pa i r  of shoes.) 
C9:64, 65, 66 
A: This is a nice color i f  you have things t o  wear 
with It. 
*E: Well the color would be ok, but t h e  s t y l e  is 
(. , .). I guess f o r  today j u s t  these two then. 
A: Uh huh. Ok. 
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C18:9, 10. 11 
A: I think that's a b i t  pur i s t ,  i s n ' t  i t ?  To suggest 
that 
*C: Well, i t  mlght be but 
A: bearing i n  mind t h a t  it's 
going out wlth a l l  t h i s  other l i t e ra tu re .  
147 (Discussion on nudity expressed i n  art.) 
C29:ll. 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 
C: The nude body is supposed t o  be the  u l t imate  
challenge t o  an a r t i s t .  
D: Well, I, 11 
I 
C: : t o  be a b l e  t o  por t ray 
B: Yeah 
C: + meaningfully 
*B: I think so too, but I, I guess i t  depends on how 
i t 's  done coo. 
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C32:la. 13  
C: Well I know, but-uh you know, 1 don't r e a l l y  th ink 
you ahauld have laws aga ins t  any kind of a drug. I 
th ink  the  choice should be up t o  the  individual.  
*A: Well, I agree with you that the  laws ce r t a in ly  should 
be f r e e r  about dmgs,  but I do f e e l  t h a t  there ' re  
some dmgs  (. . .) that I do think ought t o  be s o r t  
of controlled.  
2) E l l ip ted  forms 
149 (Topic is A ' s  boyfriend who t r e a t s  her badly.) - 
CB:26, 27, 28 
A: He's an inve te ra te  l i a r .  He j u s t  l i e s  and lies man. - 
He just-he can go on a t  g r ea t  lengths.  
B: (LF) You d idn ' t  h o w  tha t ?  
*A: But I guess 1 wasn't accepting it. I d idn ' t  want 
t o  bel ieve it. 1 guess. 
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150 (Topic is TV programs tha t  a r e  edited. The previous 
utterance mentioned the C 'n M program.) 
C1:38, 39, 40 
D: Ã  ˆ They a r e  s t i l l  edited, they've got  to  g e t  i t  down 
t o  exactly the r i g h t  number of minutes. 
*B: ft But you see, I don't know, a l o t  of C 'n K stuff  
they ' l l  j u s t  break up and say w e l l  we're out of time, 
I ' m  sorry and t h a t ' s  it. 
A: ft Maybe tha t ' s  j u s t  t o  cake you think (. . .) 
151 (Topic concerns the problems Involved i n  being an 
' Informed adult. ' ) 
C30:12, 13 
A: But, I think-uh it's physically impossible-uh t o  keep 
up with everything that ' s  going on a l l  the  time. 
And I think in  our own adjustment we've got t o  
realize that-that we j u s t  can't do it. And then we 
work from there somehow. 
*B: But a t  the same time you f e e l  t h a t  way, you think tha t  
a s  a (. . .) educated adul t ,  you have t o  keep up 
with-vlth ce r t a in  In terna t ional  events and a f f a i r s  
- 
o r  else not r e a l l y  be a responsible person. 
152 (Topic is about 'business discourse. ') 
- 
Cl:9, 10 I 
C: (.) Would it-this be representat ive of the s o r t  of 
discourse i n  which they would normally partake? 
I 
I *B: Yeah, but I wasn't thinking of tha t ,  t ha t ' s  not the I 
reason I picked then. 
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153 (In the previous turn,  1, Speaker B, has to ld  about 
someone B knows who w a s  born i n  a communist country, 
became a U.S. c i t i z e n  and Joined the U.S. mi l i t a ry  
service. B asks A i f  i t  is poss ib le  f o r  t h i s  person t o  
r e tu rn  t o  "his communist country and exchange our most 
valuable mi l i t a ry  secrets." 
C10:2, 3, 4, 5 
A: Well, f i r s t  of a l l ,  a s  an en l i s ted  man he could not  
have our most valuable mi l i t a ry  secrets-uh t h a t ' s  
simply not-I mean he- he wouldn't have them. 
*B: Yeah, 1-1 have-I have been 
told  t ha t  he knows c e r t a i n  things t ha t  you and I 
do not read in the  papers. Our-uh force,  you know, 
about a c e r t a i n  s i t u a t i o n  and 1-1 f e a r  because I ' m  
very p a t r i o t i c ,  I've been born in t h i s  country and 
so have my parents and so on and so  on and the  f a c t  
t ha t  he can r e tu rn  t o  h i s  country tha t  is very c lose  
t o  t he  Russians, i t  really-uh shakes me up t h a t  we-uh 
we're t ra in ing  him 'n then when he comes yeah go ahead 
I 
A: ;But-But-But 
I f  he 's  an American c i t i zen ,  he has every t o  serve 
in the U.S. mi l i t a ry .  
B: Right, so. - 
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154 (Topic is FDR's s t r a t eg ie s  during the depression.) 
C14:12. 13 
B: You got to give the devi l  (TOR) h i s  dues now. 
*A: Oh I do. Oh you give them c r e d i t  i n  some areas  and 
take away from other areas,  no question. 
155 (Topic is about doing things tha t  haven't been done before.) 
C27:52, 53, 54 
D: That's been done before. 
*A: Well yeah, msra everytime they do it though it's 
d i f fe rent .  
C: Hot t o  Venus. 
3) Reportative But Opine 
156 @ had t r i e d  to  buy some medicine i n  a pharmacy which he 
had bought there before without a prescription. How, 
he has reported a prescr ipt ion is needed.) 
C32:6, 7, 8, 9, 10 
A: But I think tha t ' s  good (.) because I think of ten  
people depend on (.) medicines too much when they 
could get by without taking s tu f f .  
D: Mom 
*C: Well. I know, but-uh h you know, I don't  r e a l l y  think 
you should have laws against any kind of a drug. I 
think the choice should be up t o  the  individual. And 
i f  a person is r e a l l y  a hypochondriac, i t  doesn't 
- 
make any difference whether you have t o  have a doctor 's  
prescription or  not. 
B: Really? 
C: Sure. 
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157 ( In  10 B bel ieves  recovery s t a r t e d  before W I I .  I n  11 
A disagrees,  he does not believe recovery s t a r t e d  before 
WWII. I n  12 a topic  s h i f t  occurs and i n  13A.) 
C14:lO. 11, 12, 13 
Well we were on a s t a r t  on a recovery before MI. 
Don't you remember? 
Oh, I remember those days very w e l l  'n I don't s ee  
a l o t  of recovery there. 
You got t o  give the  d e v i l  h i s  dues now. 
Oh I do. Oh you g ive  then c r e d i t  i n  some areas  and 
take away from o ther  areas ,  no question, but of 
course-but s ee  I happen t o  be one who does not 
bel ieve In the  Federal government making jobs f o r  
people. 
4) Reportative But Reportative 
158 
C14:14d, 18a, 19, 18b 
I f  he (Reagan) wants t o  l ay  off  anybody or  cu t  down 
anything, l e t  him c u t  down on these  agencies, these 
people who're ge t t ing  s a l a r i e s  up there  i n  Washington. 
)t Ok. I-uh agree and he's ta lked about t h a t  but 
he can ' t  do t h a t  t he  Congress has t o  do t h a t  I-uh 
No No 
agree with you-that the-uh department of energy, I 
know you've done some reading on t h i s  . . . - 
V. 'Different '  
159 (Topic is recovery from the depression in  the 1930's.) 
C14:8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 
B: . . . 'n  he (FDR) got t h i s  country back on i ts  
f ee t ,  but-uh 
*A: now w a i t  a minute John, before you go 
fur ther ,  the thing tha t  got t h i s  country back on its 
f e e t  f inancial ly  'n wery  other way was I W I .  
B: ( -2)  Well we were on a s t a r t  on a recovery before 
W I .  Don't you remember? 
A: Oh, I remember those days very well 'n I don't see  
a l o t  of recovery there. 
B: You got to  give the devi l  h i s  dues now. 
A: Oh I do . . . 
160 (Topic i s  the variables which a f f ec t  discourse.) 
C1:20, 22, 23 
A: . . . or  in department meetings, yeah! 
*D: Well a department 
meeting is s o r t  of i n  between because everybody has 
t o  pretend that i t ' s  not an adversary 
B: 
A: + That was a joke Richard. 
Tf. 'Opposite' 
1 )  - l i c i t  negative plus accounting 
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161 
C20:5, 6 
A: I think organized labor has-uh a l i t t l e  ea s i e r  t a sk  
here . . . because f o r  organized labor its simply a 
matter of reducing working hours . . . 
*B: What w e  need in Europe is longer working working 
hours and more productivi ty,  not  shor ter  working 
hours and more vacations . . . 
162 (A is ta lk ing  about her kindness and understanding in 
t r ea t i ng  her boyfriend who t r e a t s  her t e r r i b ly . )  
CB:182, 183, 184, 185 
A: I kept believing t h a t  i f  I went on with it long 
enough ,that he'd recognize and be-behave in a manner 
consis tent  with t h a t  recognition. What a foo l ,  huh? 
*B: No, no t  a foo l ,  it was a hypothesis. You t r i e d  i t ,  
you paid f o r  it, now i t ' s  your next decision. What's 
your next decision? 
A: I want out. 
B: Well (.I t ha t ' s  it .  
B: I hate  t o  see our money-but-just being thrown from 
*A: Well it i s n ' t .  That's w h a t  I'm 
saying. Whatever we  spend, we  spend with a 
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p u r ~ o s e  In 
B: W e l l l e t ' s  (. . .) 
when we put maney into  rebuilding Beruit we're doing 
it because we f e e l  i t ' s  going to  benefit  the U.S. 
i n  the  long run. 
B: Oh, ok, let 's  see w h a t  (. . .) 'n America has t o  
say about this issue. 
164 (A is t rying t o  decide t o  break up with a "rat-fink" 
boyfriend.) 
CB:lll, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117 
B: That's a l l  r i g h t ,  you're going to  f e e l  be t te r .  
k h If  I just  make the decision and s t i c k  by it 
eventually I ' l l  f e e l  bet ter .  The problem is tha t  I 
keep going back on the decision, r ight?  I mean i s n ' t  
that w h a t  the  problem is, rea l ly?  
*B: No-no. 
A: Don't you think (. . .) 
B: The problem is that  you're not 
finished. 
A: W e l l  what w i l l  f i n i sh  me? 
B: Guly the f i n i sh  l ine .  
165 (This discussion concerns the trade issue between Japan 
and the U.S. A is an expert on Japan and B is a U.S. 
senator. ) 
Dltl, 2 
A: Basically the  bar r ie rs  a r e  dom and the Japanese a r e  
quite wil l ing t o  relax.  
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*B: Well, a s  f a r  a s  the bar r ie r s  being down is concerned, 
that i s  c lear ly  wrong. The bar r ie r s  a r e  s t i l l  very 
very r e a l  and people who t r y  t o  export f r u i t  or  tobacco, 
o r  telecommunications equipment o r  beef o r  lumber t o  
Japan, I think would f ind the  statement that the 
bar r ie r s  a re  do= to  be t o t a l l y  incredible. 
166 (Topic i s  taking f lying lessons.) 
C34:4, 5,  6 ,  7, 8 
B: Uh-huh, I ' d  l i k e  t o  actually: 
A: So would I ,  very much. 
*D: Not me. 
A: Really? 
D: Everytime I get on a plane my-the palms of my hands 
s t a r t  t o  perspire. 
167 (Topic is shoes B is buying from A in  a shoe store.) 
c9:33, 34, 35 
A: You don't want t o  t r y  these on too? 
*B: Xo huh uh. No, I want these. 
A: Ok. 
2a) Antonym or accounting only without exp l ic i t  negative 
. 
168 (Topic is method of transcription.)  
C1:96, 97, 98, 99a 
D: I f  you do it tha t  way Mike, with one person on one 
s ide  and the  other person on the other ,  i t ' s  very hard 
t o  record overlaps. 
*A: # I t ' s  easy t o  record overlaps, t h a t ' s  just-oh 
well-I mean it depends on what d e t a i l  you want on an 
over lap 
D: Presuming you want to  bow exactly where the 
overlap occurs. 
A: + Yeah, there ' re  ways of doing tha t  though a s  well. 
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C26:8, 9, 10, 11 
A: I don't mind waiting so much. 
*B: Really? I 'm- I'm a rea l ly  impatient person when I ' m  
waiting for  people. 
A: R a l l y ,  Sharon? 
B: Yeah. Or waiting for  things l i k e  taxis .  
170 (co'mersation concerns A ' s  boyfriend. 1 
CB;24, 25, 26 
A: Why don't I l i s t e n ?  Why don't I learn? 
*B: Oh well, I think you do. You know perfectly well 
w h a t ' s  going on. Don't you? 
A: I guess I must. I ought t o  by now. He's-He's a l iar .  
171 (Overheard in  a pr ivate  home.) 
S9:ll .  12 
A: Tomorrow it's going t o  rain.  
*B: Oh do you rea l ly  think so? Look a t  the moon, no ring. 
2b) Explicit negative plus uncertainty marker 
172 (A woman tour i s t  has been s i t t i n g  i n  the sun a l l  day next 
t o  a pool. B and C are  her female companions.) 
S6 
A: I f e e l  fa in t .  
B: I would advise tha t  you take a s t i f f  drink of whiskey. 
*C: Oh I wouldn't i f  I were you. 
173 (Overheard in pr ivate  home.) 
S10:16, 17 
C: Don't you think Reagan i s  too old? 
A: (President Reagan i s )  probably seni le .  
*B: Doesn't appear t o  be seni le  yet. 
174 (Overheard in M a l l  a t  Ward Warehouse.) 
S8 
A: Chinese food is so good. 
*B: I don't think so. (Chinese food is good.) 
175 (The topic of conversation is how A's boyfriend t r e a t s  her.)  
CB:248, 249, 250, 251, 252 
A: You know l i k e  a l l  of a sudden h e ' l l  s t a r t  acting rea l ly  
nice and coming over everyday and h e ' l l  t r e a t  me sweet 
and give me things and-and act  l ike  a r e a l  do l l  and I 
believe chat tha t  means something to  him. 
*B: Bullshit ,  bu l l sh i t .  I just  can ' t  believe tha t .  
A: Well tha t ' s  what it f ee l s  l ike.  
B: Look again. 
A: I don't know, t h a t ' s  what i t  f ee l s  l i k e  to  me. 
Zc) Expl ic i t  negative without accouating 
176 
C12:4, 5 ,  6 ,  7, 8 ,  9,  10, 11, 12 
I read my Bible 'n everythiag 'n it says t h a t  everyon 
w i l l  have the  mark of the  (. . .) on t h e i r  head o r  on 
the back of their haad o r  something l i k e  this. 
(.) That's-uh t he  book of Revelations, r i gh t ?  
Right, uh huh. 
Yeah, uh::: Ok, you r e a l l y  believe t h a t ,  uh? 
Yes sir, I do (LF). 
Ok, (LF) I don't .  
In you don't be l ieve  i t ?  
No! ( - 2 )  not at a l l .  
Oh, w h a t  makes you not believe? 
C12:14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 2 1 ,  22 
B: You don't bel ieve the Bible? 
A: Not l i t e r a l l y ,  no of course not. 
a: Well see, the Bible-the Lord wrote the Bible 
*A: I don't 
bel ieve that e i the r .  
B: + You don't be l ieve  in God. 
A: + I didn ' t  say that. 
B: Oh, ok. Well, what it w a s ,  ma was inspired by the 
Lord t o  write the  Bible (.&) 'n the  Bible was the 
word of God so (.) you 'mow, I believe what it says 
is t rue .  
A: Well, f ine .  You're en t i t l ed  to  
believe -uh: :h t h a t ' s  ok. 
B: Yes, uh huh 
178 (Topic is 'house cleaning habits. '1 
C35:23, 24, 25, 26 
D: It (house cleaning) depends on what kind of animal 
you a re ,  you how. It's l i k e  a pig. Living with 
a Pig. 
*C: Oh, it is not Gary! 
E: No Gary. Not rea l ly .  ( I t ' s  not rea l ly  l i k e  l iving 
with a pig.) 
A: Oh Gary! 
179 (A is having a hard time breaking up with her boyfriend.) 
CB:205, 206 
B: Listen,  i s n ' t  that s tuff  what you advocate fo r  your 
pat ients?  So i f  i t ' s  good for  your pat ients  it must 
be good for  you (.) What do you think? O r  don't 
you believe in tha t  st&Â£ 
*A: I don't believe in anything. 
3a) Explicit negative plus uncertainty marker and accounting 
180 (Topic is A ' s  relationship with her boyfriend.) 
CB:88, 89, 30 
A: I t ' s  a drag of a game cause I keep losing. 
*B: Oh I don't how about t h a t  if you kept losing you 
w~uldn ' t  be in it. You'd get r i d  of somebody the f i r s t  
day with no second thought about ic. If you didn't 
wanted out of it. 
A: I think it w a s  jus t  a challenge. 
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C33:21, 23 
B: I rea l ly  do. 1-1 think from the beginning children 
should have the i r  own rooms. 
*C: I don't. I think-uh for  l i k e  a s m a l l  baby, you know, 
u n t i l  you're maybe a t  l ea s t  a year o r  2 years old-uh 
ju s t  the sense of security that develops i n  a child 
in-in the presence of other people. 
182 (Conversation about buying drugs over-the-counter in 
drug stores.  ) 
C32:11, 12, 13 
B: But If you don't how w h a t  it (some drugs) i s  and you 
can go in aud buy anything, don't you think there 
would be some trouble? 
*C: I don't think so. People don't know what they take 
now, even with a doctor's prescription.  
A: Well I agree with you t h a t  (.) the laws cer ta in ly  
should be f r ee r  about drugs. 
3b) Token of disagreement 
183 (Topic is r ing s i ze  i n  a jewelry s tore . )  
C8:12, 13, 14, 15 
A: Too easy (.) you need a t  l ea s t  (.2) half a s i z e  smaller. 
*B: Huh uh. (shaking head) 
A: (. . .) these r ings ' re  ok because betveen six and 
a halÂ (.) 'n seven. A l l  r igh t?  
B: I hope so. Yeah (LF) . 
184 (Topic is r ing s i ze  in a jewelry s tore . )  
C8:9, 10, 11 
A: You want a t  least a half a s i z e  smaller. Too big. 
*B: Huh uh, i t ' s  not too big. 
A: Here, t r y  this .  It's not too big a t  a l l ?  
185 (Topic is A ' s  boyfriend.) 
CB:69, 70, 71, 72 
B: Wait a minute, you're not tha t  stupid,  a r e  y-are 
you trying to  t e l l  m e  you're stupid. Is tha t  w h a t  
you're trying t o  t e l l  me? 
A: h Maybe I am. 
*B: Uh huh. Well I don't buy it. . 
A: I don't hm Mark. I don't-I j u s t  f ind i t  so 
d i f f i c u l t  to  believe t h a t  he can just-he can jus t  
not care about me. 
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